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TO JAPAN, 1936-1941' 


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Copyright by 
Jaraea Henry Hersog 

RELATIVE TO JAPAN, l£j6-19iil 


Janes Henry Heraog 

A* B* * University of North Carolina* 19U6 
K«F«A«« Harvard Univeraity, 1961 

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Ifcgree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
Political Science at Brown University 

June, 1963 

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This thesis by James Henry Hersog is accepted in 
its present form by the Department of Political Science 
as satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree of 
Ttoetor of Philosophy* 


• a • • 

Recommended to the Graduate Council 



Approved by the Graduate Council 



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The role of the United States Navy in Jap&neee-Araerican relations is 
an excellent example of a military branch of one country significantly 
influencing foreign relations with another country. In choosing a 
dissertation topic involving the i nited States Navy in international relatione 
I gravitated to relations in the Pacific area, eventually narrowing the 
subject to a study of the role of the Navy in relations with Japan in the 
decade before I earl Harbor. Once I had begun work at ray first course of 
original material in the Naval History Division, Navy Department, Washington, 
it was apparent that the early 1930 «s offered very little material, while 
the period beginning with 1936 wa« decidedly richer. Consequently, I 
further limited ay field of study to the 1236-12U1 period* 

I consider myself most fortunate in the quality and quantity of 
original documents made available to me. Within the Naval History Division 
I was allowed access to the complete files of the War Plans Division (Op 
16), the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Files, the 
unpublished work of Captain Tracy Kittredge which purportedly was to have 
been a history of the Navy in World War II, the unpublished narrative of 
Admiral Thomas C. Hart and naval orders and documents which were promulgated 
only within the structure of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
The filing system of the Navy in the prewar period left much to be desired 
and cross-referencing was very limited, necessitating a page by page check 
in some folders to insure complete coverage. 

Of equal importance to me, and most enjoyable from the view point of 
exact indexing and cross-referencing, were the State Department records in 
the National Archives. I visually sighted each State Department entry to 

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and from the Navy Department for the period of study. Records and documents 
in the Naval War College and the Roosevelt 'ap«rs at Jtyde Park were used to 
complement the Washington sources. 

The interesting and varied facets of American relations with Japan 
involving the Navy made a topical rather then a purely chronological 
^recantation seen beet. There was a certain sacrifice involved in choosing 
the f ormer approach because interesting material which did not "fit in" 
to any chanter and was too Halted to warrant a separate chapter was left 
out of the paper. In this category I would place the personal relationships 
between Admiral Nomura and other senior Japanese naval officers with 
Admirals P ba *fc and Turner, the work of Naval Intelligence against the 

■* ae espionage network and the use of the Good Offices of the r&vy by 
the Jspanssft to get restricted material released from other departmental 

I am very grateful to a large number of persons without whose help I 
could never have finished in the time allowed me. I m particularly 
grateful to ]*ntain James C. Longino, :jf>N, for his friendship and guidance 
as my naval > vlserj Captain F. Kent Toomls, \MM$ Director of Naval History, 
for his assistance in granting clearance to classified Ifevy r*e 
Commander Burton Robert Trexler, '2>N, for his prompt work in declassifying 
desired selections; Mr. Dean Allard, Custodian of Ifeval History Division 
files for his very cooperative assistancej Kr. William H. Franklin, 
Director Historical Office of the State Department for his advice and 
permission to review State Department classified documents, Mr. £• Taylor 
Parks for his assistance, advice and excellent cooperation in expediting 
the return of research materials to me} Mrs. r atricia Dowling for cheerfully 
and efficiently supplying the voluminous files in the diplomatic records 



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section of the National Archives! Hr. Hernial Kaha, head of the Civil 
Records Branch of the Kational Archives for hie advice, Miss Elisabeth 
Drewry, Director, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, for her assistance and 
cooperationj Kr. John F» DiNapoli, Director of Libraries, Revel Her College 
for his assistance in promptly getting requested materials to me, Mrs* 
Winifred R # Barton for the clerical assistance in preparing the thesis, and 
finally and most importantly, my very able and patient adviser, Doctor 
Whitney Trow erklns, who generously gave his tine, suggestions and guidance, 

Any mistakes or shortcoming are solely mine and should not reflect 
upon any of my cherished acquaintances who have helped me along the way* 

Wk ' 

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James Henry Nersog 


Raducah, Kentuelqr on August 3, 1926, 

Education: Bowling Orecn State University, 19hh 

University at North Carolina, 19liU-19l*6, A*B. 

United States Navy General Line School, 19U8-19U9 

Naval Fli^it Training, 191*9-1950 

Harvard University Oraduate School of Public Administration, 

I96O-I96I, M.P.A. 
Brown University, 1961-1963, Ph.D. 

United States 

Commissioned Ensign, United States Naval Reserve, June 5, 19U6 
Duty on Destroyer Sscort, Battleship, Transport and Patrol 

Squadrons, and various Staff assignments* 
Assistant Professor Naval Science, Columbia University, 1953- 

Commissioned Commander, United States Navy, 1 November, 1962. 



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Introduction * 

In the Rail of 1936 a newly re-elected President Franklin Roosevelt 
relaxed in South American waters on the cruiser, tf»S.S # DIDZAKAPOLIS* While 
on the cruise the President learned of the Anti-Comintern Pact of Bovember 
25 tying Japan to Germany and Italy in agreements directed at communism and 
the Third international. Germany the previous Spring had violated the Treaty 
of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties by reoccupying the demilitarised 
Hhineland and the Italians had taken Addis Ababa in July to end their 
Ethiopian war* The actions of the two European militants seemed to be part 
of the pattern begun by the Japanese in their seisure of Manchuria in 1931* 
The news that the three leading aggressors of the time were united was 
certainly reason enough for the "resident to inquire of his naval aide the 
status of the nation's war plans* The answer to the President received by 
the naval aide from the Chief of Naval Operations covered the general status 
of the war plans and emphasised that the war planners in the Navy considered 
Japan the most probable enemy with which the United States mirjht wage war* 

The war between Japan and the United States which finally broke out on 
!)eoember 7» 192|1 has been called "the logical results Of the events which 
began in Manchuria*" If the Manohurian Incident were considered the start 
of a trend of events , the tempo of sequence of those events increased 
noticeably in 1936 and accelerated until the crippling naval defeat at ?earl 


!enry L* Stimson and McOeorce Bundy, On Aotlve Service in ? eaoe and War 

(Hew Yorkt Harper and Brothers* 19U3). p* 220* 

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Karbor brought the Jnited States into war. In 1936 actions by ^erroany and 
Italy and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War filled the headlines of 
American newspapers, but the attention of the Joited States Navy was focused 
in the I acific and future relations vdth Japan, The frame of reference 
through which the naval strategists viewed their problems was drawn from 
the traditional roles of the Navy in the F acific, the theories of Captain 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the history of Japanese actions in the 'acific, the 
experience of the recent naval treaties and the attitudes of the statesmen 
of the nation toward problems in the Orient. 

The assessment by the Navy of Japan as the most likely enemy of the 
:nitod states had obvious historical roots. Before developing the role of 
the Navy in the relations between Japan and the United States from 1936 to 
Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to examine briefly the influences and back- 
ground which conditioned the thinking of the naval leaders in 1936* 

Traditional roles of the Navy in the Far East . 

The United States Navy had two traditional associations with the Far 
ast. One, almost as old as American trade with China, was the group of 
naval vessels stationed in the Orient since 1835 to protect American 
nationals and their commerce. It was from the American forces in the Far 
Fast that Commodore lorry drew support in the "opening" of Japan in 1653 
and from which Admiral Dewey formed his force to attack the Spanish at 
Manila in 1898. In the twentieth century the collective vessels in the Orient 
were called the Asiatic Fleet* 

A second and more modern relationship of the Navy to the Far East came 
with the ran id acquisition of islands in the acific in 1698-1899. Possession 
of Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the r hilippines raised the American flag over 

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potontial naval bases strategically located between the west coast and the 
Far East* A line of communications seemed in place ready to be developed to 
promote increased commerce with the Orient, and. concomitantly, there arose 
the responsibility for the Navy to defend the line across the Pacific. The 
lack of existing bases and the absence of a fleet capable of defending the 
new territories or future bases were major problems to be solved if 
possession of the islands were to be an asset instead of a liability* The 
solution of the two basically naval problems; i.e., secure bases and a 
strong fleet, would become the most important strategical consideration in 
the Pacific in the twentieth century. 

The Influence of Hahan in the ?acific. 

The recognised authoritative figure on naval affairs and international 
relations in the late nineteenth century was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
First as a lecturer and then as second President of the newly established 
Naval War College, Mahan developed his knowledge of naval history and in 
1690 published his first lectures under the title t " The Influence of f-ea 
Tower upon History, 1660-1783 * * The book, an excellent history of British 
naval development, a clear explanation of the art of naval warfare and a 
strong endorsement of a large navy, was well known and well received in 
Europe before it attracted attention in the United States. The admiration 
of Mahan for the British naval and mercantile growth and power ensured 
favorable reception In Britain. In Germany, Wilhelm II was so impressed with 
the book that he ordered a copy placed in the wardroom of each ship in the 
new German Navy, and more of Mahan' s works were translated into Japanese 

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than into any other language. In the nited States his reputation was 

primarily aiiong scholars and naval officers, although his prolific pen 
accounted for numerous articles in the periodicals* The two most ardent 
exponents of Mahan 's ideas, who through personal friendship had direct 
access to his views on international and naval affairs, were fenator Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Assistant Secretary of the Havy, later I resident, Theodore 

Kenan's theory may be summarised as follows* In order for a nation to 
be truly great it must have sea power* Sea power encompassed a merchant 
marine, markets, bases, and a strong capital ship navy to guarantee the use 
of lines of communications* The six natural factors in a country upon which 
sea power depended were: (1) geographic position, (2) physical conformation, 

(3) extent of territory, (20 number of population, (5) character of the 

people, and (6) character of the government* The nited States possessed 

the potential to develop sea power to rival and surpass Britain, contended 

Hahan, if the people and the government were convinced of the advantages to 

be gained and were shown how to manipulate their resources to accomplish 

their goal* One of the prerequisites for success was a system of bases 

similar to those possessed by Mahan »s model, Britain* 

Though Mahan envisaged the Caribbean Sea, after completion of an 

Isthmian canal, as a great artery of maritime activity and an area in which 

the United States should have bases, his interest was directed to the 

acific in terms of strategy and commerce* His first focal point of 


Alfred T. Mahan, From f team to Gail (New York and London: Harper and 
Brothers, 190?), p* 303. 


Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea I ower upon fflstory, 1660-1783 
(Bostom Little, Brown and Company, 1C90), pp. 28-69. 

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interest in that area was Hawaii. In 1890 Mahan wrote that Hawaii was 

politically unstable and that it was to toerican Military and commercial 


interests "to allow no foreign influence to equal our own" there. In 

1893 in a letter to the Editor of the New York Tines Mahan used the "yellow 
horde" threat of possible invasion of the islands by Chinese as justification 
for a civilised Maritime power to have a firm hold on the islands. "Our 
own country, with its Pacific coast, is naturally indicated a proper guardian 
for this most important position. To hold it, however, whether in the 
supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great extention of 
our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?" Mahan well knew that 
the United States Navy was not then prepared to wage war to hold Hawaii, but 
his blueprint for future action was being clearly drawn. He continued his 
literary campaign for annexing Ik-rail in an essay: " Hawaii and Our Future 
Sea Tower " in Forum magaaine in March 1893* His approach this time was one 
of strategic position. "It is rarely that so important a factor in the 
attack or defense of a coast-line — of a sea frontier — is concentrated in 

a single position) and the circumstances renders doubly imperative upon us 

to secure it, if we righteously can." Senator Lodge and like-minded cohorts 

used Kahan«s statements in their arguments for annexation, and Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt wrote t "As regards Hawaii I take your views 

absolutely, as indeed I do in foreign policy generally. If I had my way we 

Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Tea ower, I resent and 

Future (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1B9B), p. 7. 


Letter: Hahan to New York Times , January 31, 1893* reprinted in 
Interest of America in r** lower , op. cit ., pp» 31-32. 


Mahan, " Hawaii and Our Future Sea ? ower ," reprinted in The Inter est of 
Amerioa in Sea "ower, op. cit ., pp. U6-U9. 


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would annex those islands tomorrow," 

Roosevelt may have been ready to annex the islands , but he was not the 
President. fter the attempt at annexation failed in 1893, Mahan continued 
to write articles and letters favoring annexation* It was not until after 
Admiral Dewey »s victory at Manila that the Hawaiian Islands were finally 
annexed by joint resolution. Mahan' s "first fruit" in the i aoif ic had 
become American. 

The naval strategist who valued Hawaii as vital to the defense of the 

vest coast and as an asset to the comsnercial interests of America in the 

Pacific did not look upon the acquisition of the Philippics with equal 

enthusiasm* He wrote to Lodge: 

I myself, though rather an expansionist, have not 
fully adjusted myself to the idea of taking them, from 
our own standpoint of advantage. It does seem to me, 
however, that the heavy force, army and navy, we have put 
in T uaon, has encouraged the revolutionists to an extent 
for which we are responsible. Can we ignore the 
responsibility and give them back to Spain? I think not 
• •••Might it not be a wise compromise to take only the 
^]3arianas7 and Lusonj yielding to the "honor" and 
exigencies of Spain the Carolines and the rest of the 
Philippines. 8 

If Mahan were unsure of the wisdom of annexing the Philippines, he was part 

of a host of Americans. The scales upon which with complex pros and cons 

of annexation were being weighed were tipped in favor of annexation by at 

least three factors* the feeling of moral obligation to the Philippine people, 

the desire for a Far fcst naval base and, especially pertinent, ignorance of 

any other suitable solution. 


Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3# 1897 1 *jo >sevelt Papers, quoted in William E. 
Livesey, Mahan on Tea Power (Norman* University of Oklahoma Tress, 1^*7), 
p. 168. 

Mahan to lodge, July 27, 18*?8, Lodge Papers, quoted in v ivezey, op . cit .. 

pp. 182-183. 

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: ossession for possession's sake was not part of Hahan *s concept of 
bases and commercial markets. After the annexation of the Philippines and 
Guam, he considered naval bases at Manila and Guam sufficient to protect 
American commerce into the rich Yangtae valley and to uphold John Hay's 
Open Door policy. Nevertheless, though the two potential bases were thought 
sufficient, Hahan appreciated that American naval power alone would never 
be strong enough in the Orient to force acceptance of the Open Door policy. 

Moral influence by the United States and mutual cooperation by the other 

commercial powers were cine qua non t o the success of the policy. 

The influence of Kalian on >eific policy had passed its senith by the 

time of the announcement of the Open itoor policy, but in another very 

important area bearing on I acific balance of power it was yet to be fulfilled. 

That area concerned the composition and employment of the fnited States Navy. 

The late nineteenth century function of the Navy was coast defense and 

battleships were thought of as floating forts to be stationed around ports 

to augment shore batteries. Xhe suggestions of Hahan for a fleet as a 

collective force of capital ships capable of cruising long distances, 

seeking out and destroying or containing the enemy went unheeded by the 

Secretaries of the tfavy. Two events pushed the ideas of Mahan to fruition. 

They were the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam and the succession to 

the residency on the assassination of MCKlnley of Theodore Roosevelt. As 

the acquisition of the islands had made the nited States a Far Astern power, 

it likewise made necessary ships designed to cruise long distances in order 

properly to defend the islands. From Hawaii to Guam was 3300 miles and to 

Alfred T. Hahan, The i roblem of Asia ( Bos torn Little, Brown, and 

Company, 1900), pp. 172-179 and The Interest of America in International 

Conditions (Boston* little, Brown and Company, 1910), pp» Ui7^1u9, 182-155. 

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the Philippines from Hawaii was ^800 miles* Few ships in the Navy could 
steaia the 1*800 Miles without refueling and many could not make the leg from 
Hawaii to Guam. So in a matter of simple logistics, future ships would have 
to be something more than the "coast-line" battleships authorised as late 
&b 1899, The shackles tying the Navy to coast defense were broken with the 
arinexation of Hawaii; the shackles were thrown away by the naval-oriented 
President Roosevelt who was determined that, not only would the !«avy have 
long range ships, but that they would meet the specifications of capital 
ships advocated by Kalian. 

The results of the drive by the energetic President were spectacular. 
From 1901-190$ Congress authorised at his insistence ten first-class battle- 
ships, four armored cruisers and seventeen other ships. In 1905 Roosevelt 
called for a breathing spell and advocated a , rojiram of replacement at the 
rate of one-a-year. At this juncture, counting ships under constriction, 
the Navy had twenty-eight battleships and twelve armored cruisers — strength 
exceeded only by France and Britain. 

Two situations caused Roosevelt to renege on his one-a-year replacement 
program. The first situation was successfully handled by Roosevelt 
personally; the second, required Congressional action and involved a defeat 
for Roosevelt and the Kavy. i ublic sentiment in Japan, which became anti- 
American over the absence of a cash indemnity from Russia in the Treaty of 
ortsmouth of 1905, flared to a war fever pitch over the segregation of 
Oriental school children in San Francisco in 1906. Roosevelt finally 
managed to placate both the Califoraians and the Japanese and to reach a 
"Gentleman* 8 Agreement 11 on future Japanese immigration, but he also 
exploited the ensuing crisis to request more battleships. Ffts subsequent 
dispatch of sixteen battleships on a world cruise was to impress the 

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Japanesa and to win support for his last drive for additional ships. 

The second event occurred in late 1906 when the British launched the 
revolutionary new battleship, the KHf« with a main battery of ten 
twelve-inch guns, greater speed and heavier armor. Its Harked superiority 
in fire power, speed and protection made all other battleships obsolete. 
In January 1907 Roosevelt asked for four new battleships comparable to the 
DRKAENOJOHT to keep the United States as a leading naval power and to be 
ready for any action by the Japanese* Congress for many reasons fought the 
second drive for modernisation of the Ifevy, quoting often Roosevelt's one- 
s-year plan* Reluctantly, two new ships were authorized and two aore the 
following year, but four ships were still four short of that which was 
requested* Roosevelt and the Navy were blocked from keeping up a modern 
capital ship force. At the rate of two or less battleships a year under the 
following administrjitions, the Navy deteriorated in capital ship and 
balanced force strength to a nadir from which resident Wilson lifted it in 

The role of naval bases in American- Japanese relations* 

No deficiency in naval strategy in the twentieth century caused more 
frustration to American naval leaders than the lack of bases in the western 
Pacific. From the acquisition of the Philippines to the eve of Pearl Harbor 
the question of a secure base in the Philippines and whether the !&vy would 
be able to defend the islands was interwoven in American- Japanese relations. 
With a secure base and a superior capital ship force the United States not 
only could defend the Philippines, but also go a long wa/ toward backing 
up the principles of the Open Door policy in China. But as far back as 
Mahan in 1°QQ the problem appeared insurmountable. A fleet capable of 

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defending the * hillppines and backing the Open Door policy could crush 
Japan, Neither the American people nor any administration was ready to 
risk war with Japan to assert such superiority in the Orient, Tet 
conversely, If Japan were strong enough to defend herself against American 
naval action, it could also defeat the American naval units in the Far 
Past and/or take the Philippines, Tlwodore Roosevelt's calling the 
Philippines, America's "Achilles heel" was quite appropriate. In the face 
of determined Japanese aggression, the United States had the choices of 
getting out of China and the Philippines; risking defeat, at least 
temporarily} or resorting to other means to thwart the Japanese. The 
history of the United States shows that the combination of the latter two 
was used, with the "other means" being treaties, nonrscogniticn and moral 

The question of potential bases came up before the treaty with Spain 
was signed in Paris in 1898, A Jnited States Navy spokesman urged the 
commissioners to ask Spain not only for the V hillppines and Guam but also 
the Carolines, the Felews and the remainder of the Marianas, These islands 
contained many sheltered anchorages suitable for possible naval stations 
and possession of the continuous chain of islands through the western 
acifie would guarantee the ; Jnited States a secure line between the acific 

coast and the hillppines. In the hands of an enemy they would offer a 

serious menace to the route to the Philippines, The general feeling was 

that Guam and the hillppines were all the fueling stations the Jnited States 

needed and in the face of Spanish resistance over giving up the other 

Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a !few Order of Sea lower 

( rinceton? Princeton Pul T ere lty Press, 19u6), p, 31. 



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islands, the commissioners demanded and received only Guam and the 
Philippines* When Spain disposed of her remaining Pacific islands by ceding 
them to Germany, there was still little opposition, since German occupation 
with European entanglements seetiingly precluded her becoming a threatening 

acific naval power. 

From 1900 to 1907 the Army and Ttevy in the : hilippines worked on their 
respective plans for a fortified naval base. The Wavy favored Olongapo on 
Subig Bay, about sixty miles from Manila, since it was easily defended by 
sea, while the Army's plan involving defense against land attack called 
Manila Bay the easiest to defend. Impetus to develop a base came with 
increased tensions with Japan in 1907. Within the Navy the General Board 
reminded Secretary Metoalf that without an impregnable base in the 

hilippines, the islands would be at the mercy of the enmy during the three 

months required to move the battleships from the Atlantic to the Far East. 

Since Congress had already appropriated $$00,000 for Philippine defense, 

the Navy wanted the entire sum spent on fortifications of a naval base. 

The resultite argustents between the War and Tiavy Departments res al ted 

finally in the Joint Board in If09 "recommending that the government abandon 

the idea of developing a first-class base in the Philippines, locate its 

principal insular base at I earl iiarbor in the Hawaiian Islands, and maintain 

only a small, unfortified station at >langaT>o." Congress had already 

appropriated $900,000 to begin work on a base in Hfewaii and with the Joint 

Board's recommendation for development there, an additional 3900,000 was 




William Reynolds Braisted, The /nited States Navy in the 'acific, 1897- 

1909 (Austin* ' niversity of Texas Teas, 1956),, pp. 201-2;?. 

Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of Ame rica.* Sea For or 
( rincetonj Princeton rniversity ress, 191*6), p."? * 


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voted. The development of I earl Harbor was undoubtedly a viae step; the 

wisdom of the abandonment of plans for a fortified base in the Philippines 

was questionable. The United States was still committed to defend the 

islands and Japan still remained a potential threat. 

Five years later the Japanese naval forces occupied the Geman owned 

Marshall, Caroline and Marianas Islands as World War I came to the Pacific, 

At the time of occupation it was still pretended both in London and in 

Tokyo that this move was temporary, and that Japan entertained no intention 

of holding these islands beyond the duration of the war, A Treaty of 

Alliance in 1902 had united Japan and Britain for mutual advantages against 

Russia, but in 1911* the mutual advantages to be gained from the treaty were 

at Germany»s exoense, Japan's quid pro quo for ridding the 1 acif ic of 

German cruisers, aiding British anti-submarine work in the Mediterranean, 

and supporting British claims to German islands south of the equator was 

British support for Japanese claims to German islands north of the equator. 

At the Paris Peace Conference the Japanese, bolstered by the wurilM 

assurances from both Britain and France, demanded outright transfer of the 

three island groups which they had seized. Only the nitod States offered 

opposition. The American delegation realised that the Japanese were not 

going to give up their strategically located possessions readily, tally 

to any control involving the nited States, An American proposal was Rftdtt 

to return the islands to Germany with the reasoning that in German hands 

there would be no threat to the United States and possibly in the future the 


Braisted, or?, cit ., p. 2?2, 

Sprout, Toward a I9bw Order of Sea ower j op, cit ., p. 36, 

^Ibid., p. 89. 


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nited States might be able to acquire part, if not all,, the islands Iron 


resident Wilson was aware of the strategic position of the islands on 

the route between Hawaii and the Philippines , but since he favored early 

withdrawal from the Philippines, he was wore concerned with Ja;*&nese actions 

in China and Siberia* The final disposition of the islands appeared to 

safeguard American interests and temper the Japanese demands. Japan was 

•riven a mandate from the Allied and Associated Powers to administer the 

inlands. The mandate forbade the construction of fortifications anywhere 

in the islands and expressly ordered an annual report containing full 

information as to conditions in the islands* 

The effect of Japan* s receiving the mandate was observed by one naval 

writer as being to» 

•••surround Guam with a cordon of potential Japanese 
strongholds and naval bases. Japan, as mandatory of the 
islands, is not entitled to fortify them, but that she 
would forego the use of such invaluable bases in case of 
emergency is not to be believed* Hostile submarines, 
working from a base at Saipan Island, in the Marianne 
(Sic) group, would be within a few hours* sail of Guam* 
A few hundred miles to the south-west lies Yap, the 
administrative centre of the Archipelago.. .The Island is 
admirably adapted for the use as a base for submarines 
or other vessels operating against the Guam-Manila line 
of communications, and so long as it remained in enemy 
occupation this route would never be safe... Some 11*00 
miles east of Guam lie the Marshall Islands. • .used by the 
German Cruiser Squadron... When the Marshall Islands were 
in German ownership the beginnings of a naval base is 
said to have been further developed, and there is now a 
depot for the storage of coal and oil. Similar reports 
have been heard in connection with Yap... and I onape, in 
the Carolines. Notwithstanding that the military govern- 
ment installed upon the first Japanese seisure of these 
islands has since been replaced by a civil administra- 
tion, they are regarded primarily as military ports, and 

Ibid*, p. 91. 

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very little information concerning the work in progress 
there is allowed to leak out, • .Without in any way 
impugning the good faith of Japan, it may be accepted 
as certain that these newly-acquired territories will 
henceforth occupy a moat important place in her scheme 
of naval strategy.^-? 

Japanese possession of the former German islands was but one of many 
political and military moves by the Japanese between 191i* and 1920 which 
bore on the important postwar naval decision to develop American I acific 
bases. Japan's occupation of German holdings in Shantung} her "twenty-one 
demands H on China in 1910; the movement of troops into Siberia in 1917 
during the Bolshevik Revolution} the demands for a statement of racial 
equality at Versailles} the demands for ownership of the German possessions 
in the r acific } the belligerency over control of the important trans- 

acific cable connecting center at Yap} and the accelerated naval program 
of constructing capital ships all contributed to an ever-tightening vortex 
whose final stage of maturity meant war with the id ted States. 

Against this background the Secretary of the Navy in 191; and, in more 
urgent pleas, in 1920 asked Congress for additional naval stations on the 
west coast since there was "no more pressing problem in connection with the 
national defense than the provision of the acific of ample bases. • .for the 
maintenance and operation of the fleet ..." The Secretary also averred that 
the day would never come vhen a powerful American fleet would not be in the 

acific. Funds were requested to develop Hawaii, but it was the Navy's plans 
for the large-scale development of Guam as a "strongly fortified naval base" 
and of an improved secondary base in the hilippines that were "loaded with 
international dynamite." Enough of the congressional hearings on the naval 


Hector C. Qywater, fea-I ower in the acific (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 193U), pp. 266-268^ 

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proposals leaked out to show the trend of official opinion* Two assumptions 
upon which the opinion rested were that the United States still had a 
"moral responsibility" for defense of the Philippines, even if they were to 
be granted independence, and secondly, that the American people were headed 
toward amed conflict with Japan* "On the basis of these assumptions, 
American naval authorities could see no justification for congressional delay 

in voting the appropriations necessary to retrieve past blunders and to 


push our military road into the far western Pacific* ■» 

The American naval planners were to be thwarted again in their quest 
for bases* The deliberate plans for development of the bases were 
inevitably bound to trigger Japanese reaction and further accelerate the 
existing naval construction race* Many complex factors combined at this 
station to prompt the Harding administration to seek an easier way out of 
the costly and explosive predicament. Many congressmen balked at the 
expense of further naval base development and ship construction; pacifists 
despaired of more war; Anglophiles objected to spending money to surpass 
British naval supremacy; strategists hoped to find a way to prevent the 
scheduled renewal in 1921 of the Treaty of Alliance between Japan and 
Britain; and the politicians hoped to win public support by keeping campaign 
promises to limit armaments expenditures* In this climate of thought the 
Washington Naval Conference was called in 1921* re-conference approval of 
the idea by the British and opposition by the Japanese fortold the inter- 
national attitudes at the Conference* 

Sprout, Toward a Mew Order of Sea ower. op* cit ,, pv. 100-102. 

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tffJ *ii>on,J lo e*sai 

The T 4aval Treaties i Four lower and Hine wwr Treaties . 

The Washington Naval Conference met in ffcveaaber 1921, Secretary of 
State Charles vnne ilighes, who presided over the Conference, presented the 
American position on the first day in a highly unorthodox ap; roach. Moving 
right to the crux of the unprecedented American proposal, Hughes offered to 
scrap all American battleships being built and, in addition, fifteen old 
pre-dreadnought battleships, and to abstain from further building for ten 
years, fie followed his offer with a presentation of a list of specific 
sacrifices on the part of Japan and Britain which the United States would 
consider "fairly commensurate." The final level of capital ships to which 
the navies of the leading powers would be cut was approximately 5> X>,000 
tons for the ' Uited States and Britainj 300,0 tons for Japan and 175,000 
tons for France and Italy. 

In the ensuing diplomatic maneuvering Japan attempted to get a higher 
ratio than the sixty per cent proposed by the mited States. The significance 
of the discussions in Congress during the previous winter on the Jnited 
States Navy* 8 proposed bases in Hawaii, Guam and the hilippines was not 
lost on the Japanese, approval of the plans would mean a definite shift in 
American favor in the balance of naval power in the Far Fast, ana under such 
conditions Japan would not accept less than seventy P«r cent ratio. However, 
if the statu 8 quo of fortifications in the acific could be maintained, t:»n 
the lower ratio might be acceptable. Hughes knew well the views of the 
naval authorities on the subject. "The General Board repeatedly advised 
against permitting any considerations of acific naval bases in the 
approaching conference. And American naval authorities apparently understood 
that their Government* a proposal at the opening session was framed on the 
assumption that the nited States was to make no commitments limiting their 


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plans as to Quam and the Philippines •" Tho American delegation chose to 

put political strategy over naval strategy and without consulting ths naval 

representatives agreed to a modified non-fortifioation clause in order to rwt 

Japan to accept ths sixty per cent ratio* The limitation on fortifications 

did not a v\Ly to Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand or the Japanese hone islands* 

It did apply to the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Formosa, the Pescadores, 

the Benin and Kurlle Islands and other smaller groups* The Mandated Islands 

were not included since their fortification was forbidden In the mandate* 

A second objective of the Washington Conference, and one which was 
mandatory if the United States were to give up its easily attainable 
supremacy in capital ships, was the liquidation of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty 
of Alliance of 1902, Britain, pressured by the United States and Canada, was 
quite willing to abrogate the treaty* The trick was to do so without the 
Japanese losing prestige or becoming politically isolated* The answer was 
the Pour Power Treaty between liritain, Japan, the United States and France* 
Various theories have been advanced on the selection of France as the fourth 
member* France did consider herself a Far Fastern ?o\-mr and havin^ a fourth 
member created the picture that the United States was not joining the old 
alliance only to be outvoted by Britain and Jaoan* 

In the Four ^owor Treaty the contracting parties agreed to respect the 
ri$its of others in "relation to their insular possessions and insular 
dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean**" If "controversy arising out 
of any Pacific question and involving their said rights" could not be settled 
by diplomacy, the four powers should meet in a joint conference "to which the 


>id«, p* 171* 

°Ibid«, p. 176* 


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whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment." There 
were no proposed military actions or provisions for enforcement other than 
conferring. On December 12, 1921 the treaty was accepted by the delegations 
of the four powers and the way was clear for Japan to accept the sixty per 
cent ratio* 

Another independent treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, was the reaffirma- 
tion of the American principles of the Open Door policy. Like the Four 
Power Treaty it was a statement of intent to recognise rights and principles 
rather than to take enforcement action. The agreement in this case was to 
"rear ect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and 
administrative integrity of China," to maintain the principle of equal 
opportunity, and to assist China "to develop end maintain for herself an 
effective and stable government." Signatories to this treaty were; Britain, 
the United States, Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal 
and China. 

Collectively the three interdependent treaties at the time were 
considered a success by the diplomats. The Jnited States at the conference 
table had received British agreement to naval parity and Japanese agreement 
to statistical inferiority. The Anglo- Japanese Treaty of 1902 was replaced 
by a limited agreement which did not prevent Anglo-American cooperation 
against the Japanese in other areas of diplomacy, and other world 
powers subscribed to the "open Door" policy and the costly arms race was 
prevented. On the question of the non-fortification clause opposed by 
American naval officers, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Colonel 
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. had this private comments 

. ■ 

soqcrtq OR 


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m» dcatj tsars* •■ 

— 19« 

'The clause in the treaty] leaves us, in my opinion, 
in a slightly better position than Japan. Ws trade 
certain fortifications which we would never have com- 
pleted, for fortifications which they (the Japanese) 
would unquestionably have completed* We retain one out- 
post of great importance (Hawaii) and they £ive up all 
but their mainland. 2 ^ 

Since the naval ratios set by the Washington agreements applied only to 

battleships, the resulting building race in cruiser strength necessitated 

conferences to settle that question. A nesting in Geneva ended without 

agreement, but the London Conference of 1930 set the cruiser ratio at 10 t 10 $7 

for the United States, Britain and Japan respectively, and submarine strength 

for the three set at parity. Before the Second London Naval Disarmament 

Conference in 1935-1936* aimed at perpetuating the naval agreements, Britain 

had conceded submarine parity to Oornuny and allowed her thirty-five per 

cent total tonnage in their bilateral naval a gr e eme nt. France and Italy had 

stepped up their building programs. Italy refused to corns to the London 

meeting, and Japan, who was refused the parity which she demanded in all 

categories, withdrew. The diluted provisions with "escalator clauses* 1 

rendered the treaty virtually worthless. In December 193b Japan gave the 

two years advanced notice that she intended to teminats her adherence to 

the Washington Naval Treaty, thus causing it to expire on the same date as 

the expiration of the London Treaty of 193C* On January 1, 1937 the 

provisions of the naval treaties no longer applied to the nest probable 

opponent of the United States Navy. 


* Colonel Roosevelt ! s Diary, January 29, 30 quoted in Sprout, Ibid ., 

P. 251. 

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The effect of political attitudes on naval t v JLn?:ln : . 

The reaction or Secretary of State Stiiwon to the Japanese* aggressions 
in 1931 and his subsequent diplomatic maneitvers attempting to salvage the 

principles of the ?Gellogg-8rland ?act and the Mine ?ower Treaty have been 

thorou^ily described by participants and able scholars* How did the 

attitudes of the political leaders toward American problems in the Orient 

affect naval thinking in the 1930 *a? 

The resort to non-recognition of Japanese galas in the conquest of 

Manchuria had historical precedent in similar action by Sryan and lanslng in 

1915 vhen the United States did not records® the Twenty-one Demands of Japan 

on China. Xr both situations tiers was no appropriate military force or 

willingness to risk the use of such fo.»oe f if it were available* 

Outraged as [^resident Hoover] was by Japanese 
aggression* he was or>posed # in every fiber of his beins* 
to any action which ml#it lead to American participation 
in the struggles of the far East** •since he believed that 
any policy of embargo or sanctions might lead to war* his 
position effectively blocked any governmental sup, art for 
economic sanctions* ••• In talcing this position Mr* Hoover 
was squarely in line with the whole tradition of American 
foreign policy in the Far Sast* !5ven Theodora Roosevelt 
had always insisted that American interests in the Orient 
were not worth a war* •••&*• Hoover *.. cas so much a man of 
peace that he did not like the notion of even unspoken 
threats of war*23 

Mr. Hoover with his deep pacifist character was certainly not prone to 

overthrow the traditions dating to Theodore Roosevelt of not wanting to wage 

war in the Orient* He was safe from having to make a decision on use of the 

fleet in the Orient since there was m base from which such a concentration 


" Stlmson and Bundy, or>« clt* * Ch* EC, (2) A* Whitney Orlswold, The Far 

.■- v u-.i -.lie.- «Mj .-• tt&tST 55a£es, Ch. X* (New Torki Harcourt* Brace and 
Company Ine*/ 1938) • 

^Stimson and Estrty, op. cit o, pp. 233, 2Ult-2lif>o 

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of ships could operate. That too had been a political decision* The 
collection of ships honored with the term "Asiatic Fleet* 1 was sent to 
Shanghai In 1932 on Secretary Stimson*s suggestion to protect American lives 
and property in conjunction vith a similar move by the British, but again* 
it was problematical that action would have been taken apinst the Japanese 
except in self-defense* Jh "deference to his Secretary of State's urgent 
pleading" Hoover accepted "Stimson's suggestion that the American Fleet be 
left at Hawaii* where it arrived in mid-February [1932] by pure coincidence* 
in maneuvers planned and publicly announced the previous summer* The fleet 
duly remained in Hawaii instead of returning to its usual west coast bases* 

and it was probably useful in restraining; the more flagrantly headlong 

Japanese militarists*" The Fleet was withdrawn the following year to the 

Atlantic by the new administration as an act of good will* 

In 1932 the Asiatic Fleet had been used in Shanghai to protect American 

nationals and property* i^ould the physical presence of the fleet interposed 

between the Japanese military and American interests be sufficient to deter 

the Japanese in the future from aggressive acts? What order would be given 

to the naval commanders if the Japanese did attack American vessels and 

property? Was there a limit of acceptable aggression before war was 

inevitable? Under which conditions would the United States demand restitution 

or begin war using the Far Eastern forces? Would naval farces be withdrawn 

in a deepening crisis before Japanese actions would make the withdrawal appear 

to be out of fear or would the forces be left to protect American interests 

and symbolise American prestige "to the bitter end?" 

President Hoover had reluctantly allowed the United States Fleet to 

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remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive moves in other 
parts of Asia* With the United facilities at Pearl Ilarbor in the 1930** 
and the almost complete lack of a supporting train, did the politicians 
realise that the fleet was incapable of deploying further west without 
risking heavy losses and possible defeat? Did the Japanese consider the 
pr ese n ce of the fleet in Hawaii was a bluff? If the use of the fleet at 
Hawaii was to show the intent of the United States not to ignore Japanese 
actions in the aciflc, and that there was a possibility of the use of the 
fleet in conditions which the United States considered serious, did the 
Japanese understand the conditions under which the fleet would be used? Would 
the United States "draw the line n clearly and fight if its position were 

These are but a sampling of the questions asked within the United States 
Navy in the early ITXC's* Sane questions were answered in the final phase 
of war preparation in 19ltl* Many were never answered, since the trend in 
international developments, the national apathy to American invoJsrment and the 
political decisions facing the nation's leaders did not permit clear cut 
decisions or firm positions relative to Japan* The questions which perplexed 
and influenced naval planners in the pre-war period were passe after the 
sinking of American ships on December 7, 191*1 fused an undecided people into 
a fighting nation* 

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The Constitution of the United States bestowed upon the individual 
elected as President the dual responsibility of being at once the Chief 
Executive and the Comnander in Chief of the armed forces* President Franklin 
D* Roosevelt brought to that highest office unusual past experience as a 
former Assistant Secretary of the Navy* As one y&ry^ close observer noted, 
"he probably knew raore about the Mavy than any of his predecessors* Throu^iout 
his Administration [he gave] preferential attention to every question arising 

in regard to the Navy* lie himself made most of the more important decisions 

with respect to naval affairs*" 

The naval organisation from which the President received advice and 

through which his policies were Implemented was headed by a civilian 

Secretary appointed by him* The highest military position in the Mavy, the 

Office of Chief of Naval Operations, likewise, was filled with the choice of 

the President* Through these two personally selected individuals, the 

^resident had civilian and military control of the naval forces* By an 

Executive Orier on 5 July 1939 the President directed that the Joint Board 

(made up of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Amy Chief of Staff and their 

top assistants) and other service elements report directly to him on certain 

matters rather than through the civilian Secretaries* The significance of 


Cordell Hull, Memoirs (Hew Torki The Macmillan Company, 19U3), p* I£l* 


Hark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff » Prewar Plans and Preparations ^ a 

volwae in the series: United .^tatos Arn$r in World War II (Washington? Depart- 
msnt of the Amy, 1950), p. 6* 


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the Executive Order was apparent, for It eliminated one civilian echelon in 
the decision-making process on certain matters* On those matters the 
President ohose to use the military channels only* Military advice* decisions 
and* possibly* influence would flow directly between the Commander in Chief 
and his military leaders* 

The Chief of %iaval Operations was not created as a billet until 1915 
and the authority of the officer holding the position was not completely 
accepted until World Vfer II* Despite intra-service friction between the 
World Wars, the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations increased 
so that a siaable staff consisting of functional divisions came into being 
to assist him in the administration of the office* The two key divisions 
which figured in the external, policies of the Navy were the VJar lans 
Division and the Central Division* The Chief of Naval Operations and his 
assistants also worked with joint organisations and other governmental 
agencies between the nforld Wars* The major joint military organisation was 
the Joint Board* or Joint Array and Havy Board, with its subordinate working 
committee^ the Joint 'lanning Committee* Another important committee in this 
period was the Standing liaison Committee, organised in 1933 at Secretary 
of State Hull f s suggestion* Since the problems which prompted the State, 
War and Navy Departments to work together in this committee primarily 
pertained to Latin America, that Committee will not be discussed* 

The purpose of this Chapter will be to describe the parts of the naval 
organisation which contributed to influencing the decision makers in American 
relations with Japan from 1936 to* Specifically, the duties of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Maval Operations, the lar Plans 
and Central Division Officers and the Joint Board will be discussed* In 

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addition to the review of the structural side of the naval organization, 
short biographical sketches of selected individuals will be given* 

The Changing Naval Organisation* 1739-1919 * 

When the Federal Government under the Constitution of 1739 case into 
being there was no Navy Department nor necessity for one. The last of the 
Navy had been sold three years earlier, and naval affairs were assigned to 
the War Department* As a result of naval unreadiness in a quasi-war with 
France* a separate Navy Department was established on April 30, 1739* 

Almost from its very be inning the Navy Department has been in a state 
of change as the various Secretaries, Congress and naval officers sought to 
improve the structure within which the naval forces were administered* In 
the first of a sequence of five phases, the Secretary and half a dosen 
employees were capable of managing the few ships and small Naval Establishment* 
Military assistants to the Secretary appeared in the second phase, when in 
1315 a Board of Commissioners consisting of three Captains was appointed* A 
dispute within the first month between the Secretary and the Captains was 
finally resolved by President Madison* The responsibility of naval comnand 

retained by the Secretary and the field of logistics, i.e., the buildir , 

equipping and repairing of ships, was assigned to the Board. In 131*2 a 

major change occurred as the work load of the Navy Department was divided 

functionally between a number of Bureaus, each of which was headed by a senior 

officer specialist in the respective field. Under this principle, the 

Mexican, Civil and Spanish-American Wars were fought* 


Rear Admiral Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the K&Ty 
Department in World tear II (Washington? Department of the riavy, 1959), p. S. 


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In 19CC the General Board, the most important of many boards appointed 

by the Secretaries, was established* Originally headed by Admiral George 

Dewey, its first members wsret the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the 

Chief Intelligence Officer and his principal assistant, the President of the 

Naval War College and his principal assistant, and three other line officers. 

The assigned mission was "to insure efficient preparation of the Fleet in 

case of var and for naval defense of the coast, •" After 1915> and the 

establishment of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, the General Board 

became purely a consulting body ft$ the considerations of matters of general 

policy referred to it by the Secretary. 

•••Its members have no administrative duties and only 
act in an advisory capacity* It recommends to the 
Secretary the number and types of ships and aircraft to 
properly constitute the fleet and such building program as 
may be submitted annually to the Congress* It also advises 
with respect to the general policy toward the number of 
naval districts, navy yards, operating bases, and other 
shore activities •• .The membership of the General Board is 
designated by the Secretary and usually consists of the 
highest ranking officers* The Secretary may, if he 
chooses, select retired naval officers, •••The Board 
usually consists of from five to seven members, although 
no specific number is designated in the Havy regulations* 
Its members are sometimes referred to as the "Elder 
Statesmen" of the Navy* 1 * 

In 1909 the fourth phase of changes in the or ganissat ion found a Naval 

Aids system attempted, due to the shortcomings of the Bureau system in the 

expansion program after the Spanish-American War* The primary deficiencies 

were in the provisions for making war plans, for planning and directing the 

operations of the Fleet and for coordinating the work of the various Bureaus* 

Four senior line officers were assigned to advise and assist the Secretary 

-inlted States Navy , Senate Document 35, Seventy-fifth Congress, First 
on (Washington! 0*^.0*, 1937), Pp* £-&• 

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in the fields of fleet operations, personnel, material and inspection, 
respectively* Congress did not give statutory approval to the idea and 
Secretary Josephus Daniels let three of the Aides be detached without relief. 
Upon the advioe of Admiral Dewey, Chairman of the General Board, the Aide for 
Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley A* Fiske, was retained* 

Admiral Fiske enlisted the aid o£ a Navy veteran of the Spanish- 
American War, Congressman Richmond ?• Hobson, who believed as Fiske did that 
the office of Aide for Naval Operations should be guaranteed by statutory 
authorisation* Hobson, with the full consent of the House Naval Affairs 
Committee, incorporated in the Naval Appropriations Bill of 191£« "•••• there 
shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active 
list of the Navy not below the grade of Rear Admiral, appointed for a term 
of four years by the President by and with the advice of the Senate, who 
under the Secretary of the Navy shall be responsible for the readiness of 
the Navy for war and to be charged with its general direction*" 

The Hobson rider was strtclosn on a point of order* 3ecretavy Daniels 
did not approve the scope of responsibility proposed for the Aide for Ifeval 
Operations because he feared too much military power within the Havy Depart- 
ment* In order to placate Secretary Daniels and to get his approval for 
enactment, the provisions of the rider were rewritten* 

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall 
be an officer on the active list of the ffavy appointed by 
the President, by and with the advioe and consent of the 
Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, 
not below the grade of captain, for a period of four 
years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of 

Purer, op, oit ** p* 109* 

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tha Navy, be charged with tha operations of the Heat, 
and with tha preparation and readiness of plans for its 
uaa in war* 6 

The bill, with tha revitted rider incorporated, passed both Houses on March 

3, 1915 but the Hobson-Fiske group was not satisfied. Tha responsibility of 

the Chief of Naval Operations as first written was "for the readiness of 

the Navy for war and its general direction" and as finally passed, the 

responsibility authorisation had been pared down to being "charged with the 

operations of the gleet and with the preparation and readiness of plane for 

its use in war*" (Emphasis mine.) The difference between responsibility 

for the I'avy and responsibility for the Fleet meant that the Chief of foval 

Operations had no specific authority over the Bureaus and the shore establish-* 


In August 1916 Congress further strengthened the authority of the Chief 

of Naval Operations qy authorising the rank and title of Admiral for the 

position and giving legislative recognition to the force of his orders 1 

..•All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations 
in performing the duties assigned to him shall be performed 
under the authority of the Secretary of Navy, and his 
orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, 
and shall have full force and effect as such*? 

While the legislative maneuverings were taking place the Office of 

Chief of ffaval Operations was quietly getting organised. On :4ay 11, 1915 

Admiral William 3* Benson was appointed as the first Chief of Naval Operations 

and immediately thereafter he assumed the duties which were then being 

performed by the last of the Naval Aides, Admiral Fiske* The psychological 

Ibid. * quote from 5 !*•• Code \&2\ (2) Kavy Regulations, 1920, 
Articled (1) and Article k33 (1), 


'Ibid*, p* 110, quote from 5 U»S* Code hZl% {2) Navy Herniations Article 
392 (2TT~" 

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preesures of possible entry into the European war, the huge ship building 
program advocated by ^resident Wilson and authorised by Congress and the 
favorable attitude of Secretary Daniels, whose fears of loss of civilian 
control were assuaged, all enhanced the spirit of cooperation with the new 
CJJO* When war did come in 1917* for the first time in the history of the 
nation, one officer was responsible for the operations of the Fleet and war 
plans readiness* 

The Bureau chiefs, who Jealously guarded their areas of responsibility 
as their predecessors had since I8li2, cooperated with Admiral Benson in the 
winning of the war) however, the wartime professional esprit de corps soon 
faded into peacetime bickerings* the crux of the arguments turned on the 
authority of the CNO to control the Chiefs of the Bureaus* 

The Chief of Naval Ope rations . 

■—■— — mm* — i p i i*i 1 1* i iii i man wwwww* ■ — iwn^'Wi^ww^M**! 

In 1921 a Board of naval officers was appointed by the Secretary of the 
^Savy »to consider and recommend such changes In the interest of «<*flcieney 
and economy as may be deemed necessary in the organisation of the Navy 
Department*" The recommendation that the CflD have authority over the entire 
Naval Establishment was evaded by the Secretary who told the Board to limit 

its study to eliminating duplication of effort among the Bureaus and not to 

concern itself with departmental organization* 

A change in 192lt in Navy Regulations, Article 1*33, gave to CNO some of 

the authority recommended by the 1921 Board* The change read: "He shall so 

coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel 

therefor as to insure maximum readiness of the fleet for war." The ensuing 

^ urer # op * cit " P« 3-31* 

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dispute over the now?? of CNO over the Bureaus cm. the strength of the 

article f inally reached President Roosevelt in 193k« To get to that highest 

level, the question had been examined by Secretary of the Navy Clauds A* 

Swanson and by a special board headed by the Assistant Secretary of the tfsery, 

^enry T*. Roosevelt, ""resident Roosevelt ruled that the artiele 1*33 should 

remain in effect but thatj 

In my ^ttdgaent he (the President) would too greatly 
delegate this power if he delegated to the Chief of Naval 
Operations the duty of issuing direct orders to the bureaus 
and offices. . .the orders to the Bureaus and offices should 
come from the Seoretary of the Navy.? 

Ih Marsh 1°}£ the President reversed his position stated, supra, and in 

Executive Order 9096 of 12 Harsh, 191*2 which bombined the CWO and the 

Commander in Chief, 0.5 • Fleet into one billet, the following words a? peart Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding 
the combined offices as herein provided shall be charged 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy v&th the 
preparation, readiness, and logistic support of the 
operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing 
forces, and sea frontier forces of the United States Kavy, 
and with the coordination and direction of effort to this 
end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, 
except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Seoretary 
of the Navy may specifically exempt ...^ 

The Executive Order made legal what had been practiced in fact, because, 

through necessity, the Chief of Naval Operations had to coordinate the 

efforts of the Bureaus in preparing the Mavy for war* 

The duties which had accrued to the Chief of Naval Operations by 1?U2 

encompassed the responsibility for the operation of the Fleet, the preparation 

and readiness of plans for fleet use, coordination of the Bureaus to insure 

9 Ibid .» p. 112. 
10 Ibict., pp. 11>!U«. 

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fleet readiness far war and advice to the Secretary of the Navy on the 
status of forces and prospective requirements* In addition the Chief of 
Naval Operations was directed by various orders to "advise the Secretary of 

the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments 

and forei^i relations*** 1 * i to act as the Secretary of the Navy "during the 

temporary absence of the Secretary* the Under-Secretary and the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy" j and to serve as a member of the Joint Army and Navy 

Board in accordance with General Order No* 7* 

The officers appointed as Chief of Naval Operations in the period under 

etu^y were? 

Hdteiral William H. Standley Ju3y 1933-January 1937 

Admiral William D* Leahy January 1937-August 1939 

Admiral Harold H* Stark August 1939-vMarch 19l*2 

Each of the three CNO's in this period had broad experience prior to 

their appointment* All had had duty in the Asiatic Fleet and in various 

shipboard and Navy Department assignments* Additionally* Admiral Standley 

had been Director of War Flans Division froa 1923*1926$ Assistant Chief of 

3«vml Operations* 1923-1930 1 and Commander Battle Force, U.S* Fleet before 

becoming GNO* During his period in office* Secretary of the Navy Swanson was 

frequently absent* due to illness* and A&niral Standley performed the duties 

of Acting Secretary of the Navy* He was a United States Delegate to the 

London Naval Conference, held in London* England* durins the period 

Navy Regulations* 1920* Article Ii33» ?>ara« 7* 

M 5 Us Code h23. 

Organisation of the Office of the Chief of ^ aval operations with 

Duties Assigned the Divisions thereunder* a manual dated October 23* l'ffl# 

issued within the Navy Department by the T *o, Admiral H*R. Stark (hereafter 

cited as CNO Manual)* p. 2j WD Piles* 

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December 7, 19 3£ to Karoh 25, 1?36, and signed the Tendon Naval Treaty on 
behalf of the 'liited States. Ite also initiated the Vlnson-lrammel Bill 

which provided for establishing, building and Maintaining the (?•&• Navy at 

Treaty strength. 

Admiral Leahy had a yrery colorful career prior to becoming CJJD. He 
served in the Asiatic Fleet during the Philippine Insurrection and Bosoer 
Rebellion, and later was Commander IJaval Forces in lUcaragua in 1912. He 
commanded a troop transport in World War I and a Ifeval Detachment for the 
protection of Americans in the war between Turkey and Greece in 1921. He 
was also Chief of two Bureaus, Navigation and Ordinance and supported the 
Bureau Chiefs in their fight against increased C?C authority* Under his 
leadership discussions began with the British over possible cooi>eration 
against the Japanese and a review of Joint Mar Plans was started. 

Admiral Stark was Aide to Admiral Sims in Tendon in World War I when he 
met the young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D* Hooswvelt* ^h® 
ensuing friendship lasted through their respective careers* Xh 1930 Stark 
was Aide to Secretary of the Navy Claude F. Adams and later to Secretary 
Swansea. !&s influence upon the Fresident during his tenure of office is 
discussed in iTh&p-car IUne, infra * 

Within his own immediate office the CM) on October ?3# 1&0 promulgated 
a manual on the organization of his office in which the duties of his various 
assistants were clearly stated* The most important of his assistants was the 
Assistant Chief of ?Javal Operations (OF 11) whose duties were* 

Biographical information on the officers discussed in this chapter 

was famished by Biographies Branch, 014*30, office of Information, %vy 


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11-1* Next in authority to the Chief of Naval Operations, and holding 
the same relation to Directors of Divisions as the Chief of 
Staff of a Comrcander-in-Chief holds to the flag officers under 
that commander-in-chief , shall be an officer who will be known 
as the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations* 

H-2* The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations shall relieve 
the Chief of Naval Operations of all administrative details 
possible* He shall sign such of the mail and attend to such 
routine natters as the Chief of Naval Operations may designate* 

11*3* Considers all questions of either a biinistration or policy 
proposed by Directors of Divisions, before such matters are 
referred to the Ghief of Naval Operations* 

ll-'i. The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations is a mpbar of 
the Joint Army and ?lavy Board (General Order No* 7)«*-> 

Officers who held the position of Assistant CNO during the period under 

study weres 

Rear Admiral William S* ?ye June 1936-June 1937 

Rear Admiral James 0, Richardson June 1937-June 1933 

Rear Admiral Arthur ?• Fairfield June 1933-July 1939 

Rear Admiral Robert L* Ghormley July 1939-August l$lfi 

Rear Adniral Royal B* Ihgersoll August 19l|0-January 191*2 

Rear Admirals Ghormley and Ingersoll will be discussed infra in their 

role as Director of v&r Plans Division* Rear Admiral Richardson preceded 

Admiral Kimmel as Commander in Chief U*3* Fleet and will bo discussed in 

Chapter Nine, infra* Rear Admirals Fye and Fairfield had no particular 

connection with American-Japanese relations in the period under consideration! 

War "lane Division (OP 12) 

The duties of the War Flans Division, listed below, show two sections 
into which the division was separated in 19hP. Irior to that time the duties 
were basically the same without the section organisation* 


p CN0 Manual, op* cit .. p* 5* 

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(1) Development of policies and projects in support of 
■war piano* 

(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation 
of current plans for joint action of the Army and !Javy f 
and in the solution of current problems* 

(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on 
policies and projects affecting national defense* 

(h) Study of subjects retmrrod to the War Plans Division 

by the Chief of Naval Operations* 
(5) Action in advisory- capacity in current administrative 

matters referred to the War Plans Division* 

(b) Plans Section i 


Direction of war planning* 

reparation of designated war plans. 
(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory 

(h) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation 

of Joint Basio '-Jar Plans* 
(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on 

plans affecting national defense* 

12-2* The Director of the VJar Plans Division is a member of the Joint 
Board (General Order HO* 7)* 

12-3* The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees » 

Joint Board 

Joint Manning Committee 
Joint Aeronautical Board 
Joint Air Advisory Committee 
Shore Station Development Board* 

12-li* The War n lans Division is non-administrative* 

Officers who heV the poeitlon of Director of War Plans Division weret 

Captain (later Admiral) Hoyal B* togersoll June 1936-July 1933 

Captain (later Vice Admiral) Robert U Ohormley July 1933-July 1939 
Captain Russell S. Crenshaw July 1939-October 191,0 

Captain (later Acfc&ral) Richmond K* Turner October 19l*0-February 


The officers who served as War ,lans Director had several qualifications 

l6 Ibid.. p. 7. 

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In carrion* All were graduates or the liavai Academy and courses at the Saval 
War College, and all had had several tours of duty in the }Javy Department in 
Washington prior to the War Plans assignment* 

tJhdoubtecQy Gaptain Ihgersoll had the widest experience in foreign 

relations prior to becoming T &r Plans Chief* As a Passed Midshipman in 

190$ he was one of the young officers assigned special temporary doty to 

attend the 3us s ian- Japanese Beaee Conference hold at the i'avy Sard, Portsmouth, 

Hew Hampshire. lie made the World Cruise with the Battle Fleet in 1908, and 

later served In the Asiatic Fleet* In 1913 he accompanied the first Gffl 

AoMral Benson, who was Haval Advisor to the American Cosnission to Negotiate 

Peace in Paris, France* Ingersoll returned with President WULson»s party 

handling oo^nsinications for the President on his trip hone* While Director 

of War ^lans Division, he went to London twice* On his first trip in June 

1936 he was Technical Assistant to the American Delegation at the London 

Naval Conference* In December 1937 he again r.^ent to London to discuss 

possible cooperation with the British against the Japanese in the Pacific* 

Captain Ohormley had a normal cycle of shipboard and chore duty tours 

prior to becoming Aide to Assistant Secretary of Navy Theodore P-ooaevelt, Jr. 

in 1923-192li and to Assistant Secretary of $avy Douglas Robinson* 172U-1925* 

T !e returned again to Washington in 1927 to serve for three years as Secretary 

to the General sard* His duties immediately after serving as Director of 

ar Plans Division were as Assistant CNO and Special Hava! Observer in London* 


Graduates of the Naval Academy served at that time two years as 

Bused Hidshlpman before being commissioned as Ensign* 
Of* Chapter Four* p* 67. 


Cf . Chapter Few, p* 76. 

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Captain Crenshaw had less experience than his predocessorn had prior to 
heading the War ^lans Division, his duties being the normal career pattern. 
Crenshaw had been an assistant to Ohorraley in the War Plans Division and, 
when the latter moved up to became Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, 
Crenshaw became Director of the Division* Since Ghoxaley's new job require d 
thorough knowledge of the Mar Plans, he probably continued to influence the 
Division through Crenshaw* 

Captain Turner served in various billets as an ordnance expert prior to 
entering and completing flight training at 'enaaoola, Florida at the age of 
forty-two* He had duty in the Asiatic fleet and in 1932 was Technical 
Advisor for Naval Aviation to the American Delegation, General Disarmament 
Conference in Geneva, Switzerland* In 1939 he was Commanding Officer of the 
USS ASTORIA when that cruiser transported the ashes of the former Japanese 
Ambassador, Hirosi Saito, from Annapolis to Japan* During the incident he 
made many personal friends among the Japanese, including the future Ambassador, 
Admiral Kichisaburo riomura* 

Central Division (0? 13) ♦ 

The Director of the Central Division had the most varied responsibilities 
by far of the assistants to the CUD* In addition to effecting liaison with 
the State Department, the Division functioned as a clearing house for 
legislative, regulative and organisational matters; reports of all types; 
matters pertaining to the administration of island governments under $avy 
control and miscellaneous matters such as honors and ceremonies* The charge 
seems well supported that "[The Central Division] was in effect a catchall 
for the solution and handling of any Navy Deparfcmni administrative matter 
involving the GNO that could not logically and immediately be assigned to 

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some other division*" 

Irior to the progressive build-up of international tension during the 
1930*8, the ^avy Department's liaison with the State Department consisted of 
requests for ships and planes to visit foreign ports and requests for 
passports for naval personnel and their dependents to travel outside the 
country* ' Even after the accelerated tempo of crises after 1936, the liaison 
between the two departments was limited* 

33-1* DUTIESt 

(a) International affairs * 

(1) Treaties and treaty interpretation* 

(2) Liaison with Department of State regarding i 

(a) Naval forces in disturbed areas or areas under naval 

(b) United States naval ship movements in disturbed areas* 

(c) Visits by T Jhited States naval vessels to foreign ports* 

(d) :iane flights of iMted States naval aircraft in 
foreign jurisdiction. 

(e) Visits of foreign ships or aircraft to Wilted States 

(b) Legislation* regulations » and organisation* 

(1) reposed legislation and arrangement of priority* 

(2) Revision and editing of Navy Regulations* formulation 
of General Orders* 

(3) Review and coordination of bureau manuals and 
publications* ••• 

(U) Courts* boards* investigations* etc** referred to the 
Chief of Naval Operations* 

(5) Organisation of the Office of the Chief of Naval 

(6) Organisation of the Navy Department* 

(7) Recommendations and statements concerning the budget* 

(c) Island governments * 

(1) Assist in the supervision of the governments of the 
dependencies of the United States which are under naval 

^Furer* op. oit«* p* 118* 

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(1) Preparation or the Chief of Haval Gyrations • data for 
the Secretary's annual report* 

(2) reparation of the Chief of Naval ( parations » annual 
report* and statement for the Bureau of the Budget and 
for congressional hearings* 

(3) Handling and routing annual and speoial reports from 
Naval forces* 

(e) Itiscellmisous * 

(1) onors and ceremonies j courtesies to foreign officials 
and naval forces visiting the United States* 

(2) Recommendations in connection with appropriation 
♦♦Contingent Navy*" 

(3) Weather matters not assigned to specific cognisance of 
any Bureau* or Division of Operations* 

(U) Matters which can not appropriately be assigned to 

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13-2. In natters assigned to its cognizance* the Central Division is 
responsible for necessary liaison and coordination of effort 
within the Kavy Department and liaison with other agencies of the 

13-3* The Director of the Central Division is a member of uhe Joint 
Economy Board* 23 - 

Offioers who served as Directors of the Central Division, 1936-l°kl* were: 

Captain Bruce Livingston Canaga July 193U~October 1936 

Captain (later Vice Admiral) olaf M. Hustvedt ctober 1936-July 1933 

Captain (later Admiral) Arthur D* Struble July 1938-June 1939 

Captain (later Rea^Admiral) Hoscoe S. Schuirmann July 1939-August 191& 

The career patterns of the Central Division chiefs were almost as varied 

as the duties of the office which they headed* Captain Canaga served in 

various fleet assignments* had duty in Scotland and Uemany in 1919* and was 

a member of the T7*S* Naval Mission to Brasil from February 1921 to November 

1922* Captain Hustvedt received a Master of Science at George Washington 

in I9U4 and served in a battleship division which operated with the British 

2 t3NO *4anual* op* ci^ ** pp* 3-9* 


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Grand Fleet in World War X* Captain Struble participated in the Haitian 
Campaign in 1919 • 

Captain Sohuirraann was ty far the west experienced of the above groqp 
when he became Director in 1939* §f that tine he had had duty in the 
Asiatic Fleet, in the Sixteenth Naval District at Gavite, Philippine Islands | 
and in the Office of $aval Intelligence. From April 1933 to July 1935 ha 
served with the General Board, acting as Secretary from September 193k to 
July 1935 • He was Technical Adviser at the Naval Conference at London 1935- 
1936, and upon his return from that duty he was Administrative Aide to the 
Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admirals HUliam 1 • Standley and William D« 
Leahy, successively* "The records in the National Archives show that he worked 
much more closely with the State Department than any of his predecessors, a 
partial explanation undoubtedly being that there was so much more need for 
liaison in the years immediately preceding the war* 

The Joint Board . 

The oldest of the inter-service agencies was established in July 1903 
by agreement between the Secretaries of V&r and Navy without statutory 
authorisation* The need had always existed to coordinate planning between 
the two services, but the Spanish-American war with its overseas operations 
and logistic problems brought the urgency of Joint planning to the forefront* 
The Board was suspended, strangely enough, in 1913 and 191k by resident 
Wilson because "he did not wish it to enter discussions of subjects that he 

considered to be the President *s prerogative and that might lead to political 


repercussions." The Board "renewed itt meetings in ootober 1915, and was 

Purer, op* cit * t p* 6)*9. 

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finally reconstituted by new orders at the end of [World War !]•" ' M 

nev charter for the Joint Board specified the membership to bet the Aswy 
Chief of Staff, his Deputy Chief of 3taff and Assistant Chief of 3tafT for 

Plans, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval 

Operations and the Director of the vjar Plans Division* 

Just as the General Board was consultative and advisory to the Secretary 

of the Navy, so was the Joint Board consultative and advisory to the 

Cemander in Chief* It took no executive action unless required to do so by 

higher authority. There were no required meetings of the Joint Board, en 

masse, unless there were matters to be discussed* While European armies 

aarohed in the initial maneuvers of World War II, there were no nestings of 

the Joint Board between October 11, 1939 and February 21, IShp or in the 

months of March and August 1?&>. In late 19hP the Board cane to meet mjah 

more frequently and in July 19lil be&an formal weekly sessions* 

The organisation which permitted the Chief of Staff and th<* Chief of 

Naval Operations and their immediate assistants not to waste tins in 

unnecessary meetings was the working arm of the Joint Board, the Joint 

Planning Comlttes* Made up of the T ^ar Plans Division Chiefs and their 

assistants, the Committee met often, discussed their particular problem with 

the other service's representatiTes, reached an understanding and presented 

the tentative a gr e em e nt to the Joint Board* Usually there was no further 

discussion in the Joint Board meetings on tentative agreements, since both 

Watson, op» clt« » p* 79* 

rurer, loc« clt » 

ataon, op* cit ,, pp 79-30 # 


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servloe chiefs kept informed on subjects by briefing and being briefed by 
their Hex Plane officers. Discussions in the Joint Flaming Committee 
conferences in reality reflected the views of the Chief of Staff and the 
Chief of Maval operations* Disagreements were resolved during Joint Board 
meetings or by the President, if necessary* Bfcr Hay 191*1 the work load of 
the Joint Planning Committee had increased to the point that another level 
in the staff structure was added. The assistants to the War Plans Directors 
formed a Joint Strategic Committee to work out details of joint war and 
operating plana and to reach agreement if possible, before submitting their 
work to the Joint Planning Committee and ultimately to the Joint Board for 
approval* "lanning matters other than joint war and operating plans were 
normally referred to ad hoc committees of the lannins Committee* 

-^ The organisation of the Joint Board was sound and it continued its work 
until superseded by Joint Chiefs of Staff in 19h2» The primary mission had 
been to coordinate war planning and in this effort it must be considered a 
success* Implementation was another matter* 

In the foregoing chapter the evolution of the authority of the Chief 
of Naval Operations was discussed to show the gradual change in the position 
of naval officers to influence foreign policy* In the earlier periods of 
the Mavy Department, the Secretary had exercised very positive control over 
all components of the naval forces* By the first part of World War II, 
Congress and the President accepted extensive control aver the idlest and 
supporting shore activities by a single officer, albeit under the authority 
of a civilian Secretary* Even before the military side of naval leadership 



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reachod this sonith of control, the President by executive order had directed 
that the Chief of Naval Operations end hie Army counterpart work directly 
with him on certain natters* Those matters generally pertained to war plans* 

As the authority of CM) increased, so increased the n$ed for competent 
Staff assistants to help solve the many concurrent problems* The two 
divisions of the Office of Chief of Ttaval Operations whose mission involved 
working with other governmental agencies were the War lans division and 
Central Division* Additionally CNO and his assistants in oommon causes with 
the Army formulated plans within the framework of the Joint Board of the 
Army and Navy and its subsidiary ooswittees* In the next chapter the plans 
so derived will be discussed* 

The evaluation of enemy potentialities , proposed courses of action and 
estimates of own future requirements which emanated from the above discussed 
officers influenced in varying degrees the political decisions made relative 
to Japan from 1936 to 191*1* The nature and degree of influence in certain 
areas are discussed in the following chapters* 

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Traditionally the period between wars has been used by professional 
military men to study past mistakes and successes and to prepare for future 
operations* The latter employment finds expression in staff estimates , 
studies and, finally, war plans. Ideally, the finished product would serve 
as an exact blueprint for successful operations against an enmw, utilising 
forces available which are equal to forces required. Aside from errors in 
estimates of enemy and own force capabilities and courses of action, the 
ideal is hardly possible because forces required in offensive operations are 
seldom available in the peacetime periods which allow for leisurely war 

The war planning by American military officers between the two World Wars 
of the twentieth century was generally done within the framework of the Joint 
Board and Joint laming Committee discussed in the previous chapter. 
Subsidiary war plans by Fleet, Army, Force, Corps and other descending 
subordinate commanders were based on the plans generated by the Joint Board. 
The one plan relative to a foreign power upon which most of the planning 
effort was spent was the Orange 'Ian, which considered action against Japan. 

Orange Plan underwent numerous changes between its initial appearance in 
192U and final revision in 193$— each change reflecting a change in the 
relative power oositions of Japan and the 'Jnited States. Superseded by a 
new sequence of Rainb ow war plans in 1939, Orange ^lan was never executed as 
an operational plan. The investment of time soent on Orange Plan was not 
lost, however. Experience in joint war planning and the development of 

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strategic thinking on Pacific problem* facilitated the writing of the 
Rainbow lans and unified the American Staff in discussions with the British 
in early 191*1 over proposod actions in the Pacific. 

The Orange Ian. 

In the immediate aftermath of World War I* the Joint Board* in an 
idealistic General Staff approach* undertook to prepare detailed plans for 
action in any conceivable emergency* A color vas assigned as the code word 
for each emergency and applied as veil to the country visualised as the enemy 
in that emergency. Prance was the code word for Japan and actions with 
Japan and Red applied to the British Empire* Blue for the United States was 
less war plan than a plan for the national position of the American military 
forces in certain contingencies with no particular enemy specified* Most of 
the hypothetical situations were highly improbable in the peacetime era of 
the early 1920* s* Ifo country menaced the United States* and few were 
physically able to do so after the devastations of World War I* Likewise* 
the Blue 'Ian was unrealistic in that the skeleton Army of l?21-19ii0 could 
n9M9r fulfill its assigned missions without general mobilisation* As 
strategic plans* most of the ten or twelve color plans developed between the 

ware were worthless* because they bore little relation to contemporary 

international political and military alignments* The major exception was 

the Qranne Flan, for war against Japan* That plan called for moving large 

Army units to the -Philippines and extensive naval operations* The color r>lans 

were valuable as abstract exercises in the technical process of detailed 

"llay S* Cline* W ashington Command n oet: The Orwrat ions Division, a 
volume in the series* Uniied states Army in World War II (Washington: 
Department of the Arwy, 19!>1) , p. 36* 

j or V 

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military planning. Onus former 'seiutant GO, who, of course, was a 

of the Joint Board by virtue of his of fie©, saidt 

I have always thought that our Orange Man was chiefly 
useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in 
War Planning aai to serve as a basis for asking for appro- 
priations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its 
shore facilities. As to actual executing the 0-1 plan I 
hope we will never be called on to do that unless the 
ufcdnistration fully realises the probable cost and duration 
of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support 
an expensive war of long duration. 2 

There were valid reasons even in the 1920 » a for considering Japan as the 
potential enemy in the ; aoific, and therefore a special subject for planning 
purposes* A review of the rapid changes in control over the Pacific islands 
will show part of those reasons. In 1898 the United States annexed Hawaii 
and after the short war with Spain acquired the Philippine Islands and Guam 
in the Marianas Islands. Toe next year Wake and part of Samoa were clained. 
In unprecedented time the United States hurdled across the Pacific to become 
a Far Eastern ower, simultaneously securing a sequence of potential bases 
extending all the way frost its west coast to the Philippines. 

Spain, shortly thereafter, bowed out of the Pacific by ceding the 
remainder of her island possessions in that ocean to Germany, who already 
controlled the raid-Pacific Marshall Islands to the east of the Spanish-owned 
groups. Germany received the Caroline and Marianas Islands, less Guam, 
without serious American objection because at the time Germany posed no threat 

in becoming a major naval power in the Pacific. Sven the foremost naval 

strategist of the day, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, could see "no sufficient 

Hearings hefpre the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl 

Harbor Attack , 79th Congress, United States Government Minting Office, 

(Washington, B.C., 19U6, 39 vols.), Tart 16, pp m 92U-925, Ltrj Adra. Pdchardson 

to Adm. Stark 26 January 19h0. (Hereafter cited as Paarl Harbor Attack ). 


Of. Chapter One, pp. >9 for Mahan* s theories. 

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reason for our opposition*" The subsequent events certainly were not 

anticipated* Japan and Britain signed a Treaty of Alliance in 1902 which 
the British invoked in 1911i to get Japan to clear the } aciiic of German 
cruisers* In the process the Japanese occupied the Marshall, Caroline and 
Marianas Islands "temporarily •" The temporary occupation stretched into 
near permanency when in 1920 the Leasts of Nations confirmed the former 
German islands as a mandate of Japan* Althou#i the non- fortification clause 
in the Vkshinston Naval Treaty 1921-22 was to remove offensive threats in 
the acific, the mere control of the former German islands gave Japan the 
potential to isolate the Philippines and Guam and to sever American lines 
of commerce to the Orient* American suspicions over Japanese intentions and 
preparations in the islands increased annually as Japan continually refused 
visits by Americans or Europeans to the various island groups* 

"Strategy- of the Pacific 1 * was a topic discussed by the Joint Board in 


1919 » but not until after the League of Nations had blessed Japan's position 

astride the route to the Philippines did The Joint Planning Committee 
recommend a war plan* The *fcr "Ian Orange was completed, approved by the 
Joint Board and the Secretary of the Navy in August 192U and by the 
Secretary of NW on September 3, 192h* According to the Orange plan, the 
United States would conduct "an offensive war, primarily naval, directed 
toward the isolation and harassment of Japan, through control of her vital 
sea communications and through offensive sea and air operations against her 

Harold and Margaret Sprout. Toward a New Order of 3sa Power (Princetoni 
Princeton University rose, 19U6), p* j£* 


Cf* Chapter Seven for discussion of attempts to get permission for 

American ships to visit the Mandated Islands* 


Watson, op* cit ** p* uoo. 

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XV i. 



«stnf tf"«oi/ 


H 111* 


naval forces and economic life, followed if necessary* by such further 
action as may bo required to win the war*" The initial mission for the Army 
and Navy was to gain superiority over the Japanese in sea power in the 
western Pacific* In order to accomplish the mission a major naval base was 
required, and Manila was considered the best location for such a base* 
Manila Bay and the approaches thereto were to be held by forces in the 
Philippines and by the Asiatic Fleet until reinforcerrants could arrive from 

the United States* In the original plan £0.000 men were to sail from the 

west coast within ten days after the start of hostilities* At the time of 

the plan the assigned missions for the Army and Navy were beyond their 

capabilities* They were to become even more unrealistic as the Army further 

deteriorated in the peacetime economy* 

The Army planners became increasingly more concerned over obvious 

deficiencies In forces available for planned operations* Brigadier* General 

Stanley D* Embick who designed the defenses of Corregidor and vas Commander 

of Harbor Defense of ianila and Subic Bays, wrote in 1933 while in the 

: ; hilippine8, and later reiterated in 1935 while serving in the 'Jar Plans 

division, that H To carry out the present Oram^e Plan — with the provisions 

for the early dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters— would be literally 

an act of madness*" Corregidor could hold against the Japanese for at least 

a year, but the surrounding land around ?4anila and Cavite would fall with 

little if any resistance* Smbick's contention was that as long as Corregidor 

held, Ma ni la Bay would be denied to the Japanese as a base* but as long as 

Iouis Horton, American and Allied Strategy in the Far Sast, Military 
Review . December 19lt9, Vol* XXIX. No* 9. p. 23* 

Watson, op, cit *. p* lil£* 

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the Japanese hold the surrounding area Manila Bay would be denied the 
United States as a base* 

After the passage of the Tydings-HeDuffie Act in March 193k granting 
Philippine independence* the American military and naval commanders in the 

Llippines recommended to their respective departments that* if the United 
States were going to defend the islands regardless of their independence* an 
adequate base be built and forces increased. If the United States were not 
going to defend the islands regardless of independence* the recommendation 
was that American forces, other than those necessary to internal order, be 
withdrawn* The Aragr section of the Joint 'laming Committee* in analysing 
the recommendations of the Philippine commanders* maintained that the 
question of being able to defend Manila Bay depended upon the ability of the 
Navy to guarantee safe passage of troop reinforcements Immediately after the 
start of war* If the Asiatic Fleet could not delay the Japanese advance 
long enough* or* if the Pacific Fleet were not strong enough to escort 
sufficient troops to the Philippines, then the mission of the Philippine 
Department of the Army would have to be changed* In other words* the 
Philippine phase of the Orange Plan would have to be revised* At this starve* 
the Navy apparently believed that it could perform its part of the mission* 
And so the recommendations of the Philippine commanders were rejected by the 
Joint Board* An awareness of weaknesses was obvious* however* because the 
Joint Board stated that forces in the Philippines should be increased to 1$5 

planes* 2it submarines and 15 patrol planes and that the harbor defense. 


anticraft and mobile troop strength be augmented. 


'Louis Morton* Military Review* op. clt .* pp. 25-26. 

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A year later In May 1935 Oran.ya Plan was revised again* The change in 
the Navy concept uas significant, since It was the strategy ultimately used 
in World War II* The Pacific fleet an broach to the Philippines would be a 
progressive movement. The first objective, to be undertaken as soon as 
practicable, was to seise the Marshall and Caroline Islands tram. Japan in 
order to develop advance bases and secure the lines of communications to the 
Western Pacific* The next year there was another revision. The earlier 
missions of the Army 2nd Navy forces in the Philippines had been two folds 
to hold the entrance to Manila Bay, and to hold the Manila Bay area itself 
as long as possible. The second part of the mission was dropped* In 
addition, the proposed 50,000 troops from the west coast to be embarked 
within ten days of hostilities was dropped from the Orange Plan* The defense 
force of the Philippines would consist of a 10*000 United States troop 
garrison, the Philippine Army and such troops as could be evacuated from 
China* These troops were to hold out for six months until the Navy could 
open the line of communications across the Central Pacific* 

Prior to the last revision of Orange Plan an incident occurred relative 
to Presidential interest in the war plans* >.Mle on a South American cruise 
in December 1936, President Roosevelt inquired of his Naval Aide, Captain 
Bastedo, about the status of the War lans* (In the light of subsequent 
history, the question could be considered a harbinger of change in 
Presidential emphasis* His first term had been devoted tc social experimenta- 
tion in solving the domestic problems of the country* Increased international 
tensions and the overwhelming victory of the previous November seemed to turn 


Ib:'d.» p* 26. 

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the attention of the President to wore active interest in international 

affaire •) Captain Bastedo directed the President** question to the Chief 

of Naval Operations. The paragraph relative to the acific in CNO's answer 

indieateo the general nature of the reply to the Haval Aide. 

^lan for ijar in the Pacific * This plan requires the 
maximum effort on the part of the Havy* Its conception 
is that if the United States is attacked by a Pacific 
Power, the war can only be terminated and a decision 
reached by carrying the war to the Western Pacific* 
Practically all detailed planning is confined to this 
plan as the Joint Board had decided that war in the 
'acific is more probable than war with any- other major 
naval Power*^ 

The "China Incident" of 1937 and the growing military mi^ht and 
national mobilisation of fascist Germany and Italy suddenly confronted the 
United States military leaders with problems of the first magnitude* The 
Navy* so long considered the "first line of deftmse" was numerically a one- 
ocean navy* The Anqy was near its lowest ebb and incapable of mustering an 
expeditionary force for offensive operations any place. On March 17 , 1937 
the Joint Board restudied the current draft of the 3asie Orange Ian in the 
H$it of recent events. On November 16, 1937 the Board approved a 
reeoawndation by the Axwy Chief of Staff, Cfcneral Craig, to rescind the 
plan and to prepare a new plan in line with forces available* A new plan 
offered by Joint banning Committee was rejected and on January 19 Mxs two 
service authorities on Pacific problems, Major-Oeneral Stanley D* Eabiek and 
Bear Admiral James 0. Richardson, were directed to make a further Pacific 
study* Their efforts were accepted as a new Orange Ian by the Joint Beard 

^rteaot CNO to Pre*. Naval Aide, 12 Jan. 1937; KB Filet Al6~3/warfare, 

'0* Mtt 

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on 21 February and by the Secretaries of Var and Navy a week later* On 

the basis of this latest plan the Navy asked for and received from the 

President and Congress authorisation for a twenty percent increase in sise* 

The same set of facts that prompted a review of the war plans and their 

revision also prompted the Navy to send a representative to London to seek 

possible British cooperation against the Japanese* 

Although the latest Orange Plan related to Japan only* it was obvious 

to the planners that the European situation would increasingly bear upon the 

American strategic position* On November 12* 1938 the Joint Board instructed 

the Joint "lanning Committee 

. *to make exploratory studies and estimates as to the 
various practicable courses of action open to the military 
and naval forces of the United States in the event of 
(a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the 
Fascist powers, and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand 
Japanese influence in the Philippines ••"* 

The planners presented their study five and a half months later* They 

concluded that Germany and Italy could violate the Monroe Doctrine by 

supporting Fascist revolutions in Latin America* The relegation of such 

countries to the status of colonies would give to their European exploiters 

the advantages of trade, access to raw materials* and military and naval 

bases* From such bases the Panama Canal possibly could be attacked* Finally 

the planners discounted the German or Italian action in Latin America unless: 

(1) Germany believed that Britain and France would not intervene and 

(2) Japan were to attack the Ihilippines and Guam and even then only in case 

^fotson, op* cit ** p* 92* 

^Cf* Chapter Four, p* 67 for details of the visit* 
^Watson, op* cit *» pp* 97-93* 

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the tilted States had responded to the Japanese attack by counterattack in 

the western Pacific. 

The Rainbow Plane* 

However* to overcome glaring deficiencies in present war plans con- 
cerning concerted action by Germany* Italy and Japan* the Joint Planning 
Committee recommended that future plans reflect the new possibilities* That 
recommendation received immediate approval and action. In less than three 

weeks* four of a new family of tentative plans were~ offered by the Joint 

Planning Committee to the Joint Board for approval* They were Rainbows 1* 

2, 3 and it* 

The most limited plan (RAINBOW 1) would provide for 
the defense of the Lestem Hemisphere south to the bulge 
of Braail (10° south latitude) — the Western iieraisphere 
being taken to include Greenland (but not Iceland* the 
Azores* or the Cape Verde Islands) to the east* and 
American Samoa* Hawaii* and Wake (but not Guam or the 
hilippines) to the west* Two other plans would provide 
alternatively for the extension of operations from this 
area either to the western Pacific (RAINBOW 2) or to the 
rest of South America (RAINBOW 3). The directive also 
called for modification of the first three plans under the 
contingency (RAINBOW k) that Great Britain and France 
were at war with Germany and Italy (and possibly Japan)* 
in which case it was assumed that the nited States would 
be involved as a major participant. 

Reexamination of the possibilities under Rainbow k led the planners to 

the conclusions that if all the major powers were at war using their current 

forces* operations in Latin America would probably be very limited in scope 

while operations by Japan in the aciflc would probably be extensive in 

scope* The recommendation was made that there be two plans covering Pnited 


Matloff * ?4aurioe and Ldwin M. f nell* strategic -' leaning for Coalition 

Warfare* I9hl- ljh2 t in the series "nit ed St ates Army in World War II* 

ishington, D.C., 1?S3), p. 5. 


Ibid.* p. 6. 

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states participation with Britain and Franc* against Germany, Italy and 
Japan* One plan provided for the United States to furnish armies for a 
maximum effort in Europe against Qernany and Italy, while the other plan 
called for MOT providing maximum effort in Surope, maintaining the Monroe 
Ttoctrine and carrying out "allied Democratic Power tasks in the Pacific •" 
The Navy by this time, June 1939$ had had talks with the 3ritish over 
cooperation in the Pacific against the Japanese and unofficial agreements had 
been reached over cooperative action* The Joint Planning Cownitteo recommended 
that the plan for the United States to concentrate in the Pacific be moved 
up in priority to the Rainbow 2 position where it mi^it "conceivably press 
more for answers'* than plans other than Rainbo w 1 would* Part of the 
Justification for the change in priority readi 

Whether or not we have any possible intention of 
undertaking a war in this situation, nevertheless we may 
take measures short of war, and in doing so should 
clarify the possible or probable war task that would be 
involved* 1 ? 

A week later on June 30, 193° the Joint Board approved the recommended 
change in priority* The revised description of the new five Rainbow plans 

a* Joint Army and Mavy Basic Vfcr Plan Rainbow IJo. It 

Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine 
by protecting that territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the 
vital interests of the United States can be threatened, while protecting 
the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade* This 
territory is assumed to be any part of the v&stern Hemisphere north of 
the approximate latitude ten degrees south* 

This plan will not provide for projecting U.S. Array forces farther 
south than the approximate latitude ten decrees south or outside of the 
Western Hemisphere* 

17 Ibid., p* 7. 



I mm id ii 

***** mtmc 

naln fierf* * 5 not •*•« 


- - 

b» Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow Ho* 2t 

(1) Provide for the missions in a* 

(?) Under the assumption that the United States, Great Britain, 
and France are acting in concert, on terms wherein the ifaited States 
does not provide maximum participation in continental Europe, but 
undertakes, as its major share in the concerted effort, to sustain the 
interests of Democratic lowers in the Pacific, to provide for the 
tasks essential to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces 
in the Pacific* 

c* Joint Army and -Javy Basic Mar 3an Rainbow No* 3i 

(1) Carry out the missions of the Joint Amy and Navy Basic War 
Plan — Rainbow No* 1* 

(2) Protect United States 1 vital interests in the Western Pacific 
by securing control in the Western Pacific, as rapidly as possible 
consistent with carrying out the missions in a« 

d« Joint Army and Mavy Basio War Plan Rainbow No. Us 

(1) ITevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Monroe 
Doctrine by protecting all the territory and Governments of the Western 
Hemisphere against external aggression while protecting the United 
States, its possessions, and its sea-borne trade* This Plan will 
provide for projecting such <7«S* Army Forces as necessary to the southern 
part of the South American continent or to the Eastern Atlantic* 

e* Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No* $% 

(1) Provide for the missions in a* 

(2) rojoct the armed forces of the United States to the Eastern 
Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European Continents, 
as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in a 
above, in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or 
both* This plan will assume concerted action between the United States, 
Great Britain, and France. 1 " 

With the definitions of strategic objectives having been clarified, the 

Joint Planning Committee had the basis for all future planning until war cams 

to the United States in December 19iil* A shifting emphasis in the priority 

of developing the five Hainbow plans resulted from changes in the international 

situation* All the plans must be reviewed here because of their bearing on 


Ibid.* pp* 7-8} quote from JPC Report 27 July 1939, JB 325, serial 




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the plans against Japan, Rainbows 2, 3 and 5* 

As should bo expected ths security of the Astern Hemisphere received 
first priority* Rainbow 1 was submitted to the Joint Board on 27 July 1939, 
where it was studied, slightly changed and submitted directly to ? resident 

Roosevelt in accordance with his order of $ July 1939* The resident 

approved the plan orally on lu October 1939. 

While the plan was before the President, Admiral Stark, the Chief of 

Naval Operations, sent to Under Secretary of State Mr* Welles a meaorandna 

dated Hi August* 

There is enclosed a secret memorandum relative to the 
political aspects of the plan—Rainbow Ho* 1* I believe it 
is necessary for your background but feel that since it 
quotes joint basic war plans it should be destroyed or other* 
wise adequately protected after you have read it* 

Part of the enclosed secret memorandum read? 

• • .The General Situation under which these plans are being 
prepared is as follows: Germany, Italy and Japan, acting in 
concert, violate the letter and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine* 
Japan, supported by Germany and Italy, violates by armed 
aggression vital interests of the United States in the 
Western Pacific* It is to be assumed that aggression 
initiated by on© or two of these powers will be eventually 
supported by the concerted action of all three*2- 

The next priority alter Rainbow 1 applied to Rainbows 2 and 3, the two 

Pacific area plans. "The Joint Board had directed the Joint banning 

Committee in June 1939 to give priority to the development of plans for United 

States naval offensive in western Pacific (Hainbow Ho* 2 and No* 3) in the 

19 Cf. Chapter TWO, p. 23. 

CI* ** °P* cit «j p* !>6j (2) Watson, op. cit. , p* 103* 

nemo? CNO to Under Sec. State, lU August 19U9j 1WD Files j Al6-3A;arfare, 


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event of war with Japan*" Yen after war broke in .Europe a few months 

later , the strategic thinking continued to emphasise the plans against Japan* 

Since Britain and France controlled the Atlantic, and to a lesser degree the 

North and Mediterranean Seas, the most likely action to involve the United 

States in war would be an attack by Japan in the Pacific* 4 lanning for such 

an eventuality was much more complex than planning for Orange plans in the 

past. Hot only ware other ♦♦Democratic Powers" involved in the Pacific, but 

additional potential enemies who might act in concert existed in the Atlantic* 

Another problem facing the planners was how far the Japanese would 

advance and in which directions before the United States and the "Democratic 

owers" could take action* 

The Navy planners at the outset set up three alternative 
hypotheses* The first was that Japan would not have begun 
moving southward from Formosa* In that case the U.S. Fleet 
might move to Manila Bay, "with certain groups visiting 
Singapore, Kamranh Bay, and Jfcng Kong." Ground forces 
might be moved to the western Pacific at the same time or 
later* The Navy planners thought that these acts might 
prevent Japanese moves southward, and hence prevent a war 
in the Pacific* The second hypothesis was that Japan had 
taken Hong Kong, Kamranh Bay, and begun operations in the 
Netherlands Indies, that the United States would react by 
moving forces to the far Pacific, and that the Japanese in turn 
would begin operations to seise Guam and the Philippines* The 
third hypothesis was that the Japanese would already have con- 
trol of tlie Netherlands Indies and would have forces in position 
to isolate Singapore and take the hilippines* In this case, 
as the Army planners pointed out, "the rincipal advantage of 
Allied participation will have been lost and the problem 
becomes essentially that of an Orange War. "23 

The second hypothesis became the basis of the development of Rainbow 2 

and 3« "On 10 April 1910 the Joint Board had further directed the Joint 

Captain Tracy B* Kittredge, JSNR, Tnpublished Monograph on the nited 

States Navy in World War II, on file in Navy History Division* Sect* III, 

Vol. I, Note 83, p. 2U0. 

2 \ 

tetloff and Snell, op* cit ., p. 9. 

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Planning Committee to proceed immediately with the completion of plana for 
an Immediate projection of U*S* forces into the Western Pacific (Rainbow 
No* 2) * n The initial movement of forces was planned for Singapore and the 
Dutch Saat Indies, to be supported, if the second hypothesis held true, 
across the Atlantic, around the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean* Xo 
insure that Singapore would be available to the U*S* Fleet, the Navy 
recommended that the British be asked to send a division of capital ships to 
reinforce their Far Eastern naval forces* The Navy further recommended that 
the British, Dutch and French authorities be contacted diplomatically to 
ascertain their proposed actions in the °aeific vis & vis Japanese aggression* 

Another explosive political question was whether U*S* forces would be used 

to defend the European colonial possessions* ' Before these questions could 

be answered events in Europe turned attention from the ■■ acific* 

In rapid succession in the Spring of 19 >£ Denmark, Norway, Holland and 

Belgium fell* France was falling fast in June and within the American 

military circles there was genuine fear that the French and possibly even the 

British Fleets would fall into German hands* In May, before France had 

fallen, the 'resident, Mr* Welles, Admiral Stark and General Marshall hid 

agreed that "we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not concern 

ourselves beyond the 190th Meridian, and that we must concentrate on the 

South American situation*" Work was suspended on Rainbows 2 and 3, but 

evidently only by the Army, as will be shown shortly. Rainbow h received 

top priority — 

Jvlttredfre Monograph, loc» clt» 

25 26 

" Mat" off and Snell, op* cit », pp. 9-l r . £., ?• 13* 


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To provide for the most effective use of United States' 
naval and military forces to defeat enemy aggression 
occurring anywhere in the territory and waters of the 
American continents, or in the United States, and in United 
States' possessions in the Pacific westward to include 
Uhalaska and Midway**? 

The Plan was finished in May and forwarded by the then Secretaries of War and 

Mavy, Harry I • Vbodring and Lewis Compton, respectively, to the 'resident on 

June 13* n July 12 the "resident asked the new Secretaries of war and Navy, 

Henry L* Stimson and Frank Knox, to read the plan. They resubmitted it on 

July 26 and the Preeident approved it on August lu* * 

In the meanwhile the Navy had continued to work on Rainbow 3* although 

in November 19U^ A&niral Stark wrote his ^lan Dog which closely paralleled 

Rainbow 5* On November 29 Oeneral Marshall expressed grave concern over the 

plan of the Navy ( Rainbow 3) calling for holding the Haley Barrier against 

the Japanese southward movement* He suggested; 

• .•readjusting war plans on the basis (1) that our 
national interests require that we resist proposals that do 
not have for their immediate goal the survival of the 
British Umpire and the defeat of Germany} and (2) that we 
avoid dispersions that might lessen our power to operate 
effectively, decisively, if possible* in the principal 
theater — the Atlantic. Such a basis might provide 

a* that our naval threat should be continued in the 
Pacific so long as the situation in the Atlantic permits* 

b* that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should 
avoid dispersing our forces into that theater, we should, 
however, assist the British to reinforce their naval set- 
up in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligations 
in the Atlantic* This would provide a more homogeneous 
force for lalaysia and would, in effect, concentrate rather 
than disperse our naval eetabllsJawnt*^ 

Stark answered with a memorandum the same day* ''Should we become engaged in 

27 M 

Ibid* Ibid ., n!>* 

Watson, op* cit** pp* 121-122. 

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the war described In Rainbow 3* it will not be through my doings * but because 

those In niftier authority have decided that it is to our best national 

interests to accept such a war*" >ther evidence of the CN0 ( s tenseness 

over possible Japanese action in the Fall of 2$k0 to take advantage of the 

European situation is sh wi by a memorandum exactly a week earlier to CJeneral 

Marshall} "Over here we are much concerned with the possibility of having a 

war en our hands due to precipitate Japanese action* " One of the largest 

areas of doubt was British intentions. Those doubts were soon to be resolved 

in the forthcoming American-British meetings in January. 

The discussions with the British in early 19U1 are described in detail 

in the next Chapter* During the conversations, claiming on Rainbow plans 

was suspended* The American position during the conversations was basically 

that found in Rainbow £* and as soon as the Chief of Staff and the Chief of 

Naval Operations had approved the ABC-1 Report a new Rainbow $ was ordered* 

The first draft was completed on April 7 and three weeks later it was 

submitted by the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board for approval* 

On May Hi the Joint Board approved Rainbow 5 and ABC-1* On June 2 the two 

plans were sent to the President* the Secretary of the Navy having approved 

on May 28 and the Secretary of War on June 2* The "resident read the 

documents and returned them without approval or disapproval on June ?• The 

Presidential military aide offered this explanation: 

* The President has familiarised himself with the two 
papers j but since the report of the United States British 
Staff Conversations* \DC-1* had not been approved ^ the 
British Government* he would not approve the report at 
this time j neither would he now give approval to Joint Army 
and Navy Basic War HLan-Rainbow No* 5* which is based 

^Ibid** p. 122* 31 Ibid., p. 121* 

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m the report ABC-1, However, in case of war the oapers 
would be returned to the President for hie approval*^ 

The general assumptions and the concept of war of the Joint Rainbow 5 

were Identical with those of ABC-1. The Army and Navy each wrote a 

supporting Rainbow $ plan for the guidance of their respective forces. The 

Navy Rainbow 5 plan was promulgated on May 26, 19U1. ' Many of the tasks 

assigned were by now familiar, since some had been in the orange Ian and 

all were in general terse in ABG-1. 

The °aclfic Fleet was assigned the task of diverting 
enemy strength away from the Halay barrier Ijy the denial 
and capture of positions in the Marshall*, and by raids on 
enemy bases and ocraminioatione* The Pacific Idlest was 
also to defend Wake, Guam, Midway, Samoa, and other 
American island*, as well as "prepare to capture" the 
mandated islands and establish an advanced base at Truk* 
These moves would be necessary preparatory steps to the 
mintenanc* of the line of communications between the 
United States and the Philippine Islands, and the 
establishment of American naval superiority in the Western 

The defensive strategy in the Pacific and the plan to exert 
effort against the European enemies first, precluded any reinforcements 
being sent to the acific* Hainbow £ reflected that defensive thinking* The 
preceding Orange Plane had been unrealistic for want of forces* The Rainbow 
plans were by comparison quite sophisticated in that deficiencies were 
recognised and planned for in the period until the United State* could 
mobilise and build up the supplies of materials to support .its allies end 


" temo: Col. Scobey to CNO, 9 June 191*1 j HHD File; Misc* 1. 

The Savy Basic v/ar ""Ian-Rainbow Se* $ is found In earl Harbor Attack ^ 

-art 18, pp. 287£-?9liO* 

3U Mo 

rton, Military Review, op. pit .* p* 38* 

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The evolution of war plane In the ye rs between the two world wara had 
one continuous feature* War with Japan was considered the most probable war 
the United States would fl^t* H/ork continued on Orang e ^lans and their 
revisions until changes in the balance of pouer in Europe raised new threats 
to United States and Western Hemispheric security* In the new circumstances 
Japan was even more a potential enemy, for her relative and actual military 
power in the Pacific had increased and she had gained possible (later actual) 
allies in Europe • The shift to the folnbow group of plans placed the 
probable war between Japan and t3ie United States in the perspective of world 
conditions* Even considering the more immediate threat of Germany and Italy 
to national interests in 1939* the second and third priority plans* t lainbows 
2 and 3* related directly to action against Japan, tfith further changes in 
the military picture in Europe in the Spring of 19hP$ the decision was made 
to concentrate on defeating Germany by assisting Britain* War with Japan 
was still considered hi$ily probable* but it would havo to be defensive* 
The offensive plan against Japan, Rainbow 2 and 3* were finally cancelled 
on 6 August 19?4l» Rainbow 5* vjhich encompassed the whole war effort, was 

the plan with which the United States entered the war* "ot until h May 191*2 

^r® ft******** 1 and h cancellod* " Although the strategy in the ■vranst Plans 

of progressively advancing through certain island groups to defeat Japan was 

ultimately used in the Faci£ic, Rainbow 5 was the plan adopted, ^miany, 

not Japan* had hi iciest priority on the list of onemles. 

35 Cline, op* eit », p* £?• 




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The period immediately proceeding 1936 (the point of departure for this 
paper) was narked by extreme economic doldrums, social pressures resulting 
in governmental experimentation and general military inactivity. After 
World War I the Jnited States had rejected "foreign entanglements" by 
refusing to join the League of Nations* In the subsequent search for peace 
without using force the United States gave up a position sans pareil in the 
ship building race to overcome the British naval supremacy and in a complete 
reversal led the way to drastic naval sera; ring and limitations. In the 
same search for peace by treaty, the I nited States joined with France in 
promoting world acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 to "renounce 
way as an instrument of national policy. n 

"^-Xhe journey down the idealistic path to peace led past rlgnpcets 
which iniicated that all was not well with the world. The »SM »!»• of 
Manchuria, Ethiopia and the Rhineland served as evidence of how the r~si:jg 
military power of Japan, Italy and Germany would be used. How to act 
effectively against incipient political/military power diametrically op? osed 
to national interests without generating public hysteria or negative reaction 
is a problem inherent in a democracy of elected officials. (Fear of 

lie opinion vis a vis unpopular actions has dampened if not deterred many 
.tioal decisions.) 

im course of action against i jntial enemy is the obvious alignment 
of allies. If pi*: ere done ii RMMMt between the military groups of 

the United States and peselMUl allies, national ■tritettn war lane might 


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thereby be derived. Future collective military action might tlien be 

executed almost immediately after political approval of such plane* 

A review of the study of War r lans in the prece-ding Chapter will show 
the relative readiness of the Navy for certain action against Japan and the 
pitiful impotency of the Army to defend the continent much less field the 
expeditionary force to move through the Pacific Islands. It is no small 
wonder then that the Navy should desire to investigate the possibilities of 
British cooperation to complement its own courses of action against Japan} 
or that the Pr<@sldent should desire to deter further successes of opposing 
ideologies by naval action if possible or that there should be similar 
desires in Britain for cooperation against an enemy in common. 

This Chapter is devoted to the review of the growth of British- 
American cooperation from simple exploratory talks in London in January 
1936 to full scale cooperation as World War II involved first the one then 
the other of the English-speaking opponents of Japan. 

The relationship of the British and American Navies has varied in 
extremis from open hostility concomitant with the birth of the latter to the 
nicest sense of cooperation in the two world wars of the twentieth century. 
British naval tradition, organization and tactics transposed to the 
embryonic American fleet remained from colonial days a latent common bond. 
The American Navy, through lack of funds and national apathy deteriorated 
into insignificance after the victories of 1812. In fact, the omnipresent 
British Fleet and its excellent system of world wide bases, while protecting 
the Empire lines of commerce, also provided the bulwark behind which the 
onroe Doctrine and American Far "astern policy matured with no seriour 

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outside challenge* 

The changing political and military balance of power in Europe in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century I'ound the British naval 
supremacy effectively challenged by a modern German fleet* The innovation 
of submarine warfare aggravated the seriousness of the international position 
of Britain* The British retaliated with blockade measures* American 
commerce and American lives quickly became pawns in the game* The diplomatic 
exchange of notes between the ' nited States and Germany and Britain over the 
first submarine warfare campaign did bring about a cessation of sinkings 
without warning in April 1916* However, shortages in American anti- 
submarine forces and the ?tevy in general left -resident Wilson with a weak 
hand in hi w coercive attempts to force Germany and Britain to respect our 
neutral status* His proposal for a conference to end the war was rejected 
by both sides* He concluded then that it was necessary to provide naval 
forces sufficient to take care of our rights as neutrals* independently* 
since the Allies did not want the mited States in the war on its own terms 

and the Germans were not ready to compromise* He therefore persuaded 

Congress in August, 1916 to vote a large naval building program. The program 

came too late to influence the Germans* In February 1917 the second 

submarine campaign started "to isolate England by sea despite any effort the 


Cf. Ernest R* May, The World War and American Isolation 19IU-19 17 

(Cambridge: Harvard University ress, 1959)* 'art II, p. 113ff. for an 
excellent discussion on German-American relations relative to the first 
submarine campaign* 


The program called for construction within three years of ten battle- 
ships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, sixty-seven 
submarines and thirteen miscellaneous type vessels* 

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United States night make." 

The General Board anticipated the outbreak of war and on February 1*, 
1917 recommended to the Navy Department a possible w.r program with the 
following points t 

(a) mobilize fleet and start patrol work and mine sweeping; 

(b) dock and repair all ships; (c) increase personnel of 
navy to 150,000 and Marine Corps to 30,000 officer 
personnel being increased in proportion; (d) rash to com- 
pletion all vessels building or authorised and build up 
aviation forces as rapidly as possible (e) take possession 
of all vessels of the Central Powers and remove all enemy 
aliens who might do harm; (f) arm merchant vessels; and 
(g) prepare plans in cooperation with the Allies for 
offensive operations against the enemy.** 

^arly in 1917#the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, 

discussed with American Ambassador Walter Hines Page a visit to London by 

an American Admiral. Rear Admiral William 5. Sims, Head of the Naval War 

College, chosen for the mission, left for t ondon with no instructions and 

re; ortedly with this admonition from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 

Villiem r. Benson t 

Don*t let the British pull the wool over your eyes* It 
is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of 
the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the 

Sims with an aide, Commander J.V. Baboock, traveling under aliases a£ 


Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (Hew York: G. • 

?utnam»s Sons, 191*8), pT3o7u 

HDonald W. Jtltohell, History of the Modern American Navy (New Ycrkt 
«lfred «. Knopf, 19lt6), p. 199. 

Kittredge Monograph , Vol. I, feet. Ill, Part A, Chp. 10, p. 209. 

Siting Ba Morlson, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston* 
Houghton HLfflin Company, 191*2), p. 338. 

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7 8 

S*W* Davidson and V.J. Richardson, respectively, arrived on April 9. 

Sins was amazed to be informed most confidentially of the true gravity of 

the submarine situation from Admiral Jellico* SinkL' gs of merchant ships 

had reached 5^0,000 tons in February and aliaost 600,000 tons in March, and 

were then progressing at the rate of nearly 900,000 tons for April — three 

or four times the amounts which the public had been led to assume* The 

urgent call for destroyers was answered slowly but gradually the increased 

number of American destroyers and the system of convoying merchant ships 

urged on the British Admiralty by .admiral Sims proved the telling difference 

against the submarine and Germany 1 !? attempt to negate Britain's naval 


The flag secretary to Admiral Sims during his tour as the Senior 
American Naval Officer in Jliropean waters was Tdeutenant Commander fftrold R* 
Stark* Stark had brought his command, a flotilla of torpedo boats, from the 
Asiatic Station to help the British in the Mediterranean and English Channel* 
His experience in working with the British under wartime conditions would 
prove valuable twenty-four years later when he was the Chief of Naval 

The interim period between world wars found both British and American 
naval officers attempting to balance forces under the treaty limitations on 


The British conferees to the ABC meetings in Jan. 19U1 came as members 
of a purchasing committee* 

Mitchell, op* cit ., p. 205* 

Knox, op* cit ., p* 38?* 


The Navy Department was inclined to disbelieve the urgency for the 

destroyers and did not order the first ships to be fitted out until the iiith 

of April* As late as July 5th only thirty-fair destroyers had arrived at 

Queenstown* Ibid., p* 38f. 

8 V 

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siae and new construction in their respective navies* with little contact 
existing between the two services except at the conference tables. 

r-re-5 earl Harbor 7 laraiing. 

~arly in 1937 the Joint Board restudied the draft of the joint Army 
and Navy Basic Ian Orange which dated from 1928. Hie shortcomings, 
especially in the non-existent Army ex editions ry force and, in a more 
limited sense, the naval requirements, were obvious to the planners* The 
Navy, aware of British interests and responsibilities in parts of the 
western Pacific and the possibility of future cooperation against a militant 
Japan, decided to conduct private conversations with the Admiralty* 
Actually the conversations were to have a two-fold purpose* to find out what 
could be done if the T Jnited States and Britain found themselves at war with 
Japan and to take up with the British the question of getting out of the 

qualitative limitations of the sisse of battleships which had been stipulated 

in the London Treaty of 1935 and 1936* 

The individual chosen to go to London was Captain Royal £• Ingersoll, 

chief of War Plans Division, (Op* 12). The mission had much more 

significance than the visit of one Captain to converse with his British 

counterpart* Not only was Ingersoll briefed by his naval superior, Admiral 

William D. Leahy, the Chief of 'Javal Operations, but he also was called to 

ti» White House for a Presidential briefing. L?;on his arrival in London, 

Ingersoll was taken by the American charg^ d« affaires to the Foreign Minister 

U v ;a t 8 on, op. olt .. p. *. 


earl Hnrbor Attack , art 9, p. 1*273* 

13 Ibid., n. 1*276* 

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rtr. Anthony rien, who had cancelled a post-Christmas holiday to sec 
Ingersoll. Ingersoll told Mr. Eden that U.S. Navy plana of action in the 
Pacific were based on certain assumptions about the dispositions the British 
might be able to make and that the same was probably trie about their plans. 
-A President Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy thought the time had cone "to carry 
natters a stage further by exchanging information in order to co-ordinate 
our plans more closely." Ingersoll was free to disclose the American 
dispositions under certain eventualities and desired to learn what the 
British dispositions would be under like circumstances. In answer to a 
question from Kr. Men relative to possible courses of action now or in the 
future, Ingersoll replied that the discussions which were to be held 
between himself and the Admiralty rt would be limited to future incidents 
against which joint action might later be taken, /but that/ no move could 
be made at all in the Pacific, unless full preparation had been made for 
every eventuality, including war. M Ingersoll thought the technical examina- 
tion between the two countries should come first, after which any considers- 

tions on political decisions should be easier. The technical talks were 

held with Captain Thomas Phillips, Ingersoll «s opposite in the War Plans 

Division of the Admiralty. 

Ingersoll noted hia impressions during his visit in a diary report to 

the Chief of Naval Operations! 

Mr. ilden appeared more interested right now in immediate 
gestures to impress the Japanese than he was in long- 
range planning. ..British not counting on any aid from 


Anthony Sden, Memoirs a Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1962), pp m 619-620. 

earl Harbor Attacks art 9, p. U273» 

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t<.B8it 9 France or Dutch.* British interested in Manila 
as base. Fear Hong Kong too vulnerable from land attack 
.••British do not believe the Japanese would attempt 
to take the Philippines while occupied in China and 
believed they are safe if the British Fleet were at 
Singapore and the nited States Fleet were at Hawaii or 
to the westward thereof.. .Their fleet should start for 
Singapore and curs for Hawaii to arrive apj roxiraately 
the sane tins. Should blockade be decided by the 
government they would hold a line roughly from 
Singapore through the itetherlands rast ladies past &»w 
Guinea and New Hebrides eastward of Australia and New 
Zealand. ••Admiralty would provide communications codes 
and ciphers for use in coordinated conraunications... 
Admiralty believes that a show of strength by the two 
fleets nay be necessary, even if there are* no 
hostilities with Japan, in order to bring about peace 
terns between China and Japan which will continue the 
rinciple of the "open door. "16 

A The official "Record of Conversations" of January 12, 1938, signed by 

Captains Ingersoll and -hillips agreed to recommend cooperation in case of 

war with the Japanese, the British basing a fleet at Singapore and the 

United States concentrating a fleet at earl Harbor. 

Admiral Leahy, CM), took speoial cognisance of the British statement of 

intentions as understood by Ingersoll* In a letter to the two key fleet 

commanders he stated i 

In the event that the .nited States and British Govern- 
ments should, at some indefinite tine in the future, 
decide that parallel action by the two governments in 
regard to their Far Eastern policies (including naval 
operations) is necessary, certain assumptions must be 
nade in order to adopt existing Orange Plane to the 
changed situation - that is Blue and Red against 
Orange,. ./detractions from the assumptions found in 
enclosure""to basic letter7... Should the British 
Government decide to sen? a naval force to the Far 
East it would send the force as a single tactical 

Memo: Capt. ingersoll to CND, Jan. l?3oj NJC File: Correspondence 

British-ilS Conversations in London 1938-1939. 

Pearl Iforbor Attack , art 9, p. u275, (?) S.E. Korison, Vol. Ill, 

op* oit ., p« k9* 

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unit and its strength would bo sufficient to engage the 
Japanese Fleet under normal tactical and strategical 
conditions. ••In the event of a general Iiiroi>ean war 
resulting , it would almost certainly be necessary for 
the British to effect a considerable reduction in their 
naval strength in the Far East* With the reduction of 
British strength in the Far East under such conditions 
there would probably be required direct tactical 
cooperation between the United States and British Fleets 
in the Pacific ...Should the British Governra<int send its 
fleet to Singapore , the advance of the United States 
Fleet to Truk or some other position in the sane general 
area can be assumed as the first phase of operations of 
the nited States Fleet, after the decision is made to 
dispatch the United States Fleet beyond the Hawaiian 
Islands. • .Should parallel action be decided upon by the 
two governments, it can be assigned that the British 
will withdraw their garrisons in North China and the 
major units of the British China Fleet to Kong Kong or 
Singapore and that such withdrawals would probably be 
timed with the movement of the British Main Fleet to 
the Far Eaet.^8 

-^. Less than ayear later the assumptions were invalid as regards the 

British ability to send a fleet to Singapore. The European situation had 

again drawn as a powerful magnet the major units of the British Fleet to 

European waters. What could have been suspected by even an amateur 

strategist studying the deepening crisis in 1939 9 was confirmed by informal 

talks in Washington in June 1939. The British Iteval Attache, Captain L.C.A. 

St. J. Curzon-tfowe and Commander T.C. Hampton of the British Admiralty met 

with Admiral Leahy and Read Admiral Robert Ghormley, chief of War lans 


Commander Hampton stated he was enroute to duty in 
Asiatic Station and had been sent by the Admiralty to 
inform the Chief of Ilaval Opera t lone that the situation 
in Europe and the Far East had changed so much during 
the past one and one-half years that the Admiralty now 

18 „ 

Letter SB to CINC'IS and CINCAF, Serial 218 2 Feb. 1938* File: 

Correspondence British-' IB Conversations in London 1938-1939, NHD, CIJO 


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desired to inform the Navy Department that in view 
of the threat of Germany and Italy against England 
and Franc* that the European situation demanded the 
presence in European waters of all capital ships 
and most of the other vessels of their Fleet, so 
that if Japan threatened, the British would not be 
able to send the force to the Far East thr.t had 
been contemplated in the conversations with Hear 
Admiral Zngeraoll* It is the present intention 
for the British to maintain a portion of their 
Fleet in hone waters and the remainder, except 
part of the China Detachment and the Dominion 
Forces, in the liastera Mediterranean. That in 
case of war in which Japan became involved, they 
would concentrate on Italy, the supposed weak link, 
and as soon as Italy could be reduced, naval 
forces would be available to send reinforcements 
to the Far '^st, if and when the Defense Council 
so desired* At the present the Admiralty is 
inclined to believe that Japan is less likely to 
join Germany and Italy than she was one and one- 
half years ago* 

Admiral Teahy said of course he could give 
his personal views only, that he could not ooroait 
our Navy Department to any definite agreement, that 
he did not know what action Congress would take in 
case of trouble, nor could he discuss any other 
action other than "parallel action" **.m case of an 
European war in which Japan is involved, with the 
United States neutral, we would doubtless send most 
of our naval forces to Hawaii, ••«** 

Admiral Leahy reacted with a message to his fleet commanders directing 

them to change their War Flans to reflect Britain's inability to send a 

large force to Singapore due to the world situation* 

A year after Commander Hampton* s visit to Washington, the "phoney war" 

in Europe which had remained nearly static erupted into devastating action* 

The German war machine appeared more and more invincible, as Mr* Winston 

Churchill became the new Prime Minister* Referring to himself as the 

Hemo by RADM Ohormley on informal conversations 12 June 1939 found 

in File cited nl8. 


" Letter QB to CHJC B and CINCAF, Change to Serial 218 of 2 Feb. 1936} 
Serial 286 23 June 1939, found in File cited in nl8* 

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"Formr %*?.! Person" ho had renewed his corresy*>ndeno<5 with I resident 
Roosevelt, On !4ay 15* 19hP he apprised Roosevelt of the seriousness of the 
situation and listed his immediate needs t 

First of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older 
destroyers to bridge the gap between what we have now 
and the large new construction we put in hand at the 
beginning of the war, This tine next year we shall 
have plenty* But if in the interval Italy cones in 
against us with another one hundred submarines, we nay 
be strained to breaking-point. Secondly, we want 
several hundred of the latest types of aircraft, of 
which you are now getting delivery* These can be 
repaid by those now being constructed in the United 
States for us* Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and 
ammunition, of which again there will be plenty next 
year, if we are alive to see it* Fourthly, the fact 
that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden, 
from Horth Africa, and perhaps from Northern Spain, 
makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United 
States* This also applies to other materials* We 
shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but 
I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can 
pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same* 
Fifthly, we have many reports of possible German 
parachute or air-borne descents in Ireland* The visit 
of a Jnited States Squadron to Irish ports* which might 
well be prolonged, would be invaluable* Sixthly, I am 
looking to you to keep the Japanese quiet in the 
Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient* •» 

There was also fear of the Japanese going into the Netherlands East 

Indies if the Germans took the Netherlands* The Joint Army and ftavy Board 

then recognised that the "nited States was the only power in a position to 

restrain the Japanese aotion in the Netherlands ast Indies* In connection 

with the studies of possible cooperation with the Allies, the Naval Attache 

in London was instructed by the Hoard at this time to obtain full information 

as to facilities that might be available at Singapore for a naval detachment, 


winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston a Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 19h9), ?v 2lt-25j K2) Watson, op. cit *, p. !07j (3) Katloff and 
Snell, op* cit* a p* 20 



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should the American GoVGrrwwmt decide to rapport British and Dutch 

resistance to any further Japanese move to the south. The Admiralty 

expressed a strong desire that the ' nited States Government guarantee the 

Netherlands rast Indies, ■ The Naval Attache in London reported on 17 May 

191*0 a proposal by the Admiralty that the United States send naval forces 

to Singapore but while Japanese intentions seemed obscure, Admiralty f-taff 

Officers pointed out that, if Japan moved southwards, they could easily cut 

British lines of communications between Australia and India* 

As the defense in France crumbled the British position became even more 

precarious than Churchill had indicated to Roosevelt* Since Roosevelt had 

declined the request for the desperately needed destroyers by averring that 

Congressional action was needed and "pointed to the concentration of the 

American Fleet at earl Harbor" in answer to the plea for the American use 

of Singapore, the Admiralty increased the discussions on how to favorably 

influence the Americans* To this end a special committee headed by Sir 

Sidnty Bailey was appointed on June 15. Five days later the Naval Attache 

was advised that informal conversations between British and American Staffs 

either at London or 'Washington were to be proposed* The Bailey Committee 

held meetings from 20 June to S September 191*0 examining "each of the major 

technical aspects of future naval cooperation*" It recommended at the 

Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. Ill, Part C, Chp* 12, p. 267* 


Loc* oit ,, quoted by Kittredge from AL SHA London despatch 101200 

May 191*3; 


Ibid ., p* 269, quoted by Kittredge from AT/ SNA London despatch 

171615 M*in.9l*0. 

Churchill, op* cit ., p. 25* 

Watson* op* cit *. p. 107. 

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raqaabaofano. ^rt asfer vtf tmtoJp «SdS • 

.-. .. 


July 15 meeting that cooperation with American naval authorities should 
conform closely to the 1917-1916 precedent. 

^The pressure for naval cooperation was also exerted through the regular 
diplomatic channels. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, 
with a recollection of the fruitful services of Admiral William f. Sims, as 
a Special Naval Observer in London in 1917 » suggested to resident Roosevelt 
in 19U0 the sending of another senior American Admiral, and the idea so 
impressed the resident that he discussed it with Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox and Admiral Stark. On 12 July they proposed Rear Admiral Robert 

L. Ghormley, the Assistant Chief of Jteval Operations and former head of War 

I lans Division, who was already fully informed on the past conversations. 

Roosevelt while briefing Ghormley prior to his departure for London 

informed him that he "still was not convinced that the United States would 

be forced to intervene as a belligerent in the war against the iSuropean 

axis, or would be forced to fight Japan in the Pacific to prevent continued 

Japanese expansion. n In addition to Ghormley, the President decided to 

send for a shorter period of time an Army representative, General George V. 

Strong. A third member was selected to represent the air arm, Major General 

Deloe C. Pmrnons of the 0-HQ Air Force. 

The trio arrived in London August 15 and were joined by the U.S. Naval 

Attache, Captain Alan G. Kirk and the T .S. Military attache, Colons! 

Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. Ill, ^art B, Chp. 11, p. 253. 

Watson, op. oit ., p. 113* 


Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. Ill, Part A, Chp. 10, p. 213. 

Watson, op. cit ., pp. 113-112* • 



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•io»8 «X • 

Raymond E. Lee. The meetings with the British which ensued were referred 
to as "The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee" although the 
discussions covered many natters of Joint planning and possible cooperation, 
particularly on the part of the two fleets* The American delegation 
repeatedly stressed that they were present as individuals for discussions 
and recommendations, but this did not deter the British from "fielding 
their first military team" or from speaking with complete candor. In the 
British group were Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea 

Lcrdj General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General ftaff j and Air 

Chief Marshall Sir Cyril L.N. flewall, Chief of the Air Staff. It was 

Sir Cyril Hawaii who gave the crux of British strategical thinking at the 

time i 

...That in our plans for the future we were certainly 
relying on the continued economic and industrial co-opera- 
tion of the United States in ever-increasing volume. ]*> 
account, however, had been taken of the probability of 
active co-operation top" the Jnited States, since this was 
clearly a matter of high political policy. The economic 
and industrial co-operation of the United States were 
fundamental to our whole strategy. 32 

-J£- Discussion relative to the Far Sast pointed up the fact that the 

earlier British assumptions were admittedly invalid relative to possible 

Japanese action. First, it had been assumed that the threat to British 

interests would be seaborne} secondly, that a fleet could be sent to the 

Far East. The Japanese now threatened to expand through the southeast in 

such a way as to make land invasion of Malaya possible] and the British were 

obviously in no position to send a fleet to the Far Fast. At this juncture, 


Ibid ., p. lllij (2) S.S.Morlson, Vol. I, op. cit ., p. 1*0. 

Matloff and Snell, op. cit. , p. 22, quote from Min, 21 Aug. k0 9 

MD U*Q2-1. 

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important as Singapore and tfalay were, they could not be supported at the 

cost of the security in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, 0m British 

position impressed the American delegation then and was to prove an area of 

disagrees nt later. 

Generals Strong and Amnions continued on in London through the height of 

the German air blitzkrieg which was to have brought England to her knees. 

Impressed by the British coolness and determination under heavy attack, they 

returned to Washington the Inst part of September confident that Britain 

would stand— at least for the immediate future* Admiral Ghornley stayed on 

in London as a Special Ifeval observer, 


Admiral Ohormley conferred almost daily with tho Bailey Committee. 
The Committee, on the assumption that the United States Fleet would be con- 
centrated in the Pacific, had recommended that strong forces should be moved 
into the Southwest acific and China Sea, in order to restrain Japanese 
movements to the South, and particularly into the Netherlands East Indies. 
Admiral Ohormley, in commenting on this recommendation, reviewed the 
problems that would be involved for the lilted ftates Navy moving such 
detachments across the Pacific. He pointed out that the First Sea Lord and 
other officers of the Admiralty Naval Staff had themselves suggested that 
the Royal Navy was not sufficiently strong in the Atlantic. Assistance from 
the Jhited States Tfevy would probably be required in the Atlantic, in 

Ibid ., p, , 22-23 J (2) Watson, op, cit ,,, v m ill*. 

Cf, p. 89, this Chapter and Chapter KUR, below. 

Matloff and Snell, op. cit ., p. 22 and Morison, Vol. I, op, cit. , p. uJ. 

Samuel B. Morison, Ihe Battle of the Atlanti c September lg3?-KqKl^.3 , 

Vol, I in History of United States Naval Operations in World %ar : : (Boston: 

tittle, Brown and Company, I9h7), p. al. 

waqwa «* ><W ■.« «rioq«jjnJ 

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addition to whatever action night be taken in the ^acific* Admiral Ghormley 
referred to the existing strength of the nited States iJavy in the Atlantic* 
ft large proportion of these naval forces would probably be needed to 
cooperate with the British in the "tlentie although this would depend upon 
developments in the relations with Japan and on the attitude which the 
administration and uublic opinion might take, should the 'Jhited States enter 
the war* 

The revised text of the Bailey Committee reports were sent by Admiral 
Ghormley to Admiral Stark, with a record of the discussions which had been 
proceeding since September 17* The Chief of Naval Operations* in a 
despatch of October 2, suggested that the I&val Attache should return to 
Washington to be available for consultation there while these proposals were 
under consideration* This was confirmed on October 10 when Captain Kirk 
received orders to proceed to Washington for such discussions early in 

December. In mid-October Lord Lothian revived the proposal for Staff 

conversations, this time on a "comprehensive" basis, and two days later in 

London Admiral ound spoke to the same purpose in a conversation with 


Admiral Ghormley* 

Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. Ill, -art B, Chp. 10, pp. 25U-2S5. 

Ibid ., p. 260. 

Cf Watson, op* cit e, p. 119 nGO. Lord Lothian presented the Prime 

Minister^ proposal for £taff conversations to Mr. Roosevelt on LU etober. 

First favoring the proposal, Mr* Roosevelt reoonsidered the matter, perhaps 

in the light of the 191*0 election campaign (both candidates promised that 

no American boys would go abroad to fight), and on 2? October returned the 

memorandum to Lord Lothian without action* 


Loc. cit. 

ftHnoriE imfta* ... lim «U ■! pavial *• AMMMiiM Ha***** J aaAtatJal 

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aqarfi»-« t iattaji ad£ oanaMtooo .»aoafl »**>' t Iaaea> 

#adi baalMcvq aa: art* lo -. ad* oi 

arii bmnuton rcadc no Iwa ,'tii^ ol baamdM t 1 «s\nd naaAtaa* on 

•#« ' fiiM & tv.^kaM' x otmm 

Oft November 12, Admiral Stark's memorandum, rlan Dog, a cumulation of 

the national strategic position and possible courses of action, was 

submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, with copies to General Marshall, 

Admiral Ghormley and Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief United rtates 

Fleet. The concluding two paragraphs of Ian Dog emphasised the 

importance of staff talks with possible allies as the point d'appui for 

military decisions* 

;jb important allied military decision should be reached 
without clear understanding between the nations involved as 
to the strength and extent of the participation which may 
be expected in any particular theater, and as to a proposed 
skeleton plan of operations* 

Accordingly, I make the recommendation that, as a 
preliminary to possible entry of the iMted States into the 
conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake 
secret staff talks on technical matters with the British 
military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian 
military authorities in Washington, and with British and 
Dutch authorities in Singapore and Eatavla. The purpose 
would be to reach agreements and lay down plans for 
promoting unity of allied effort should the nited States 
find it necessary to enter the war under any of the , - 
alternative eventualities considered in this memorandum* 

The Navy then on both sides of the Atlantic was eager for more serious 

discussions and it was the Army which agreed to the proposals* General 

Marshall gave credit for the proposition and the setting up of the forth- 

coming meeting to Admiral Stark* Likewise it was Admiral Stark in the 

rlan Dog paper who set the tenor of the American position in the Army-Navy 

"Dog" was the phonetic word for the letter "D»i the fourth plan 
considered was 'Ian Dog. Cf* Watson, op. cit *, p. 116 n7°. 


The original rlan Dog, Memo MB to Sec. $av., pp-12-CTB of ttov. 12, 
1S>U0 is in the Roosevelt Library, Ityde : ark, New York. 


A copy of Plan Dog is found in Appendix A. 
iearl Harbor Attack , art 3, p. 1052. 

■ -.. 


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conferences held before the Meetings with the British, '^Basically, that 
position was that we mist help Britain defeat Germany in the Atlantic for 
our own safety »s sake, and avoid unlimited war in the racifie. "The full 

national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather 

than be expended in areas far distant from each other* n v If it became 

necessary to wage war with the Japanese, it would be fought in a containment 

sense, limiting the area of offensive operations to the holding of the 

Malay Barrier severing lines of communication and raids* 

The proposed position of the T Jhited States as advanced by Admiral Stark 

was not completely acceptable to the other factions in the decision making 

scheme. The President in no way committed himself to the theory of 

strategy outlined in Flan Dog. Whatever he had had to say to Admiral Stark 

relative to his memorandum in mld*?tovember apparently did not become a 

matter of record. The Army planners, on reviewing the proposal for 

possible limited action against the Japanese by denying them the use of 

Malaysia, went on record - 

...that, so far as Malaysia is concerned, we should avoid 
dispersing our forces into that theater. We should, how- 
ever, assist the British to reinforce their naval setup 
in the Far East by relieving them of naval obligation in 
the Atlantic. This would provide a more homogeneous 
force for Malaysia and would, in effect, concentrate 
rather than disperse our naval establishment.^ 

( Admiral Stcrk himself was not satisfied with the present knowledge of the 


Admiral Stark in Flan Dog, p. 10. 


Jfatloff and Snell, on. oit ., p. 26. 

Matloff and Snell, op. cit ., p. 2Cj also Cf. nli3# loc. cit . 

Watson, op. cit ., r>. 122, quote from Memo CofS to CNO, 2) ifcvtaaber 1*0$ 
WTD 14175-15. 

yumiQ frwfeafr nXftJJhA qlad $mm mi £a 
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yiiilani aolaJtoaft ad? ni eaoXS&Al iix 

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laofaiXdaJaa Xavar -?s«i9k2b aari* lari J*** 

at? lo aabaXfcMVf Jnaaav? atvt ri^iw bailiOJat Son a»w llaaairi Cat. 


British plana • 

I oonsidar it essential that ue know a great deal wore 
about British ideas than we have yet been able to 
glean.** 9 

The President authorised conversations between representatives of the 

American and British staffs to explore the problems raised by Stark* Stark 

instructed Admiral Ghormley, whose exploratory conversations in London had 

reached the limit of their usefulness, to make arrangements with the 

British for serious staff conversations to begin in Washington early in the 

new year* Regarding British ideas of American naval deployment in the 

Pacific as inacceptable, Stark instructed Ohormley to inform the Admiralty 

that anyone they sent to Washington "should have instructions to discuss 

concepts based on equality of considerations for both the United States and 

British Commonwealth* and to explore realistically the various fields of war 

cooperation* " Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea r ord, 

answered this himself, assuring the Chief of Naval Operations that the ideas 

already expressed by the Admiralty were not to be regarded as "an 

unalterable basis" of discussion* n December 2, Admiral Ohormley 

announced the names of the British staff who were to come to Washington in 


The announcement of the British acceptance of the invitation to converse 

in Washington lent urgency to the determination of an agreed military 

policy. The Joint Manning Committee reported to the Joint Board on 

Ibid . 

Hatloff and Snell, op» oit *, p. 28* 

S*S Morison, Vol. I, op* cit ., p. hh 


Matloff and Snell, op* cit ., n. 26. 

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b»«iS« na lo acJtANiJtNrs»tofc »»tf •£ ypamgwu twt- 
no fcruoG Jsiot «i«t oJ tataonn ••* AIm : 

. .... 


tecefciber 21 on its study and offered a tentative draft of a joint memorandum 

to the "resident from the Secretaries of State, War and ilavy. Hot 

unexpectedly it emphasized the primacy of operations in tlie Atlantic. "Our 

interests in the Far East are very important* It would, however, be 

incorrect to consider that tliey are as important to us as is the integrity 

of the Western ifemlaphere* or as important as preventing the defeat of the 

British Commonwealth* The issues in the Orient will largely be decided in 

Europe*" The final proposed recommendations from the Secretaries to the 

President as drafted by the Joint Planning Committee were; 

~^ 1. A rapid increase of Array and Havy strength, 
and abstention from steps which would provoke attack by 
any other power. 

2* R decision not willingly to engage in any war 
against Japan* 

3* If forced into war with Japan, restriction of 
acifio operations so as to permit use of forces for a 
major offensive in the Atlantic* Acceptance of no 
important Allied decision save with clear understanding 
as to common objectives, as to contingents to be 
provided, as tp operations planned, and as to command 

Mr* Hull declined to approve the proposed recommendations since he 

doubted the propriety of his joining in recommendations to the President 

concerning technical military statements. Out of the conference over the 

State Department's acceptance of the policy, a long overdue change in 

upper echelon liaison became effective* #r* Hull suggested, and it was 

agreed, that the three Secretaries would meet each Tuesday on national 


Memo JIG to J3 21 Dec. 191*0, part of JB 325 > Serial 670, quoted 

Watson, op* cit *, p* 123* 


Loc* cit * 

Ibid ., p. 123, (2) Hatloff and Snell, op. cit ., o. 28. 

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Defense matters* thus superceding the Liaison Committee of Mr. Welles and 

the military representatives. 

The written record does not show the rationale leading to the event, 

but it is reasonable to assume that the calling of the three Secretaries* 

Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the White House on January 16 

was prompted by the immediately past discussions on national and military 

policy. General Marshall made a memorandum record of the conversations as 

he remembered them the following day* 

v Yesterday afternoon the resident had a lengthy 
conference with the Secretaries of State* War and Navy, 
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of 
the Army. He discussed the possibilities of sudden and 
simultaneous action on the part of Germany and Japan 
against the nited States. He felt that there was one 
chance out of five of such an eventuality* and that it 
might culminate any day... 

He discussed the publicity we might give our 
proposed courses of action- in relation to the hilippines* 
fleet* continuation of supplies to >reat Britain* etc.. 
He devoted himself principally to a discussion of our 
attitude in the Far Fast towards J&pan and to the matter 
of curtailment of American shipments of war supplies to 
England. He was strongly of the opinion that in the 
event of hostile action towards us on the part of Germany 
and Japan we should be able to notify Mr. Churchill 
immediately that this would not curtail the supply of 
material to England. He discussed this problem on the 
basis of the probability that England could survive six 
months and that* thereafter* a period of at least two 
months would elapse before hostile action could be 
taken against us in the Western Hemisphere. •• .there 
would be a period of eight months in which we could 
gather strength. 

General Marshall then recorded the final directive from the resident i 

That we would stand on the defensive in the I acif ic 
with the fleet based on Hawaii; that the Commander of the 
Asiatic Fleet would have the discretionary authority as 
to how long he could remain based in the 'hilippines and 


Ibid., p. 12ii. 

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. . . 

as to his direction of withdrawal— to ths "ast or to 
Singapore} that there would be no naval reinforcement of 
the Philippines j that the itovy should have under con- 
sideration the possibility of bombing attacks against 
Japanese cities* 

That the Navy should be prepared to convoy shipping 
in the Atlantic to England, and to maintain a patrol off- 
shore from Maine to the Virginia Capes* 

That the firm/ should not be committed to any 
aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake 
it; that our military course must be very conservative 
until our strength had developed; that it was assumed we 
could provide forces sufficiently trained to assist to a 
moderate degree in backing up friendly Latin-American 
governments against fes&i inspired fifth column movenents* 

That we should make every effort to go on the basis 
of continuing the supply of material to Great Britain* 
primarily in order to disappoint what he thought would be 
Hitler 1 s principal objective in involving us in a war at 
this particular time* and also to buck up England*-' ? 

Meanwhile the Joint Planning Committee at the suggestion of Rear Admiral 

Richmond t . Turner had been directed on December 11 to draw up instructions 

for the Army and Havy representatives for holding conversations with the 

British staff due to arrive the next month* The report was evidently 

submitted to the Joint Board initially on January 13 and again with additions 


on January 21* After criticising most of the leadership in Britain during 

the recent past, the basic report gave a general evaluation of suspected 

British proposals t 

•••It is believed that we cannot afford, nor do we 
need* to entrust our national future to British direction* 
because the inited States can safeguard the North 
American continent, and probably the Western Hemisphere* 
whether allied with Britain or not* 

Memo, CofS for AOofS WH), 17 Jan* lil, subs White, ifcmae Conference of 

Thrue 16 Jan. 1*1* WPD 14175-18, quoted Watson, op* oit ., pp* 12U-125 and 

Matloff and Snell, op* cit* , p* 29* 

Matloff aixl Snell, op. cit ., p. 30, nU8* 


Cf . Watson, op, cit ., pp. 370-371 and n60 infra* 


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s^lfii Ofin bn* IVC-OTC . ^io ,*y> t nooi« 

tailed States Array and Navy officials are in rather 
general agreement that Great Britain cannot encompass 
the defeat of Germany unless the United rtates provides 
that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far 
greater degree of material aid than is being given nowj 
and that, even then, success against the Axis is not 

It is to be expected that proposals of the British 
representatives will have been drawn up with chief 
regard for the support of the British Commonwealth* 
Never absent from British Hinds are their post-war 
interests, commercial and military* We should likewise 
safeguard our own eventual interests* 

It is understood that the British military staffs 
have recently been engaged in the preparation of a new 
"appreciation" of the military situation of the British 
Commonwealth* It is possible that this appreciation 
may now have been completed* This should be made to the 
United States representatives.,.* 

In order to avoid commitment by the President, 
neither he nor any of his Cabinet should officially 
receive the British officers; therefore the Joint 
1 aiming Committee recommends that the British 
representatives be informally received by the Under 
Secretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and 
the Chief of Staff... 60 

The accompanying enclosure to the basic report on the forthcoming 

conversations contained agenda items and a clear statement of nited States 

intentions* It was approved verbatim by the military chiefs and evidently 

forwarded to the President via the service Secretaries, for on January 26 

the President sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy with minor 

changes recommended t 

I think this procedure is all right* In Appendix 
II - paragraph one - 

I would change the word "allies" to the word 

In the last line of paragraph two I would substitute 
the words "be compelled" for the word "decide." 

Letter Jl C to JB, JB No. 325 Serial 6?U, 21 Jan. l^Ul; WD| Piles. 
Director, V'FD Special File. The date on citation n$9 was 13 Jan. 11. 


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fctow eci* csf MaajLLTa" Ma? 

. «oa& 


In paragraph five, section B, I would sake the last 
few words read "or nayaTLyin the Mediterranean regions." 

Tne sane change is suggested in the last line of 
Section D. F.D.R. x 

The statement of the American position as finally given by the two 
service chiefs contained the Roosevelt changes; 

2. As understood by these two officers the purpose 
of these staff conversations Is to determine the best methods 
by which the armed forces of the United States and the 
British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied 
with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war, 

3« The American people as a whole desire now to remain 
out of the war, and to provide only material and economic aid 
to Treat Britain* So long as this attitude is maintained it 
must be supported by their responsible military and naval 
authorities. Therefore no specific commitments can now be made 
except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans 
which may be envisaged must for the present remain contingent 
upon the future political action of both nations* All such 
plana are subject to eventual official approval by both govern- 

J&, It* The present national position of the United States is 
as follows i ^Defend the Western Hemispheres Aid the British 
Commonwealth against Gennanyj and oppose by diplomatic means 
any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory^ 

5>. If the U.f . Government decides to make war in common 
with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the 
Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that: 

a. The broad military objective of the United States 
operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but 
the nited States necessarily must also maintain dispositions 
which under ell eventualities will prevent the extensions in 
the western hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and 
military power. 

b. The objective of the war will be most effectively 
attained by the nited States exerting its principle military 
effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions. 

c. The TT nited States and British Cosnonwealth should 
endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or attacking the 

d. Should Japan enter the war, the nited States 
operations in the mid-; acific and the .Far 3ast would be con- 
ducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its 
principle military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the 


?1emo» F.D.R. to SecNav 26 Jan. I9I4I5 MB File? I&sc. fl. 

'■.aaoXgo-i BAmummStbt 
ml vi. 


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e. As a general rule the Exited States forces 
should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under 
their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived 
from the Tnited States-British joint plan. 

f • The United States will continue to furnish 
material aid to Great Britain but will retain for building 
up its own forces Material in such proportions as to 
provide for future security and best to effectuate United 
States-British joint plane for defeating Germany." 2 

The selected parameters within which the conversations were to take 

place were indicative of the keen appreciation of possible political 

repercussions from any agreement. The descriptive tern applied to the 

conversations by Ingereoll In London and Stark in r Ian Dog, and through 

their completion in -Jarch 121*1 was "on technical matters ," and the 

connotation of "technical" was a V9ry restrictive "military." Considerations, 

the nature of which required obvious decisions by the heads of government, 

were "political" and ruled out of the purviaw of the military planners. 

Although joint military plans, perse, have political significance when 

executed or made public, as in a threat to use same, joint preliminary 

planning may be readily accomplished in a strictly "military" sense. nier 

certain stated assumptions, with no political decisions required ^ military 

representatives may draw up quite intricate disposition plans, comoand 

arrangements, tasks assignments, etc.. Such were the rules to be followed 

in the joint talks with the British. As added warranties to guarantee the 

maintenance of the "military" status, no member of the government was to be 

present and no Cabinet official would formally receive the visitors. Though 


Appendix II to letter cited n60. 

Originally Tr nder Secretary of State Hr. Welles was to welccae the 
group. Neither he nor any other government official actually was present 
the first meeting. 


t M 


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oa but ia«f 

IB fcBBMS •;. 

the military services were each represented by senior officers, they were 
not the highest in any case, so the requirement for approval by higher 
authority was taoitly understood throughout the talks* The American military 
chiefs absented themselves after the initial meeting* 

The flexibility enjoyed by the military nlanncrs in this case wrs 
unique* In essence they could make r lans which were not binding on either 
side and yet were detailed enough to be the basis for effective cooperation 
when approved by their respective political superiors* * The planners likewise 
were not bound in the scope of their conversations to a rigid policy 
osition which would have been inherent if the participants included 
political representatives or the senior military leaders* 

ABC-1, Amsricaii-Dritish Conversations, Jfrraary 29 § 121*1 to March 27, lftkl * 

nited States Representatives t 

Major-General S*D* '3sbick, ^XKy representative on the ermanent Joint Board 

Defense ( Canada- Mited States) 
Brigadier-General Sherman Files, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 
Brigadier-General L*T. Gerow, head of the Army War lans Division 
Colonel J*T. Me Harney, an Air officer 

Rear-Admiral R.L* Ghormley, Special Naval ' bserver in London 

Resr-Admiral R.S* Turner, head of >iavy War lane Division 

Captain A.G* Kirk, Assistant to R3DM Turner and former Ifeval attache in 

Lt. Colonel O.T* ■ feiff er, U.S. Marine Gome 

British Representatives i 

Rear-Admiral R*H* Bellairs, head of the British Delegation 

Rear-Admiral V*H* Danokwerts 

Major-General E.L. Morris 

Air Vice Marshall J.G. Slessor, of the British [Purchasing Commission in 

Captain A.W* Clarke, Assistant Haval Attache in Washington 

»l»w ypdj t Hiti<(. -j 1 .':'.-. ; WlflK; \ ■ baJANVftQ 
tCJLn si&oinea? ■ . Ms*s *At tvmtgomU be 


tp* «Jt 4*mi$lA •!** ton 


Tt«Ui:o «o ytfrOrt *«a •*«* jiai/.w aosiq «at«M »!*»» w* naHf «.• .exjpAur 

»i*»x ^t* 


IftMt ova.- ' i 

(a»*«je ante. 

■ loirft) ta*ta*88* *Lft#»fl «a*IJS* tiarrrarfv X««»a»r~ift£ft«9Jft& 

oaferto r al 


■J ^ >:.-'. .1 ■* 4 1 «m 

rarit XoloeqB ,\©Xtnr.»/<0 1 


1 iMiB ■ ■■■-;.■ .j 

Secretariat ! 

Lt. Colonel V*P« Soobey, ",S. Army 

Coomander UR. McDowell, 'J.S. Navy 6U 

Lt, Colonel A.T. Cornwall-Jones, British Array 

On January 29, 19hl the Chief of !feval Operations and the Chief of Staff 

welcomed the British delegation in a room set aside for the meetings in the 

Main Navy Building in Washington* In addition to presenting the American 

position which had been approved by the President the American military 

leaders stressed the urgency for secrecy, e specially in light of the lend- 
lease bill which was then being discussed in Congress, The British replied 
that they came as a corporate body representing the British Chiefs of 
Staff, that they had corqplete freedom to discuss the general strategic 

position and to consider dispositions in the event the United States should 

enter the war. Both sides accepted the necessity of confirmation by their 

respective Chiefs of Staff and Governments of any derived agreements. 

During the interim period between the announcer* nt on December 2 of 

the British intention to corns to Washington and their departure from 

Britain, neither admiral Ghormley nor Brigadier General Raymond Lee, the 

'. S, Military Attache in London was able to get any advance information on 

the British position. The British explanation was logical and simple — 

it would jeopardise the security of their war plans to give the information 

at that time. The long list of questions posed by Ghormley and Lee 


■earl Harbor Attack, Tart 15, p. 1487. 


Cf. n62. 

Matloff and Snell, op, cit. , p. 33» quote from Statement by #K. 

Delegation 29 Jan. 1*1, B*lCE CD (1*1)1. 


Ibid,, p. 3u n8« Both had reported their failure to get inforwation. 


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.riolnx ieg o# *iul.l». x aad rtiotl 


solicited information desired by their respective War Plans Divisions in 

Washington, The list included questions on British strength and 
capabilities in the different areas of the world, on the relative importance 
of those areas in their strategic thinking and what their proposed courses 
of action would be under certain conditions. The questions were answered 
in detail and made available to the Americans after the party left Britain, 
In their opening talk the British gave a clear summation of their views and 
three propositions of general strategic policy* 

The ^iropean theatre is the vital theatre where a 
decision cm at first be sought. 

The general policy should therefore be to defeat 
Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan, 

The security of the Far Eastern position, including 
Australia and Ifew Zealand, is essential to the cohesion 
of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of 
its war effort, Singapore is the key to the defence of 
these interests and its retention mist be assured,"" 

The first two propositions were in direct accord with American feelings; 

the retention of Singapore certainly was not; The British repeatedly had 

told Ajaerican representatives since Hampton's visit in June 19b0 that they 

were unable to send najor forces to the Far East, Their proposition 

amounted to an open invitation for the United States to defend Singapore, 

\ The policy to retain Singapore in the face of mounting Japanese power and 

the British raaneuverings to gain American acceptance of the idea became 

formidable obstacles upon which the meetings almost foundered. The British 

saw Singapore as more than just a military base. For political, economic 

and psychological reasons it was a symbol of British Commonwealth unity 

and security in the Far East, Thus for many reasons it was part of British 

strategic thinking, and they never were to give up trying to make it part 


Loc, cit,, citation same as nob. 

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.. -''■ 

of British-Araerican strategic plans* 

Churchill^ message on U> May 191*0 might bo considered one starting 
point in the Singapore controversy, though to be sure Singapore had been 
discussed with Captain Ingersoll in January 1939. Roosevelt had wisely 
dodged the offer "to use Tingapore in any way convenient. n ' robably as a 

compromise the American fleet had been ordered to remain at Pearl flarbor 

shortly thereafter. ' on k October 191*0 Churchill a^ain wrote Roosevelt 

mentioning the possibility of war with Japan over the re-opening of the 

Burma Hoad and the fact that Japan had joined the Axis Powers. 

••••X know how difficult it is for you to say anything 
which would commit the nited States to any hypothetical 
course of action in the Pacific. 3ut I venture to ask 
whether at this time a simple action might not speak 
louder than words. Would it not be possible for you to 
send an American squadron, the bigger the better, to 
pay a friendly visit to Singapore? There they would be 
welcomed in a perfectly normal and rightful way. If 
desired, occasion might be taken of such a visit for a 
technical discussion of naval and military problems in 
those and Philippine waters, and the Dutch might be 
invited to join. Anything in this direction would have 
a marked deterrent effect upon a Japanese declaration of 
war upon us over the Burma Road opening. '° 

Admiral Stark opposed the suggestion and even the reinforcement of our own 

Asiatic Fleet because of the situation in the Atlantic, and the President 

again agreed with his naval advisers. 

With such a past history of British proposals on Singapore, it was not 

surprising that the American planners would be wary of similar proposals at 

Cf. p. 7, supra , n21 (2) Hull, Memoirs, op. cit ., p. 831 (3) Matloff 

and SneTT, op. cit ., p. 35. 

Churchill, op. cit ., op. 1|97-A*98. 

Cf. Watson, op. cit ., p. 116 $ (2) Katloff and Snell, op. cit ., p. 35. 

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the Washington meetings. At the sixth Plenary Heating on 10 February 1?U1 

the Far Saltern sit nation was the chief subject discussed* The British 

again emphasised their concern at the position of Singapore. They urged 

that the United States should take early action both to keep Japan out of 

the war, and to assure the defense of Singapore against a Japanese attack* 

The proposal at this tine was that the United States should send four heavy 

cruisers, an aircraft carrier, planes and submarines to Singapore. The 

next day the British represented a detailed paper* "The Far East — 

Appreciation by the \'.?C. Delegation." At the same time that the American 

military was being presented the paper Lord Halifax, the new British 

Ambassador, was communicating the substance of the same paper to Secretary 

of State Oordell Hull. 

The British paper on the Far East pictured Singapore as a symbol of 

British ability and determination to protect the Dominions and colonies 

and their trade with Britain. The loss of Singapore would greatly weaken 

the hand of the political leaders in Australia, Hew Zealand, India and 

China who believed in the value of British friendship. The British 

representatives admitted that even if Singapore were lost Australia and New 

Zealand could be held and the Japanese kept out of the Indian Ocean, but 

insisted that Singapore was a necessary "card of re-entry" when the 

European war should have taken a turn for the better. Without the base at 


"ittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Part A, Chp. 1U, p. 3i*B. 

Hatloff and Snell, op. clt. , p. 35 quote from ¥Xn $ 6th ratg, 10 Feb. 

U, B.H.S. (J) (M) 6. 


Ibid . > p. 36 faper part of B. ?.S. (J) (1*1)13» 

^Ibid., p. 35 nl6. 


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Singapore, a successful attack would have to be launched against the 
Japanese across the thousands of miles from the nearest base. In short, 
the British stand on Singapore was based "not only upon purely strategic 
foundations, but on political, economic and sentimental considerations 
which, even if not literally vital on a strictly academic view, are of such 

fundamental importance to the British Commonwealth that they must always be 

taken into serious account* M What the British could not say specifically 

and what was obvious to the Americans was that the prestige of the British 

Empire in the Far Fast and at home was at stake* 

the seriousness with which the British held to the Singapore position 

is shown by two key statements in the subject papers 

(a) The security of the Far Eastern position, including 
Australia and Hew Zealand, is essential to the 
maintenance of the war effort of the Associated Powers* 
Singapore is the key to the defense of these interests 
and its retention must be assured* ••• 

(b) If Singapore were in serious danger of capture, and 
the iiited States still withheld their aid, we should 
be prepared to send a Fleet to the Far €ast, even if to 
do so would compromise or sacrifice our position in the 

One loss of Singapore, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff 

• ..would be a disaster of the first magnitude, second 
only to the loss of the British Isles* »7 

On February 13 the Army and Navy representatives met to discuss the 

British paper* Rear Admiral Turner had prepared his replyj 

Giving the background for the British proposals, 
Reef Admiral Turner said that when the Japanese, some 
2j years ago, began their movement to the southward, 
the President and Secretary of .State more or less 


Ibid* , pp. 36-37 , quotes from "The Far Past aper, w Cf. n7lu 

Klttredge Monograph, Vol. I, Feet. IV, Tart A, Chp* lU, p. 350* 

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ccmsiitted the United States Fleet to actions in conjunc- 
tion with the British forces in the Far East, when 
Rear Admiral Ingersoll engaged in staff conversations on 
this subject in ! ondon, the British proposed that the 
nited States send their whole fleet to Singapore and 
that the then combined nited States and British forces 
should start a campaign against the Japanese. In this 
war the British are unable to send a strong force to 
the Far last, but still would like the nited States to 
send their whole fleet, together with a large nited 
States Army, to engage against the Japanese. It was 
not until the last staff conversations that they modified 
their requests for ^enforcements to a force of four 
heavy cruisers, aircraft and submarines. 

The general discussion which followed developed the following points » 

(a) That a concerted drive was being made by the British 
to influence the United States into accepting the 
British point of view in reference to the Far East 

(b) That the United Kingdom, while accepting the United 
States* Staff Committee's decision not to send the 
Pacific fleet to the Far East, continues to push their 
requests for united States • commitments in that theater. 

It was suggested by Major General Tmbick that it 
was the duty of the United States Committee, as military 
advisor to the resident, to present to him sound 
military opinion with reference to the Far East 75 
strategic situation with a suggested course of action. •• 

At this juncture the American delegation became quite perturbed upon 
learning of the Halifax-Hull discussion of the British military paper on the 
Far Fast. To have their own Secretary of State learn from a foreign 
diplomat about the controversial Singapore question was embarrassing, for 
the Americans had rigidly adhered to the "military" nature of the talks by 
not informing the State Department of the nature or progress of the joint 
meetings. To have the same unilaterally originated paper used in pre- 
liminary military talks discussed at the highest diplomatic levels violated 
a cardinal premise upon which the conversations were to take place. A 

Min Joint ratg Army and Navy Section, 9 Bm Ttaff Com, 13 Feb. 191*1, 

Serial 09212-11, NHD Files US- K Conversations 19iil Serial 09212. 

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protect was off ieially registered with the British delegation that the 

action appeared to the Africans to be an attempt to secure political 

pressure to influence their decision on Singapore. Before condemning 

the British action, it should be remembered that the British military group 

in Washington was the best source of military information and strategy the 

British Ambassador had in this country and, conversely, the Ambassador was 

the highest government representative in the area to whom the military could 

refer* The exchange of information between the British representatives in 

Washington was certainly understandable} the use to which the Ambassador 

put information so gained was the crux of the objection. 

The British delegation replied to the protest and their answer was 

discussed by the ftivy Section of the U.S. Staff Committee on 20 Februarys 

Rear-Adrairal Ohormley referred to the Itote by the 
United Kingdom Delegation in reply to the Declaration of 
the Jhited States Staff Committee (serial 011$12-7), 
stating that he thought this reply had clarified the 
situation to the point wherein the plenary conversations 
could be resumed. 

/one Navy member/ stated his conviction that the 
nited Kingdom Delegation should give assurance that not 
only would no further mted Kingdom Delegation papers 
be oommunicated to the State Department, but that in 
addition, none of the nited Kingdom Delegation points 
developed in the course of the Staff Conversations 
should be presented orally to the State Department 
through diplomatic channels. These Staff Conversations 
are on a purely military plane, and when concluded will 
have been the basis for sound military decisions 
representing, in the considered judgment of the combined 
membership, the best measures to be undertaken for the 
successful prosecution of the war. However, until such 
joint decisions are reached, the presentation by British 
diplomats to the 'nited States State Department of any 
matter under discussion is ex-parte, tending to induce the 
latter to arrive at incorrect conclusions which would be 

Matloff and Snell, pp. cit ., p. 36. 

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diffioult to change, since the Tnited States Staff 
Committee is not now furnishing the State Department 
with its own views.°° 

Further open conflict over Singapore ceased in the Washington conversa- 
tions after the American representatives presented "The U.S. Military 
osition in the Far ^ast" on 19 February. t£iile admitting that the loss of 
symbolic Singapore would be a serious blow, it did not follow that serious 
blows always lead to final disaster. The security of the fforth Atlantic 
and the British Isles was the common basis of American-British strategy, 
and it was up to the British to do the best they could to take care of 

their interests elsewhere. The ignited States coal was to eliminate the 

German threat to the security of the North Atlantic and the British Isles. 

Admiral Stark, C3K), had been kept informed of the 
various stages of the discussions. He felt that the 
whole question of policy to be followed by the United 
States in the Far Fast should be submitted to the 
^resident. In view of the disagreements of the Jnited 
States and British Delegation as to the strategic 
concepts which should govern any plan for combined 
action in the Far East, it seemed necessary that in 
any policy discussions between the State Department and 
the British Foreign Officer, or between the President 
and the Prime Minister, the views of the American Naval 
Staff should be clearly understood. »* 

It soon becane apparent that Admiral Stark's views on the importance 

of defeating Germany first continued to enjoy resident Roosevelt's 

approval. The Ian Dog concept was the touchstone of the n 7.S. Position" 

given to the British on 19 February and 

Report of mtg ffavy Sect, of OS Staff Committee 20 Feb. IX $ Serial 

09212-16 j mi Filet US- Qt Conversations 19ltl Serials 09212. 


Matloff and Snail, op. cit . t p. 37. 

Kittrcdge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. I?, art A, Chp. 11*, p. 352. 

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The resident Informed the Chief of Ifeval Operations, 
and the Chief of Staff, of his approval of the position 
adopted by the American us legation in the Staff Conference* 
He farther agreed that this position was in conformity 
with the CW) memorandum of the 12th November 1?U0, the 
conclusions of which had, in foot, been accepted by the 
Army and %-xvy Joint Board, by the Secretaries of War and 
the Havy, and by the President. •* 

Singapore had become a dead-letter in the ABC effort* The final report 

of the Staff Conversations, called »BC-l t was finished on ?ferch 27, 191*1. 

The basic report reiterated the general policy positions of the two 

Governments, dealing almost exclusively with the Atlantic conflict* The 

two key paragraphs pertaining to Japan are significant. The first 

mentioned neither Japan nor Singapore though the actions of the former and 

the Importance of the latter had recently been argued* 

The security of the United Kingdom must be 
maintained in all circumstances* Similarly, the United 
Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain disposi- 
tions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the 
ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations* 
h cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the 
retention of a position in the Far rast such as will 
ensure the cohesion and security of the British Common- 
wealth and the maintenance of its war effort* §5 (emphasis 

The second paragraph was the only subdivision of ten which mentioned 

Japan under a headings n lans for the Military operations of the Associated 

Powers will likewise be governed by the following s w 

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the 
war on the side of the Axis owere, it would still be 
necessary for the Associated r owers to deploy their 

''ibid., p. 355. 


The official title wast T .S. Serial. GXl5l2-12(R), B.U.S. (J)(UD30j 

Cf. rearl Harbor Attack, r art 15, PP. U*85-l5Ul. 


earl Harbor Attack, Part 15, p. 11*90. 

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forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese 
intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the 
Military strategy in the Far Sast will be defensive* 
The United States does not intend to add to its 
present Military strength in the Par ISast but will 
employ the United States I acific Fleet offensively in 
the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic 
power, and to support the defense of the Ilalay barrier 
by diverting Jatianeae strength away from Malaysia . 
The Pnited States intends so to augment its forces in 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British 
Commonwealth will be in a position. to release the 
necessary forces for the Far Sast.^" (emphasis mine.) 

A.nnex 3 to ?BC-1 was a United States-British Commonwealth Joint 

Basic War Plan. Forces and tasks were assigned by areas and by countries. 

rider tasks assigned American Naval Forces in the Pacific weres 

(a) Support the forces of the Associated lowers in 
the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the 
Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of posi- 
tions in the Harshalls, and through raids on enemy com- 
munications and positions. 

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or 
destroying vessels trading directly with the enemy. 

(c) Protect the sea communications of the Associated 
owers within the Pacific Area. 

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south 
of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

(e) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers 
within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extention of 
enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by 
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land 
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land 
positions in that Hemisphere. 

(f) Prepare to capture and establish control over 
the Caroline and Ifcrshall Island area. ' 

In the Far ~n&t the American naval tasks were generally trie same as 

in the Pacific Area, i.e., raids, destroying communications and attacking 


Ibid., pv li491-lii«2. 

" 7 Ibid., pp. 1511-1512. The I acific Area was N of 30°?J &.W of li*0°E, 
R of the equator and E of 1^0 S, E of the equator and E of 180° to South 
American coast and 7u v*. 

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vessels. A "Special Command Relationships 11 section was included which 
would promote more plans and disagreements in the future* 

30* The defense of the territories of the Associated 
owers in the Far fcst Area will be the responsibility of 
the respective Commanders of the Military forces concerned* 
These Coosnanders will nake such arrangements for mutual 
support as nay be practicable and appropriate* 

31. In the Far Bast Area the responsibility for the 
strategic direction of naval forces of the Associated 
Towers* except of naval forces engaged in supporting the 
defense of the T hilippines* will be assumed by the British 
Naval Commander in Chief, China* The Commander in Chief* 
United States Asiatic Fleet* will be responsible for the 
direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the 
defense of the Philippines* 

32* The British naval Commander in Chief* China* is 
also charged with responsibility for the strategic direction 
of the naval forces of the associated powers operating in 
the Australia and New Zealand Area***"® 

The guide lines for conversations between the British and American 

Commanders in Chief in the Far East were given here* How they were 

followed will be discussed in the next chapter* 

The associations of the British and American Navies had reached one 

high point in World War I when the United States supported Britain in the 

defeat of Germany* Certainly another high point was the agreements reached 

in ABC-1* Discussions had covered strategic concepts* objectives and the 

exchange of information on forces to meet those objectives* A basic war plan 

had been produced and general tasks assigned primarily to defeat Germany 

using American forces should the United States be "compelled to resort to 

war* w > The problems in the Pacific were not so neatly resolved. The thinking 

there was defensive with each Government responsible for the defense of its 

own territories* Despite the positiveness of the American position on the 

Ibid., p. 1$16. 

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^ -99- 
Singapore question in February and the fact that there would be no reinforce- 
ment of the Asiatic Fleet, latitude was still given for discussions on 

mutual support between the on-scene Commanders in Chief* 

The evolution of cooperation in the Pacific between the British and 

Americans was not complete with ASC-1 but it had reached a "point of no 

return*" The United States was irrevocably tied to Britain in two oceans) 

in the <m& to defeat positively an European enemy, while in the other the 

action was to be defensive against the Asiatic enemy* „ In both areas the 

use of the Navy was most important, and in the Pacific beyond Hawaii it was 

the only American force ready for us* How the two navies would cooperate 

in the Far East will be discussed in the next chapter* ABC-1 immediately 

became the basis for United States War Plan Rainbow 5> and the matrix against 

which future agreements in Singapore would be compared and rejected* 

Cf. item 30 n38, p. 93, supra * 

Cf. Chapter Three supra for discussion of Rainbow 5* 


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In Chapter One the provision* of the Four Power and the Mine Power 
Treaties were discussed* The nited States hoped that those treaty provisions 
would eliminate the necessary for military alliances and action in the 
Pacific* The idealistic dream of peace without force was shattered in 1931 
when Japan successfully conquered Manchuria without Occidental military 
opposition* As the militant attitudes and power of Japan increased, the 
need for collective action grew* but the rapid shifts in military and 
political power in Europe in the late 1930»s did much more than Japan's 
actions* per se * to change the status quo in the Far akst* The diminution 

of British and French naval forces in the Orient* to augment their home 


forces against Germany* increased the relative strength of Japan much more 

quickly than her economy or shipyards were capable of doing in an arms race* 

The strategic position of the United States forces in the Far East was 

known to every Admiral in the !lavy, for with few exceptions most senior 

officers had had a tour of duty in the China Station* Admiral Stark was no 

exception* In his I Ian Dog written in the Fall of 1$k0 on the problems of 

national defense* the decision was made that the best course of action for 

the united States was to help Britain in her Atlantic struggle* and* if 

forced to fight Japan, to fight a defensive war in the Pacific. Sven a 

defensive war required forces* and the -Pacific and Asiatic Fleets combined 

were numerically less than the Japanese Fleet. The only hope to bridge the 

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difference in naval strength was to join with other powers in a cannon 
cause against Japan* 

In addition to the rhi.ippine Islands, the rich Dutch East Indies and 
strategic Singapore se«med likely objectives for the Japanese. The Dutch 
and British therefore were logical allies since both had something to fear 
from the Japanese and both had naval forces in the Far East* The holding 
of the Malay Barrier against further expansion to the south by the 
Japanese was one of the strategic principles in rlan Dog and later became 
part of ABC-1. The American goal was to encourage the Dutch and British 
military commanders in the Far East to adopt a strategic plan of action 
based upon holding the Malay Barrier and reflecting the willingness of the 
nited States to cooperate in the plan if she should be compelled to resort 
to war with Japan* 

This chapter will give the background* participants* significance and 
results of conferences at Batavia* Singapore and Manila in the quest for 
cooperation against the Japanese* 

Military commanders on duty in peacetime on foreign stations* have one 
mission in comment to protect the lives and property of their respective 
nationals* For centuries in the Far fSast the ■ foreign nationals" have been 
Europeans. Dutch merchants* among the first of the Europeans in the Orient* 
established a highly profitable trading monopoly through the Dutch ^ast 
India Company in the first half of the seventeenth century* The twentieth 
century found them still in possession of the richest islands in the 
Pacific* appropriately still bearing the name of the original company. The 
British* operating through a rival company in the same era, developed 

nosama a tti a*to*oc -radio dfl:. jnavla JJTMUI iU. •0O91»tltfc 

boa aaiJbnl &** ->!-• t abn»£3X anlq< >. -l-iibas iU 

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a/xioa aril o$ noiaaaqsa *arf# , u/l ^uid/r^ i^xtta 1 ' \&XaM aril "to 

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»n»cpai, dliw w ol 
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avl4o*<taa? xtad# lo T&tta iciq tea aaviX aci^ fp*&oiq oj nianajao ni mtaajfai 

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adJ" ni anaaqotifi ail? lo la*iil ad# anona % aiaarUrxaai dt 

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adi aX atesalai JaadaJhc »»;i lo noiaaajtaoq ni XXJUho naiii hujal xncatfnao 

adT *\naqaioa Xani^JNo adl lo aaom oflt ^nJhUBac/ XXila \;/aJ , * > ,^-', 

Jba oXavafc ( ni aeaa arU ni xnacajoo Xaviv a d^o\d# sniiarxaqo t dailirQ 

roercantile enterprises throughout the Orient* The Straits Settlements, with 
Singapore at the tip ot the Malay eninsula, and Ifong r ong, off the China 
ooast near Canton, were strategically located in the mainstream of world 
commerce* Both Britain and the Netherlands traditionally kept units of 
their fleet in the Far Hast. 

Since 178u American traders had ventured to the Orient from their own 
east const but there was never a serious attempt at conquest of territory 
or the establishment of bases to support military forces operating in the 
area* Commodore erry, after "opening" Japan in l651i. proposed a naval 

base in the Bonin Islands, Formosa or the 3yukyus only to have his 

suggestions negated by President ierce* American naval units operated in 

the Far fast, without a naval base, as the East India Squadron, 183$ J 

Asiatic Squadron, 1866 j and Asiatic Fleet since 1902 (except 1907-1910). 

The annexation of Hawaii by joint congressional resolution, approved by 
President KcKinley on July 7, 1898, set a new precedent for American extra- 
continental expansion* The imperialistic-minded politicians, influenced 

by the theories of Captain Alfred T* Mahan, i*S* Navy had their appetites 

whetted. The Treaty of Paris in December 1898, following Admiral Dewey's 

victory at Manila the previous May, ceded the Philippine Islands and Guam 

to the United States* The American flag and frontier advanced across the 

Pacific in record time as the United States suddenly possessed potential naval 

Cf. Chapter One for Commodore erry»s part in the "opening" of Japan. 


Samuel E* Morison, The Rising Sun in the ■ acific, Iy31-April 19u2 , 
Vol. Ill in History of United States Naval Operations In World War II 
( Boston t Little, Drown and Company, 1&8), p. 28 (2) Cf. Chapter Six for 
discussion of Asiatic Fleet* 


Cf * Chapter Cue for Hahan's theory on the influence of sea power* 

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bases from the west coast to the Orient. Concomitant with the military 
interest in the westward movement were commercial and religious interests. 
The announcement by John Hay of the "Open Door M Folicy in Cliina in 1899* 
followed by the modernisation of the U.S* Navy under I resident Theodore 
Roosevelt in the next few years* enhanced the American position in the 
Pacific* By 1905 ten new battleships and four armoured cruisers had been 
added to the fleet* and in 1908 part of the new fleet sailed around the 
world to serve visible notice on other powers of the new might to protect 
the new oversea possessions* However, a number of cross currents hri played 
on the expansionist momentum. The hope of the Hague Peace Conferences of 
1899 and 1907 led many pacifist and cost-conscious congressmen to question 
the wisdom of a large naval expeditures when we were at peace with the 
world. A disorganised array of prominent figures argued against any foreign 
committments or possessions. The aura of possessing far away islands was 
severely dimmed by the expenses incurred in putting down the Philippine 

What to do with 7*100 islands and islets populated by a mixture of 
Orientals speaking sixty-five dialects with customs and culture foreign to 
any previous American standards? The Americans, unlike their neighboring 
British and Dutch colonisers* did not have the propensity to exploit their 
stronger position. Once opposition to the American government had ended 
throughout the islands* limited self-rule was allowed under residential- 
appointed governors-general* A Philippine Assembly, the lower house of the 
legislature* was permitted and in 1913 free trade with the nited States was 

iff! otf 

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ranted* * 

As If to shed the cloak of oversea responsibility and the stigma of 
having "possessions" unnecessarily, Congress passed a bill granting 
independence to the Philippines over the veto of President Hoover in January 
1933 only to have the bill rejected by the Philippine Legislature* The next 
attempt fared better and the Tydin/>s«*?cDuffie Act of 193U was passed and 
approved by the Onited States Conferees and the Philippine Legislature. The 
Act provided for a ten year transitional period after -which the TJhited Stated 
would abandon all military installations in the Islands* The quest it a of 
future naval bases was left open, however* with the proviso that the resident 
could negotiate with the Philippine Government for naval bases within two 
years of the date of recognition of independence* 

The Washington ftaval Conference of 1921 contained a non-fortification 
clause prohibiting the building of defenses in the :1iilippines* After the 
eviration of the agreements in 1936, the United States did not see fit to 
build defenses in an area which would be given its independence in a few 
short years or to invoke unfavorable reaction from Japan* Consequently* the 
Asiatic Fleet had no secure base from which to operate* However, the fleet* 
or a part of it, spent a few months In Philippine waters each year and Mild 

courtesy visits to Japan. Singapore* Hanoi. Hong Kong, Batavia and other Far 

Eastern ports* On October 30, 1936 the perceptive Admiral R*S* Tarnell 

T^ouis Morton, The Fall of the li^llppinee , fourth in a subseries: The 
War In the Pacific (Washlnrtont office or the flhlef of Military History, 
Department of the Army, 19535, P* 2u 

Louis Morton* er>* cit., p* U* 


S *E.Korlson, Vol. in, op* cit ., p* 29, 

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Commander of the Asiatic Float* Xn his first report to the Chief of 

Naval Operations on lovewber 17, 1936 he made this observation relative to 

our position in the Philippines i 

• •• The subject that the British intelligence officers 
and others seened more concerned with than any other in 
their conversations with oar officers related to the 
future status of the Philip ines. They asked if we 
really intended to leave the I hilippines to its political 
fate and withdraw all United States protection from that 
gateway to Singapore and India* Sons senior officers 
expressed an opinion that the Japanese menace could only 
be met with yitish^JUaerioan cooperation an£ that the 
Japanese projected "southward expansion poHcy* could be 
prevented by a strong naval base in the Philippines plus 
the Singapore base* Opinion was also expressed that they 
thought it very doubtful that the tTnited Ststec would 
leave its only sure foothold in the Far iSast after years 
that have been spent in building up trade and ocsraerce* 
Such opinions were probably advanced for the purpose of 
drawing forth the opinions of our officers* Of course* 
no one had definite information as to the eventual 
political independence that has been granted by the 
Tydinge-McDuffie Act* 

The British interest in the Philippines is not raerely 
academic for various British intelligence officers have 
travelled throu>$iout the Philippines within the last to*o 
years*. •' (Enphasis nine*) 

After three years as Conmander in Chief U*S* Asiatic Fleet* during which 

he witnessed first hand the Japanese push into China after the 1937 

"incident,* Admiral Yarnell reached the following conclusions which he passed 

on to the Chief of Naval Operations! 


1* lis should never engage in a war single-handed 
against Japan if at all possible. Traat Britain* France * 
and the Netherlands are virtually Interested and should 
take part * 

2. "in case of a single-handed war* we cannot aove 
our fleet to Eastern waters !ue to lack of a base* 

3* I do not believe our governasnt will sv^r build 
a first class Naval base in the Philippines* 


Letter* CINCAF to CHG* 17 November, 1936, NA, Navy File FF6* 

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U* \fe can never compete with Japan In transporting 
• I* troops to the Par 5ast* 

5* The war should be a Haval war, - cruisers, 
submarines, and aircraft operating against lines of com- 
munications** (Xtsphasis mine*) 

Vlthin weeks of the Tarnell report, gupr*, another outspoken Admiral 

reported to the Chief of Naval Operations after inspecting bases In the 

Pacific* Admiral Ben Moreell, chief of the Bureau of I'arda and Docks 

commented j 

• ■ .When we consider that the total cost of these three 
major bases [earl Harbor, Guam and Cavite] approximates 
the current cost of running the national government for a 
period of about two weeks, the modesty of the sum involved 
is apparent* The maintenance and operating costs of those 
bases would be a permanent burden, but the presence of 
these bases would enable us to reduce to some extent, the 
costs of operating existing bases* 

It is ogr belief that as lone as nature breeds men of 
ability and without scruples, and provides them with 
millions of willing followers, Just so long will we have 
the elements essential to international disorder* Our only 
protection is a willingness and ability to maintain our 
rights by FORCE , To do this we must be prepared to go in 
whole-heartedly and energetically; halfway measures are of 
no avail, and, in some eases, worse than worthless. <m 
should get in w get out*? 

A quick review of history will show that the United States did not "get out" 

and did not begin to "g t in" until it was too late* 

In February 191/3 Admiral rtark wrote a long letter to Admiral Thomas C* 

Hart, who had recently became Commander i •. Chief of the Asiatic Fleet* In 

addition to general advice on War ftans, strategy, and the use of the limited 

forces, the letter @ave the first indication found in the records of Admiral 

Stark's views on the cooperation with Jther powers urged ty Hart's predecessor, 


Memot AIM Tarnell to CMO, 2 September 39, .1 ID, CNO Filet A16-3 Warfare, 

ieraoi Hear Admiral Horeell to CNO, IS Aug* 39} MID Filet A16-3/FP 

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^ -107- 

Admiral Yarnell. 

...You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never 
percipitate (sic) anything in the astern Pacific unless 
the principally interested powers (United States-Freneh- 
British-Dutoh) act in concert. The possibility of getting 
such concerted action appears to ne to be improbable 
during the present unpredictable state of affairs in 

rope. \m have been turning over in our heads whether 
you could use Hongkong, Singapore, "-forth Borneo, or 
French or Dutch possessions, bat there is no indication 
that any of then would be available...- 

$y September l?uO France and the Netherlands had fallen before the 

German drive, and with Britain fighting for her very survival, fear that Ja an 

would take advantage of the opportunity to move south was well founded. The 

Joint lanning Committee in a report to the Chief of Naval Operations and 

Chief of Staff reported i 

.../F/here is no assurance that Japan will not, 
within the next few months, move swiftly either against 
the Dutch East Indies or against the Philippines or Quern, 
especially if the Japanese Government should become 
increasingly embarrassed by embargoes from the united 
States to Japan, and at the same time should become 
convinced that despite protests by the United States it 
was only throwing a bluff and would back down in the face 
of a serious situation. •• .Within the near future, the 
tilted States may be confronted with the demand for a 
major effort in the Far East, an effort for which we are 
not now prepared and will not be prepared for several 
years to come. If, in the near future, we should be 
confronted with the necessity of armed opposition to 
Jar<an, in the face of the potential threat in the 
Atlantic, that effort probably will be limited to the 
employment of minor naval surface and air forces 
operating from Singapore and Dutch East Indies bases, 
plus the interruption of Ja; anese shipping in the 
eastern Pacific. 11 

In line with the thoughts on cooperative action in the Far East against 

Pearl Harbor Attack, "art 16, p. 2Ui6. 


Memo j JTC to CNO and CofS, 2? Sept. 1*0| JSffi File? A16-1, Sept. -Dec, 


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the Japanese tireat Admiral Hart»s Assistant Chief of Staff, Commander F* • 

Thomas, went to Singapore for preliminary talks with the British in 

12 13 

October, and received a copy of the British Par "astern Var I Ian. Mean- 
while in London Admiral Ohormley, the Special Havel Observer, who was 

conferring with the Bailey Committee and other Admiralty members reported 

the British to be e^ectant of active American participation in the war now 

that the resident had been reelected* They talked about the defense of the 

Malay Barrier and an "alliance between themselves, us,, and the Dutch, without 

much thought as to what the effect would be in airo^e." Admiral Gtark, who 

wrote the above information to Admiral Hart continued: 

.,./J?/e have no idea as to whether they /Ehe British/ 
would at one© begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or 
were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese* ..Furthermore, 
though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will 
resist an attempt to capture their islands, X question 
whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only 
Singapore, were attacked* 

Ihe Navy can. ••make no political commitments* There- 
fore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied 
war* However, as I told you in my despatch, you can 
perform a useful service by laying with the British and 
possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of 
cooperation, should we be forced into the war* I rather 
doubt, however, ttet the Dutch will talk freely with yo . 
If they do my idea would be that you would explore the 
fields oft Command arrangements, General objectives, 
General plan of cooperative action, including the 
approximate naval and military deployment..* The naval 
part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war 
is about completed, and will be on its way to you within 
a short time* We are hoping to send naval attaches to 
Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Ballkpapan, and Ceylon] 
possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you 

watson, op* cit* , p* 3^2. 

Pearl Harbor Attack, T art 16, p* 2Uh9< 


Gf. Chapter FOUR. 

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via air transportation* .* 
A month later the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded two copies of 
Rainbow in to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet stressing the "possible 
eventuality" of war with dermany, Japan and Italy and directing that high 
priority be ;*iven to operating plans and the preparations of vessels, air- 
craft and personnel* 

• • .One of the assumptions >f the plan is that war would 
be fought with the United States, the British, and the 
nutch Colonial Authorities as Allies* Staffs conversations 
with the British, of a limited nature, have been under- 
taken in London and Washington, but as far as concerns an 
allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far 
East, the only useful staff conversations would appear 
those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might 
be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War 
Commanders in that region* It is believed that you may 
be able to hold such conversations with the British* 
There is considerable doubt as to the extent of the 
conversations which may become possible with the Dutch, 
owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan* 

'feu are, therefore, authorised to conduct staff 
conversations with the British and Dutch Supreme 
Compandors, with the specific understanding that you 
are in no way committing the United States Government to 
particular political or military decisions, and that 
the purpose of the staff conversations is solely to 
facilitate joint operations should war eventuate under 
the approximate conditions shown in the Assumptions of 
"Rainbow 3% It is requested that these conversations be 
conducted in secretj in particular the most extreme care 
should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become , / 
aware of your attempt to establish contact with the Dutch* 

In December 19bP Captain W*R* Purnell, Chief of Staff to Admiral Hart, 

had attended a British-Dutch meeting at Singapore* In January Purnell 

conferred with Vice Admiral C*K* < • Helfrieh and his staff at Batavia on 

possible joint defensive action against the Japanese* the Dutch feared an 

n33 supra * 

Letter* CWO to CDWAF, 12 Dec* 1*0, on-12-D/j NRD Files A16-3/A7-3. 

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Attack by the Japanese and were highly- desirous of support* That supj cr ^ "id 
not appear to be forthcoming from the British authorities at Singapore whose 

interest, one Dutch commit toenail remarked "," dwindled as the 

scene moved eastward from Singapore. Captain Furnell's report continued: 

•••I asked what steps would be taken by the Dutch 
in case of Japanese attack on Singapore, Captain van 
Staveren replied that the British and Netherlands govern- 
ments have not given each other guarantees of mutual help* 
He also stated that the Singapore Conferences had made a 
proposal to the two governments, that if the Japanese 
moved in force south of the 6° North parallel, the 
British and Netherlands East Indies forces would be free 
to attack them without further declaration of war. The 
Netherlands Government has rejected this proposal; they 
did not know yet the decision of the British Government. 

The Dutch were much concerned over two points, 
namely, in case of a Japanese attack against the N ether- 
lands iast Indies coming through the Sulu sea, 18 what would 
be our action; and what would we do about the protection 
of shipping from Netherlands East Indies to our West Coast 
in case of Japanese-N.E.I. war, the nited States remaining 

To the first I replied that we would guarantee the 
neutrality of the Philippines to the extent of attacking 
with all forces available, would notify them as well as all 
other nations of serious breaches of neutrality, and would 
probably maintain a benevolent neutrality toward Dutch and 
British. To the second X replied that I thought a war Zone 
would be prescribed and that conditions would be the same 
as new exist in European Voters. As an entirely personal 
view I also stated that I believed tne United States would 
take the necessary steps to protect shipping, or secure the 
materials, if the loss of these materials would seriously 
hamper united States production. Asked at this point if I 
thought the 'nited States would go to war with Japan if 
she attacked the Netherlands East Indies, I stated, 1Q 
emphasising it was my own personal view, I thought she would. ' 


' Watson, op. cit ., p. 392, (2) Cf. nl$ infra for Captain f urnell»s 

report used by Watson. 


Cf. earl Harbor Attack, Fart 16, p. 2208 for discussion of ABM 

Hart's aTtempt to close the Sulu Sea. 

Report by Capt. urnell, Batavia talks lO-U* Jan. i*l, Encl. »C" to 
Lifts CINAP to GND, Serial S 5, 18 Jan. 1*1; fflD File; AHDA-ANZAC Correspondence 

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The Dutch authorities reciprocated by furnishing Purnell with "copious data 

on such matters as thair own sea and air strength* facilities, ports, bases, 

and storage*" 

In mid-February when the question of defending Singapore was warming 
up the American and British staff conversations in Washington, anther 
British-Dutch meeting In Singapore was announced* The record does not show 
that a United States representative was invited, but since Arierioan coopera- 
tion was so urgently being sought in all quarters, there must have been an 
invitation* On ffcbruary IS, the Chief of Naval Operations sent Commander in 
Chief Asiatic Fleet a directive to attend: 

Under conditions of uteaost secrecy iritiah and Dutch 
Staff conversations will be held in Singapore beginning 
February twenty-eecond K You are directed to have your 
representative participate in these conversations with 
powers to a#ree to a Joint Plan of operation of ISnited 
States British and Dutch forces but without making 
political commitments 1 Agreements are subject to your 
and my approval 1 Tcr. sa should be approximately in 
accord with your previous instructions and tnolud* 
provisions for a common acceptance of equality of poli- 
l»l eooncrdc and military control and be based on the 
use of only the forces now at your disposal X Strategic 
plans adopted should be fully realistic X Tour 
representative will express my view that British and 
Dutch strategic arrangements which depend for their 
efficacy upon intervention by the United States would 
not be sound since there is doubt that Congress would 
declare war in case Japanese aggression against powers 
other than the Unitod States X In any ease a delay 
nil^ht ensue pending final decision of the issue I I 
recognise that this places you in a difficult position but 
more definite instructions can not now be given you* 23. 

Two weeks later Admiral Hart reported to CNO the disappointing results 

of this latest attempt to develop a definite agreement without American 

** tS0Il » QP* clt «* p* 392* 

! -Tespatcht C!» to CDJCAF, l£ Feb. Idj MB Files seme as nl9 supra * 

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guarantees of cooperation* That which the naval leaders sought and did not 

ret was a strategic plan of operations against the Japanese in which the 

United States would participate if it should he "compelled to resort to war 

against the Japanese* 

The results were disappointing* The conference was 
for the purpose of makia an An fto-rnrbch-A-tttralian plan, 
- the first step* The conference not only (Udn'tHSet 
beyond that step, but did not - in o\xr estimation - even 
complete the step* It was a big gathering, with separate 
representatives of Array, IJavy and Air arms for the British, 
and Australians i Army and llavy for the Dutch j many officials* 
They made certain agreements, subject to the approval of 
their respective governments, for cooperative action, but 
didn't really get down to cases nearly enough* ••They all* 
except for some Dutch promises, have altogether a defensive 
attitur% on the water as well as on shore, - even after 
they sat as much Royal ?3avy reinforcement as they can, at 
the present stage, have any hope for* Their navies are 
now intended primarily for hoarding their own ship lanes - 
not at all for going after the enemy 1 ••••Nov upon our making 
a definite commitment toward participation, I am convinced 
that we can get the Dutoh and British local navies (not the 
Ansacs) to do most anything we say, IP iney feel that their 
own sea supply and reinforcement lines are reasonably 
secure, - because of our own, or the Royal Navy's, effort*. • 
please think over the advisability of this Fleet's making a 
!fetherlands East Indies cn&se just as a matter of peace- 22 
time course, something that has been done in former years* ' 

The disappointment expressed by Admiral Hart and reechoed in ttaahlngton would 

prove to be the rule rather than the exception relative to other Singapore 

talks • 

Adtairal Hart's letter reporting the lack of progress being made in the 

Far Sast planning scheme arrived as the ASM. "Ian was nearing completion* 

The Far 2ast agreements had been sought to complement the Washington talks, 

and the unfavorable report prompted Admiral Stark to attempt corrective action* 

Copies of Fart's letter were sent to the President and Secretary of State in 

^TlttCECAF to Cm, h Mar. 1*1 1 M 311.3CAF/926 3/2. 

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th© belief that a word from each of thorn "?say do much toward gettiag th© 
British, the i>uteh, the Australians and th© Hew "ealanders together." The 
Navy would do what it could toward this eM* Stark's roeiaorandum to the 
President continues - 

...It la now many, many weeks since I directed Admiral Hart 
to hold conversations out there and do all he could to have 
a plan ready — just in case* Regarding HarVs Netherlands 
East Indies cruise, no immediate decision required, but I 
like the iV- p ovided it is properly timed**.* I say I like 
the idea, because I think it the most positive move we could 
make, it is in line with our war plans, so if war were to 
break, we would be sitting with our surface ships where we 
want them* In this connection I might mention that somotizae 
ago Admiral Hart asked permission to pay a visit to Hongkong 
with his flagship* Like the above, I thought it would have 
been a good move but deferred to State IJepartraent's objections* 
Regarding AMltl Hart*s proposed Netherlands East Indiee 
visit, we will of course make no recomr-iesidation to you without 
lor consultation with th© State Department, whose views you 
•tfould want. » » [handwritten at and] Secretary has Tj&d and 

^The agreements in the Report ABOl were readied with the full approval of 

Admiral Stark and General Marshall, who, though not in attendance at the 

nestings, kept currently informed on the staff conversations* As a result 

of the accord with the British in Washington, "the Joint Planning Cosimittee 

were given a new directive for the preparation of the Joint Basic Plan - 

Rainbow No* 5>, based upon the report of the United States British Staff 

Conversations, Dated 27 March 191*1 (ABC-1) and upon th© Canadian-United States 

Basic Defense Plan No* 2 (ABC-22)," 

•••Steps were immediately taken by Admiral Stark and 
General Harshall to implenient the ASO-1 agreement, both by 
arranging for detailed planning in conformity therewith 
by War and ^ T avy apartment Staff and Gomniands, and by 
taking action immediately on th© points suggested in the 
letter of transmittal of 29 March 19&U Instructions were 
lansdiately sent to the military and naval commanders 
(General Douglas rlacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart) to 


feme* GNO to ^resident} HA, loc» cit* 

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coaplata arrangements with the British and Dutoh Commands 
for a Far Eastern Staff Conference at Singapore at as 
early a date as possible. 

On April 2 leneral Marshall sent by courier a complete copy of ABC-1 

to Major General George Orunert, commanding general of the Philippine 

Department • The purpose in sending the copy was to permit advance planning 

with Cowaander in Cliief Asiatic Fleet and Coisamander Sixteenth Naval District 

(Manila). Grunert was specifically ordered net "to discuss" the natter with 

the British or Dutch. On April k the restriction m\ "to discuss" was 

revoked by a message from Marshall that a conference had been called in 

Singapore. a parallel message from CNO to CUBAF was sent on April 5t 








The conference in Singapore lasted from 21 to 2? April with the nited 

States represented by Captain Purnell, who by now was a familiar person at 

Far Hast conferences; Colonel A.C. McJ3ridge, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. 

Military Forces Philippines j Captain A.H.R. Allen, • . ;&val Observer 

Kittredge Monograph, Vol. I, Sect. IV, Pari A, Chp. 1U, p. 372 (2) 

Kittredge is incorrect in calling General Mac Arthur, the military commander. 
Major General George Granert was the military commander until MacArthur's 
recall to the active list on 26 July 191+1 • 

Watson, op. cit., p. 39l*. 


Despatch: OHO to CINCAF, S Apr. hX% NHD File} saws as n 1? (2) Of. 
Pearl l&rbor Attack, Part 1$, p. I$l6 for ara. 31» Annex 3. 

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Singapore and his Army counterpart, LT. Ool. F.G. Brink. The British 

representatives were the ranking 3riti»h officers in the Far £*at, Air 

Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander in Chief , Far Sast and 

Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey T^ayton, Commander in Chief China. The ensuing ADB 

reflected a decidedly British position, possibly due to the 

influence of the much acre senior British officers. Tiie official ADB 

report was not received in Washington until June ?; however* the British 

Military Mission received from London a telegraphic summary of the report 

and circulated it to the American delegation on Hay 6« 

The information in the summary on the recommended defense of the 

Philippines was the first major fault found with the report. It prompted the 

American military chiefs to inform the British Military Mission of their 

reaction without waiting for the complete report. Commander McDowell, 

American Secretary for Collaboration to the British Joint Staff Mission, was 

instructed to inform the British Mission in Washington that 

•••The Jnited States intends to adhere to its decision not 
to reenforce the Philippines except in minor particulars, 
such as the addition of several minesweepers and a few 
torpedo boats. • .The principal value of the position and 
present strength of the United States forces in the 
Philippines lies in the fact that to defeat them will 
require a considerable effort by Japan and nay well 
entail a delay in the development of an attack against 
Singapore and the fotherlanda East Mies. A Japanese 
attack in the Philippines might thus offer opportunities 
to the Associated ; owers to inflict losses on Japanese 
naval forces, and to improve their own dispositions for 

Cf. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, pp. 155U-1555 for list of delegates. 

Complete ADS Report loc cit .j pp» 15>51-l58U. 

Cf. p. Il6ff infra for American objections to British positions. 

Matloff and Snell, op. clt ., p. 66, n9. (2) Watson, op. cit ., pp. 3?5« 


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the defense of the Malay Barrier. • .The Chief of Naval 

orations and the Chief of Staff do not acree that 
stone Kong is likely to be altogether a strategic 
liability* rather than an asset. The possibility cannot 
be dismissed that Hong King wight, as in the case of the 
Philippines, perform a ureful service in containing or 
delaying Japanese forces that night otherwise be employed 
in a more decisive theater ...As regards ABB (sic), the 
Chief of Maval Operations and the Chief of rtaff regret 
that they must reject this paper in its entirety, as 
either being contrary to the commitments of ABC-1, or as 
relating to matters .which are the sole concern of the 
British Government. 3° 

The dissatisfaction over the ADB Report registered in June with the 

British Military Mission in Washington was just a preview of a longer, 

stronger and more detailed denunciation a month later after the American 

military staffs had had time to study the full report. A joint letter from 

the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of ftaff directed the Special 

Naval and Military Observers in London to inform the British Chiefs of Staff 

that the United States was unable to approve the ADB R*r *t for "several 

major, as well as numerous minor particulars. ■ The major differences may 

be summarised as follows t 

(a) Statements requiring political decisions were included in the 
report} specifically} that an attack on one of the Associated overs would be 
considered an attack on the other powers (para 6 and 8)j counter-attacks on 
Japan would be recommended in the event of certain listed Japanese actions 
(para 26) j a call for increased assistance to China (para 76). 

(b) The creation of a new intermediate command not envisaged in ABC-1. 
The "Eastern Theater" and Commander in Chief, Far iSastern Fleet had not been 
planned in ABC-1. The Jnited States had agreed to British naval strategic 


Letter j CDR L.R. McDowell, Sec. for Collaboration to Copt. A.W. Clarke, 

RN, Sec. BR Mil Mission, 7 June ills HHD Filet sane as n!9 supra. 


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diract.ion of naval forces not en&aged in the defense of the fhilippines* 
There had been no agreement to the use of U*S* forces by the British outside 
the Far East Area* 

(c) The strategic importance of the Netherlands Kast Indies was not 

(d) After the arguments over the importance of the defense of 

Singapore during the ADC-1 conversations and as a concession to British 

insistence in the final writing of the Report* the following was included 

as part of paragraph 11(b) t 

*A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the 
retention of a position in the Far Sast such as will 
insure the cohesion and security of the British Caramon- 
wealth and the maintenance of its war ef fort." 

In addition paragraph h of the ADB Report had listed as the most important 

interests in the Far Saott (a) the security of sea cotanunioations and (b) the 

security of Singapore* Tot, in spite of the importance repeatedly stressed 

by the British of the Malay Barrier to the seciarity of Singapore and the 

whole Far East, only three of forty-ei^it British ships in the Far iSast were 


• • .to operate in the vicinity of the '■ ialay Barrier* No 
British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval 
defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces 
advancing southward* nor to offensive operations designed 
to close the passages of the Barrier to the passage of 
Japanese raiders* All British naval forces are assigned 
to escort and patrol work* most of them at great distances 
from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have 
asserted to be 'Vital*" It may be pointed out that the 
naval defense of this position is entrusted* by the ABB 
Report* solely to United States and Dutch forces* •••Since 
the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far 
Sast is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Chief of Staff a<tvise you that* until 
such time as a plan is wolved whereby British naval forces 
take a predominant part in the defense of the British 
position in the Far East Area* they will be constrained to 

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withdraw their agreement to permit the 'nited States 
Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction 
in that Area. 

\^ The incongruity between the British position in Washington that Singapore 

sine qua non to their Tar Eastern security and the British position in 

Singapore of assigning none of their ships directly to support th t theory 

was undoubtedly the major provocation for American rejection of the ABB 


(e) The assignment of '?.S. naval aviation units to British control 
was in violation of paragra h Hi (f ) of ABC-1. 

(f ) There was no strategic plan in the ADB Report. Although American 
and Dutch forces had clearly defined tasks, those tasks assigned the British 
could "be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in 
Appendix l. w 

The Report was completely unacceptable to the American military chiefs. 

This instant failure, immediately following the concordance of strategic 

considerations in ABG-1, and the history of past failures to get the Far 

Eastern military commanders of the Associated owere to agree on a strategic 

plan of action against the Japanese, induced the Chief of Naval Operations 

and the Chief of Staff to suggests 

If farther conferences are to be held in Singapore for 
drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers. •• 
the conference would have its work simplified were its 
deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been 
agreed upon in advance between the United States, the united 
Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands East indies... -^ 

Before another Singapore meeting could be scheduled or the need 

arise for an agenda, the British Chiefs of Staff attempted, after the Atlantic 

31 ; 

earl Harbor Attack, Vart 15, pp. 1677-1679. 

ettto wx%» -unit* 

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oxJnoUA (Mil toil/* t b»J • m<; 2d s 1- aaJ- «Afcomui as vol o^iis 


Conference In August, to salvage the ABB Report by bringing It in line with 


AB0~1* I October 3 the Hevised Report, designated ADM, was rejected by 

the Africans* 

• 1 1 f t]ou are informed that we have given very careful 
study to the Admiralty's proposals for a new Far East Area 
agreement, as shown in AT>B»2* While the proposals have 
net some of our objections, we do not feel that the 
fundamental defects have been eliminated* In fact, I am 
inclined to think that the ADB agreement not only is not 
an advance on the ABD-1 Beport, but that it actually 
represents a retrograde step* 

Vhile neither the Army nor the s'awy has reached a 
final decision, at the present time they are inclined to 
beLieve that, until such time as a really practicable 
combined plan can be evolved for the Far Sast Area, it will 
be better to continue working under an agreement for 
coordination of effort by the system of mutual cooperation* 
The various Commanders in the Far East Area are exc! ranging 
ideas and are establishin/: technical procedures required 
for cooperation* Therefore, failure to issue a plan for 
unified command will not greatly retard progress* We feel 
quite strongly that the defense of the I&lay Barrier is 
primarily a concern of the British and Dutch* Hy sugges- 
tion would be that the British Chiefs of Staff in London 
give this matter their earnest attention, and endeavor to 
pimptapo an effective campaign plan that will have real 
teeth in lt*33 

Admiral Turner in his letter rejecting ADB-2 mentioned to the British 

representative that "the military situation out there has changed considerably 

since last Spring, and will change more after the U*S* reenforcements, not? 

planned, arrive in the Philippines*" It was more than just planned 

reenforcements that changed the desperate strand of pessimism found in 1939* 

1910 to a fiber of hopefulness and finally restrained optimism* The dynamic 

32 Matloff and Snell, oq^ oit »* p* 7 


Letter* liADM Turner to RACK Dankwerts, RN, 3 "et« ill) ?«D Filet sens 

as nl9* 


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personality and confidence of General Douglas KacArthur* recently recalled to 

active dutf to command U.S. Army Forces In the Far Saetj the mobilisation 

and intensive training of native Philippine troops; the enthusiasm for the 

offensive power in the newly proven 3-17 bombers which were to be flown to 

the Ihilippine* In increasing numbers; and additional patrol planes, submarines 

and torpedo boats for naval use in the Ttoilippinea all gave substance to the 

belief that within a few months the Philippines could be defended against a 

Japanese attack regardless of ether agreements In the area* 

While t*e United States was accelerating efforts to defend the 

Philippines* the British were re-exaninating their plane for defense of their 

interests in the Far S&st* The Special Havel Observer in London told the 

Chief of Naval Operations by despatch en October 2$ of a most important 

decision made by the British* 

admiral ^hllllpt former Vice-Chief Jfeval Staff with 
FADM Pallieter as Chief of Staff and additional able staff 
officers are going at once direct to far-Seat in Irince o" 
Wales as Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet* Hemisphere 
Defense Plan Five and early repairs have enabled fritlah 
to plan early dispatch of battleships to Kastem Fleet to 
eventually bring total out there to Six* Only 8 destroyers 
available of which h are modern* Admiralty feels that ATB 
is dead and that A30-1 is sound and that what is needed is 
strategical operating plan which can be drawn up in Lrnden 
or .Washington* but better In Hardest* Such a plan might 
require use of Manila as an advance base for ADB naval 
forces and development of adequate air routes throughout 
(sic) area for concentrating of air-forces* Admiralty 
believes disadvantages of Manila due to proximity to 
Formosa and possible effective air attacks disproved by 
present war* It is apparent that British are taking 
prompt steps to meet Japanese threat by sending able 
officers to theater of possible operations* by desiring 
to make sound strategical plan and by re-enforcine naval 
forces there-in heavily* These forces however deficient in y* 
destroyers, submarines and strategically located secure bases* 

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Th» informal message of the Special Jiaval Observer to Admiral Stark was 

soon followed by an official latter from the First Sea Lord^ Adnlral Pom** to 

Admiral Stark t 

..•X do not consider that either ADB-1 or APB-2 meet the 
new conditions (change of government in Japan) and I would 
suggest that the need for a conference to draw up strategic 
operating plans for Far Eastern Area based afresh on ADC-1 
has now become urgent.. .If you arree in priwiipla to the 
abandoning of further discussions on ADB-1 and ADB-2 and to 
holding of a fresh conference on basis of A3 -1, we can 
then proceed to discuss the agenda* • #36 

Admiral stark replied the next day, November 6, through the Special 

Naval Observer in London i 

• ••The Chief of llaval Operations agrees that the m«& 
exists for prompt action "by both limited Kingdom and United 
States, in pursuance of this idea* Ans^r is reenforoing both 
land and air forces as rapidly as practicable and training 
Philippine Army intensively* Mavy is reenforoing Asiatic 
Fleet with 12 modern submarines 3 of which departed Hawaii 
2kth instant, remainder departed November Uth. Also has 
delivered 6 TflfB to Asiatic and may send 6 more. GEO believes 
that AT© should not be revived as ABC 1 is an adequate ssajor 
directive 'which should be laplamented by a sound strategical 
operating plan drawn up between British IXitoh and T J.S* Navies 
and between British and Dutch Air Forces and US Army Air 
Forces* Admiral Hart and Admiral Laytcn have agreed on the 
framework of various plans but these have been unrealistic 
because Admiral Layton is practically without naval forces* 
Due to the Intricacies of the problem it seems preferable 
for the tJ«$« and UK naval forces and the three air elements 
in the Far Ssst to coordinate operations bv the method of 
cooperation and not by unity of command**' 

Stark approved the move by the Chief of Naval Staff in creating a new 

position, Comriander in Chief iSastem Fleet, Mi that capital ships were being 

sent to the Area and suggested that the British consolidate their naval 


T^atson, op* cit »a ■ • 5?) quote from Cable A«fedralty to Br Adte Delegation 

Washington, $ Jov. !jl (2) Matloff and Snell, op* pit ., p* 76. 


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forces under one flag officer. In answer to a query on the use of Manila by 
combined naval forces, Stark replied that Lusson was suitable for light naval 
forces and air elements but limited facilities and supplies precluded use 
by heavy naval forces* The United States was willing to assign eight 
destroyers to supplement the British capital ship force "if the U.S. is then 
at war with Japan* tt 

Five days later on November 11. the U*S* Chiefs of Staff suggested to 
the Admiralty via the Military Mission in Washington the holding of new 
conferences In Manila* the three senior officers who could reach a 

strategic agreement* Vice Admiral Phillips. WS t Admiral Hart and General 

MaoArthur* would attend* Admiral Phillips visited Manila on It— 6 December. 

terminating his visit without having reached an agree?*»ent because of the 

sighting of a large Japanese force proceeding towards Malaya* Phillips 

hurried to his flagship, the ^rince of Wales at Sinjjapore and together with 

the battle cruiser Repulse moved in position to intercept Japanese landing 

parties* Without protective air cover both ships were quickly sunk by 

Japanese aircraft* The loss of the only allied battleship and battle cruiser 

west of Hawaii was staggering. but to British~Ameriean cooperation the 

loss of Admiral Phillips was just as great* In the opening hours of the 

game it was he who had talked with Captain Ingersoll in London about American 

cooperation In the very area where he gave his life shortly after an eleventh 

hour effort to reach an agreement with the Americans* 



Matloff and Snail*, op* clt *. p* 76. 

Morison, opjMCit*. Vol. Ill, p. 190. 

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The period of pre-war conferences was over. The attempts to derive a 
plan of action against the Japanese expansion had failed one after the other* 
the reasons for the failures were many* From an American point of view the 
countries involved were too concerned with their own interests, commerce* 
and position* National Jealousies were very ouch in evidence* But before 
criticism becomes oppressively heavy* let it be remembered, that the delegates 
were military men whose agreements had to pass the approval of their 
respective governments* Restrictions placed on them before a conference 
limited their scope of agreenent* The U.S* naval representatives were given 
reasonable scope* considering the ?*rand strategy of defensive war in the 
aciflc and* until the last phase* the position of not reenforcii*: the 
Asiatic Fleet* Consequently* the American representative had little to 
offer the collective force until the United States were at war* To the 
planners in the Far East this nebulous support was not enough* Whether that 
support if definitely promised and used collectively with other Associated 
Powers would have withstood the Japanese will mymr be known* for the plans 
of action which were often conceived but never born could mrer be tested* 

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Bach of the major Suropean powers which had interests in China had naval 
unite stationed In the Far East} originally, to protect their respective 
nationals and their property from pirates; in the twentieth century, to 
protect against the prevalent war lords during China^ civil unrest and to 
restrain the participants in the Sino-Japanese war from aggressive acts in 
the 1930 «s« The Japanese Havy, which was victorious over the Chinese in 
139b and the Russians in 190', was observed by American naval personnel in 
the Far Kast for years* In the llanchurian and Shanghai Incidents in 1931 
and 1932, respectively, the American naval officers had the opportunity to 
witness Japanese units in action first-hand* In fact, no other tour of duty 
in the United States Navy afforded a better chance to observe the operations, 
equipment and personnel of the most probable enemy than a tour in the Asiatic 

The term "Fleet" in "Asiatic Fleet" was misleading* The American naval 
units stationed in the Far East were far from being the balanced force 
possessing capital ship offensive capability usually connoted in the term 
"fleet*" In 1935 the Far Eastern naval forces of the United states were 
called the Bast India 3quadront in 1366 the title was changed to Asiatic 

Squadron and after 1902 the collective ships in the Far Kast were called the 

Asiatic Fleet * It was a simple matter or >iastige to call the ships a fleet 

and temporarily to promote its Cocroandar to four-star Adniral rank with the 

Samuel B* Moris on, Vol. Ill, The Rising Sun in the Pacifio* op* cit «* 
p* 23* 

JUk Q * - 

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title* Commander in Chief Asiatic Sleet, in order that he would be of 
equivalent rank with his British, Branch and Japanese counterparts* His 
fores in the late 1930»a consisted of approximately fifteen destroyers, 
twelve submarines* two cruisers* five snail specially built river gunboats 
and a few auxiliaries* In addition to the vessels* the Comander in Chief 
Asiatic Fleet controlled the Fourth Regiment United States Marines stationed 
in the International Settlement In Shanghai and a Marine brigade acting as 
the legation guard in Peiping* 

After the renewal of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937* the United 
States Navy became much more actively involved than Just observing the 
Japanese* Naval units in the performance of their duties of escorting unarmed 
merchant vessels* of protecting American property and nationals* acting as 
communications stations for the Sabassy and Consuls and making routine moves 
between ports met the Japanese face to face with increasing frequency* In 
December 1957 the river gunboat WlkX was attacked by Japanese aircraft and 
sunk* As the fighting intensified and advanced up the Yangtse Valley in 193d* 
it threatened to over-run American naval units located on the river* On one 
occasion the fighting did pass by the gunboat TOJKX5ACY* leaving it in 
Japanese occupied territory* Still another gunboat* the TOTJILA, providing 
communications for and located only a few hundred yards £*om the American 
Embassy in Chungking was bombed but not hit* On the bl$i sea the Japanese 
on at least two occasions complained through diplomatic channels of American 
affronts or violations of international lift* The creation of incidents to 
show the American marines in bad li<*ht in * eiping and Shanghai seemed to be 
part of a deliberate pattern of Japanese actions to fores American naval 
units* marines* commercial interests and missionaries out of China* 

The relations resulting Iron such incidents as mentioned above often 

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involved the United States State Departe&ent, the Navy Department, the 
Japanese Foreign Office and the senior Japanese and American naval commanders 
in China* Seme of the incidents will be described, not for the history of 
the event itself but to show the interplays of negotiations to reach 
mutually acceptable solutions between the Japanese and American naval 
commanders and within the diplomatic structure in Washington and Tokyo. The 
relationships of the United States Kavy to the Imperial Japanese Navy in 
China are particularly interesting for they covered the full spectrum of 
relations from confiding the details of classified operations to the sinking 
and bombing of vessels. 

Relations between Admiral Harry Yarnell, Commander in Chief "slatio Fleet , 
and Japanese Military Forces in China . 

When the Japanese renewed military operations in July 1937 against the 

Chinese war soon spread to the area of Shanghai near the International 

Settlement. When Japanese aircraft dropped occasional bombs in the 

International Settlements and in the same period had strafed a group of 

British horsemen in a Shanghai park, the outspoken Admiral Yarnell issued 

an order to the Fourth Marines in Shanghai "to open fire in self-defense in 

case of attack by ^airplanes/"* 3y releasing the order to the press he 

created a reaction in the State Department that can best be told by that 

Department 1 s own records. Max Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division wrote s 

I called on Admiral Richardson at the Navy Department 
in reference to Admiral Yarnell <s telegrams to the Navy 
Department — concerning instruction Issued to American 
Marines at Shanghai authorising the Marines to open fire 
in self-defense in case of attack by ^irplanes/--! told 
Admiral Richardson that Mr. *tU had asked me to call 
... .It was not necessary to raise the question as to 
the merits of the order issued by Admiral Yarnell but 
that the Secretary of State felt that the giving of 
publicity to such an order operated to create serious 
embarrassment to the Secretary of State in the moderate 


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eourae which he was endeavoring to follow in foreign 
relatione* I said that admiral Richardson wae aware of 
public sentiment. . .and of the effect of sensational 
newspaper reports in regard to such orders*. .that such 
publicity played into the hands of the critics of the 
course which the Administration was pursuing* I 
referred to the fact that when Admiral Yarnell had 
issued certain previous orders and sensational publicity 
in the American press had resulted* the President in one 
instance had spoken to the Secretary of State in regard 
to the matter* I told Admiral Richardson that in view 
of all these various factors Mr* Hull felt that* if 
Admiral Yarnell could not be directed to refrain from 
giving publicity to such matters* Mr* flail would lay the 
whole matter before the President for decision* 

Admiral Richardson said he appreciated Mr. Hull's 
position in the matter* and that he thought that Admiral 
Yarnell did not take into account public sentiment in 
this country and the effect upon the public here of 
publicity of this type* Admiral Richardson said that. •• 
he would speak to Admiral Leahy*. .with a view to the Ifevy 
Department sending a telegram to Admiral Yarnell directing 
him not to give publicity in regard to such matters • 

Mr* Hamilton continued his story the following day: 

On October 29* Admiral Leahy telephoned me and said 
that he had discussed the matter with the Secretary of 
the Mavyj that the Navy Department felt that Admiral 
Yarnell had a great many trouble(s) (sic) of his owni 
that the Navy Department did not wish to send him an 
instruction along the lines which we wished to have sent} 
but that the Navy Department would send a message if the 
State Department Insisted* Admiral !,eahy offered to 
come to the Department to discuss the matter with me* I 
suggested that I refer the matter to Mr. Welles* 

I then told Kr* Welles of my conversation with Admiral 
Leahy and stated that the Navy Department did not view the 
matter as did this Department* 

the next morning* October 30, Mr* Welles spoke to the 
President over the telephone in regard to the matter and 
the President stated that in his opinion the Jtevy Depart- 
ment should send a telegram to Admiral Yarnell asking 
Admiral Yarnell to endeavor to avoid publicity in regard 
to such matters* Kr* Welles thereupon telephoned to 
Admiral Leahy and Admiral Leahy said that the Navy Depart- 
ment would send such a message* -* 


Memo: of Conversation: Mr* Hamilton and Admiral Richardson* 26 

October 19371 NA793.9UAW5. 

Menot Mr* Hamilton. State Department* 2? October 1937 J Ibid* 


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The American Consul General in Shanghai recorded the last step in the 

process of silencing Yarnellj 

admiral Yarnell told me this morning that he had 
received a message from the Ifevy Department in reference 
to his recent order to Marines to defend themselves if 
attacked. •••The Admiral stated that he had replied 
pointing out that the order is based on a ?Javy regula- 
tion of long standing that naval forces must defend 
themselves if attacked. He remarked that he considered 
it necessary to let both sides know thrt the Marines 
have their orders, and that was why he had allowed it 
to be given to the press. In the future however it 
looked as though he would have to keep such things out 
of the press.** 

On December 21, 1937 the Commander in Chief Japanese Fleet in China 

issued a letter to the European and American naval commanders that "it is 

the desire of the Japanese navy that foreign vessels including warships will 

refrain from navigating the Yangtze except when clear understanding is 

reached with us." The joint letter from the America, French, British and 

Italian Commanders said in replyi 

With regards to the movement of warships we will of 
course notify the Japanese authorities on the river of 
intended movement whenever practicable and will in any case 
be particular to give information of any intended movements 
through the Kiangyin barrier for the present. We cannot 
however, accept the restriction suggested by your letter 
that foreign men of war cannot move freely on the river 
without prior arrangement with the Japanese and we must 
reserve the right to nove these ships whenever necessary 
without notification." 

Pour days after '-drairal Yarnell had reported the above exchange with 


Despatch! American Consul General Shanghai to Sec, State #1365, 

Enclosure Ifo. 57, 20 April 1938, note of 1 November 1937j MA 793.9U/13068. 

Despatch! CINOAF to CJO, 002U 183U, 21* December 1937f MA 793.9U/1179U 

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I ;■,": 


. ., r. ;:■■ f Aft |V' . «>: -• • • - ^ •- •• i '-'■'•- '• • '■ ; ' • 


the Commander in Chief Japanese Heat in China, the Secretary of the Nary 

informed him that hie "continued presence •••in Shanghai is thought to be 


desirable fron the political, and diplomatic point of view," but by March 

the tensions -round Shanghai had eased so that by order ot the resident 

this instruction was cancelled* 

It was not long after his release from the geographical restrictions on 

his moYements that Admiral Yarnell was back in the middle of another 

controversy with the Japanese and State Department* He informed the American 

Ambassador to China who promptly relayed to the Secretary of State that he 


• ••to visit Nanking and Wuhu about 21**25 June in 
U5S ISABEL* Future presence of the 'nited States Haval 
vessels in area Wubu-Hukow will depend on whether 
American nationals that area are in need of assistance* 
Due notice of movements of Jnited States Men of War will 
be given Japanese and Chinese authorities •••While due 
care will be taken to avoid unnecessary exposure in 
dangerous areas, assistance to American nationals in 
evacuation of such areas is paramount mission of Navy 
and will be followed. It is not considered that warning 
given by Japanese Ambassador relieves that nation in 
slightest degree of responsibility for damage or injury 
to Tnited States naval vessels or personnel* With 
reference to suggestions contained in second letter that 
Silted States naval vessels should be made more dis- 
tinguished "such as painting the greater part of the 
vessel scarlet or in other colors" this suggestion cannot 
be considered. United States naval vessels on Yangtae 
are painted white with large American flags painted on 
their awnings. ..^ 

whether Mr* Hull reacted to the Ambassador* s message or to the press 

7 De«patehi SEOHAV to GINCAF, 0026 131*0, 28 Decepfcer 19375 ^ 811.30 


Memo: }fcmbeck to State Department* 7 Haroh 1938 j RA 811.30 AF/uQ3. 

Telegram* American Ambassador China to Sec* State* f?286, 12 June 1930; 
M 793.9U/13197. 

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releases is immaterial; hie reaction was immediate. His message ma 
for Tarnell more than for the Ambassador in Hankow. 

Newspapers carry today Jnited ross story dated 
Shanghai June 12 with sensational headlines such as 

DffS Tarnell defies Japan VI J ..•There Is a strong 
element of public opinion in this country which is 
opposed to the running of any risks of American 
embroilment abroad and which advocates collate with- 
drawal from any and all points of danger in the Far 
"ast, with insistence especially upon removal of all 
our armed forces. Any publicity suggestive of a 
bellicose attitude on the part of our people, whether 
official or unofficial , in China, simply plays into 
the hands of such elements. •• .in the light ^of the 
above, the Department questions the advisability of 
Admiral Tarnell making a visit to banking and Wubu 
at a time when active hostilities are imminent or in 
process immediately above Wuhn, Navy Department has 
no indication what would motivate such visit. •• .this 
telegram is being repeated to Shanghai and will be 
shown to Acteiral Tarnell, ^ ( In pencilled note at the 
bottom t "Agreed upon in conference Admiral I.eahy if-ZH 
/jfasdltonyT & egg ^Stanley !*>rnbeoj£7 f *) 

Admiral Tarnell did not go to the V&hu area, but remained at Shanghai, 

History undoubtedly would have been more colorful had Tarnell 's flagship 

been trapped by Japanese river operations instead of the "J.S.S. M3NQCAGX. 

The Sinking of the Pansy . 

As the Japanese approached Hanking in the Fall of 1937 the American 
Ambassador was advised by Chiang Kai-shek* a foreign office to evacuate. On 
November 2? the Azabassador and most of his embassy staff departed on the 
U.S.C. MM up the Yangtse, while the D«6«8« : - KM1 remained in Hanking to 
evacuate the remainder of the embassy staff. Mr, Grew notified the Japanese 
Government of the PMKPi planned movements on December 1, 1937 • Ml 
December 12 the FANAT carrying embassy personnel and escorting three 

Telegram: Sec. State to American "isbassy Hankow, #177, 13 June 1938 j 


an <tosJ8 *»al.r&6«ri I«oU*oooa ittiir SX ©m& 1»- 
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American oil barges was bombed and strafed by Japanese aircraft despite the 
weather being clear and sunny and the large American flags at the masts and 
painted on the awnings. The attack sank the I AN AY and two oil bargee, 
wounded eleven officers and men, and killed two sailors and a civilian. 

On order of Admiral Yarnell the ;nited rtates held a Court of Inquiry 
in Shanghai into the facts of the sinking while the State Department on 
orders from the President demanded "an apology, indemnities, punishment of 
officers involved and assurances that similar incidents would not happen 
again. n ~ A The findings of the Court of Inquiry were sent by the State Depart- 
ment to the Japanese Government on December 23, on which date the Japanese 
accepted the four demands originally ordered by the !' resident. Indemnities 
of $2,2lU,00C were paid by the Japanese on request of the State Department 

after agreement with the Navy Department on valuation of the various items 

in the claims. 

The U.S.S. MDNOCAGY Ifeisode . 

Second only to the PA HAY case in volume of messages, and perhaps 
exceeding the PA&AY case in amount of resulting negotiations, was the 
incident involving the U.S.S. MD!fc)CACY. «s the Japanese advanced up the 
Yangtse in the summer of 1936 the area of active fighting approached the 
city of Kiukiang where the SONOGACY was located. On July 17, 1938 Ambassador 
Grew in Tokyo telegramed the Secretary of State that the Japanese were quite 
worried over the presence of the HTiNUCAOY near Kiukiang. 

Bill, op. clt ., Volume I, pp. 559-562 j Samuel Horison, Vol. Ill, 
Rising Sin in the acific, 1931-April 19^2 p op. oit., pp» 16-18. Gf. 
Foreign gelations, Japan 1931-19ul , State Department, 19U3, Volume I, 
pp. 516-5>&3 for documents exchanged on /MAY sinking. 

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YJhile they are taking all precautions to prevent the 
recurrence of any untoward incident, having in Rind the 
extremely unfortunate PANAX case, the Japanese naval 
authorities request that in view of the intending heavy 
fighting in and around Kiukiang, the M0N3CACY be for the 
present withdrawn upriver to ;tenkow....The Japanese (one) 
requested the tf)N0GAC?'s withdrawal, (two) desired the 
M010CACY to be especially narked or otherwise be made 
distinctly recognise. i from afar (and from high aloft). 

The M0NOCAC1 did not wove since there were o number of missionaries in 

the area and on American oil installation nearby. Ten days later the 

MQNOCACY witnessed the capture of Kiukiang by the Japanese, in the course of 

which a Japanese gunboat approached the HP80CA0Y, rendered honors and 

departed back down stream. It was the last friendly act by the Japanese 

to the HOHDCACT for weeks. The harbinger of future treatment came with a 

letter from the Japanese Senior Naval Officer Kiukiang denying permission 

to contact the American nationals in the Kiukiang area or to move the vessel 

to the Standard Oil installation nearby. The next day the Japanese Navy 

representative at Kiukiang informed the HUNOCACY that he would like 

to cooperate, but his orders came from the Japanese Army command at 'banking 

and the future movements of the MONOGACY were in the hands of higher 

authority at flanking. Admiral Yarnell, Commander in Chief Asiatic fleet, 

by this time was rery perturbed over the treatment of the HONOCACX, little 

realising that much worse treatment was yet to come. His message to the 


Telegrams Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State, 1? July 193oj NA 

811.30 A?A60» ( T ach of the citations which follow are from the same National 

Archive file 811.30 AF. Only the snb-designation of the particular document 

will be given as long as the source is NA 811.30 AF.) 

13 J.S.S. OAHtfto CINCAF, 2? July 1938; A68. (The .5.S. MUD was 
located at Nanking and acted as a relay between the Commander in Chief Asiatic 
Fleet in Shanghai and the Japanese Naval authorities in China located in Nanking. 

"*0AffJ to CIKCAF, 1 August 1938i A7 7 . 

'QMS to CIHCAF, 2 August 1936; A?G. 

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Japanese naval comiander at Nanking read; 

Fighting Is now over •.••It is obvious duty demands United 
States gunboat promptly .gain touch with American nationals 
and assist them in every way? fuel also required* Request 
Admiral ikawa issue necessary instructions in order for , 
MOKDCACY to proceed installation not later than Friday •••*" 

The Japanese Army's authority over naval ships 1 movements was 

reemphaslsed in the Japanese Navy's answer to Admiral Yarnell's message* The 

message relayed by the QAHU at Nanking readt 

Rear Admiral Kueaga* Chief of Staff Third Fleet* strongly 
objects any shift of berth of MOHOQACT at th^s time. . . 
Expressed sympathetic understanding cur desire contact 
nationals and promises active cooperation to secure that 
end as soon as possible but refused to state date* Hear 
Admiral Kondo reported 31 July from Kiukiang that movement 
M9NDCACX from present berth to city would interfere with 
Japanese operations and that consent of army should also 
be secured* •••Reiterated Japanese desire that third power 
ships be withdrawn from Hankow area* 1 ? 

On the next day, August 5, a Commander Tanaga stated that the Japanese Navy 

had no objection for the AOHOOACT to berth at the Standard Vacuum Oil 

installation but that the Mavy would not "agree to her doing so until 

permission had been obtained from General Hata in Shanghai because of 

•previous unfortunate experience in /tanking* >ff (The ?ANAT sinking*} The 

Japanese Army's answer was forthcoming* The T^IDCACY was refused permission 

to shift berth to the oil installation on the grounds that the new location 

would "permit close observation their transports anchored that vicinity and 

other military operations * w The United States flavy representative in Hanking 

"made a strong protest against military attitude on grounds we had no real 

^QAHu- to CIWCAP, 3 August 1933 j A&U 

17 OAHU to CINGAF, h August 1?33| A33. 

9UP to CIHOAF, 5 August 1933j A35* 




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interest In their military operations, 's*ere deeply conscious of our neutral 
status, and that their illogical objections to our reasonable request were 
incompatible with their repeated official protestations of respect for 
American ri^its and interests in China, " Since they had allowed the 
IONQCACY. to contact the American nationals by letter, the Japanese Navy 
representatives considered the matter settled except "to try to obtain 

permission from military headquarters for the MONOCACT to#«.get fuel and 

then return to present anchorage* n 

y_At this stage Admiral Taraell had almost exhausted the peaceful courses 

of action he could follow in the China area to get the Japanese to cooperate 

on the M3H0CAC7 question* On August 15 he called upon the "lavy Department to 

enlist the help of the State Department* 

Necessary on account shortage fuel provisions and for relief 
personnel >$DN0CAC7 proceed Shanghai ••••Japanese admiral 
refuses permission to vessel to pass down river, this 
passage cannot conceivably Interfere with the Japanese 
military operations* Commander in Chief reluctant to brine 
about incident by directing PDHOCACY to proceed without 
Japanese consent* Request State lepart^ent take matter up 
with Tokyo in order secure assent to MONOCACT passage to 
Shanghai* 20 

The Secretary of the Havy relayed Tarnell's message immediately to the State 

Department for appropriate action* In the Secretary of State's instruction 

to the Ambassador in Tokyo the American position was given on control of the 

river by the Japanese by virtue of their possessing a captured boom across the 


19 0AHU to CINCAF, 6 August 1938) A86. 
*°CINCAF to CNO, l£ August 1933} /$02, 

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. . .it would appear that the position or the Japanese 
authorities in regard to the rl£ht of foreign ships to 
traverse this eection of tho river is that having them- 
selves out a passage through the boom at Matung, the 
authorities have a right to close that passage to foreign 
vessels* This Government of course cannot admit any such 
,'it or the validity of the basis invoked in support of 
that asserted right* 

Please urgently approach the Foreign Office in regard 
to this matter and ask that prompt instructions be dven 
by the Japanese Government to the end that the opposition 
of the Japanese military authorities to the proposed 
passage of the U.S*S» MOHOGACY be withdrawn and appropriate 
facilities be extended the vessel in connection with its 
movement throu^i the passage* 21 

Messrs* Hull and Grev still operated under the long established basis of 

international relations that responsible governments either controlled or 

were held accountable for the actions of their military forces* They soon 

found out that in the existing arrangement in the Government of Japan* the 

military oomranders in China had the authority for ultimate decisions in the 

China area* A report of this development reached ;fcshington on the same date 

via two routes* Ambassador Grew reported on his efforts to the Secretary of 

State on August 19 1 

Our informal efforts to obtain authority for the 
MDNOCACI to proceed to Shanghai have proved abortive* 
We were advised that •••it is not •••the intention of the 
Japanese Government to intervene in the exercise by 
Admiral Oikawa of the discretionary powers vested in 
him».,I therefore took up the case this afternoon directly 
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made strong oral 
representations, basing my approach upon (a) practical 
considerations and (b) legitimate rights, and ••• that I 
could not believe that the Japanese Government would leave 
entirely to the discretion of one of its subordinate 
officers the decision in a matter involving one of the 
primary rights of the United States •••after our initial 
representations the Japanese Government had iisnediately 
consulted Admiral Oikawa •••his reply •••could be summarised 
as follows* (a) the necessity of js&litary operations rmA&r 

^Secretary of State to American Kmbassy Tokyo, IS August 193^j Ibid* 

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compliance with our request difficult at the present tine 

but 0T9ry effort will be made to comply at the earliest 

possible moment j (b) the Japanese navy, on request from us, 

will be glad to cooperate by furnishing Japanese vessels 

or, if necessary, planes for the supply or transportation 

of provisions or fuel for the &)NQCACT and for the 

transportation of mails or personnel* .*I reemphaslsed the 

Importance of principle at issue...! interpret this as a 

categorical refusal and while fully appreciating the 

seriousness of the issue here involved I think that there 

can be no doubt but that we have exhausted diplomatic 
resources .22 

On August 19 Admiral Yarnell learned from Japanese naval sources in 

Nanking that decisions concerning the ?ONQCACY would be^ made in China* 

Admiral Oikawa offered the logistical support for the ?#)&>CACY mentioned in 

the Grew telegram above and reiterated previous objections to the gunboat's 

moving downstream as follows s 

1. Movement would interfere Japanese naval strategy and 
tactics in manner not free to disclose but requests 
Admiral Yarnell to accept his personal assurance of this 
as fact | 2* Banger from chance mines and unfavorable 
American reactions and repercussions to possible injury 
therefrom} 3* Possibility mistaken identity and firing 
upon American vessel passing through hostile waters by 
"excited Japanese gun erewj" U* Matung barrier prise of 
war through which as a Japanese controlled barrier we have 
no more right to expect free passage than we had through 
same impenetrated barrier under Chinese control. ••• 
[Admiral Oikawa] earnestly requests that Admiral Yarnell 
realise his desire to cooperate to the limit of his ability 
short of giving his consent to MONOC&CY passage which must 
be withheld for time being because of undlsclosable 
tactical considerations*** 

The attempts to put the negotiations concerning the M3N0GACY into the 

diplomatic system had failed and Admiral Yarnell *s bargaining position was 

back to that of four days earlier with two new developments bearing on the 

Telegramt American Embassy Tokyo to Sec* State, 19 August 1933 J /5>17< 

23 0AHU to CINCAF, 19 August 1933| /S19* 


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situation. In the first, Admiral Oikawa's hand was strengthened considerably 

by the Japanese Foreign Office deferring ultimate authority to the Japanese 

military forces in China* Admiral Xarnell had no Immediate countemove, since 

he had just exhausted the possibilities of diplomatic assistance in obtaining 

a clearance for the MONOCACT to move* The second development was the 

assertion of cooperation and understanding by the Japanese Admiral to Admiral 

Yaroell* The Japanese restrictions on the freedom of movement had not changed* 

Their forces controlled the passage through the boom at Mature in the river 

and in this ease possession equaled ten tenths of the law* The offer of 

Japanese logistical support to the MONOCACI had possibilities, and Admiral 

Yamell recognised that the future of the JCNQCACK necessitated his 

cooperation with the Japanese naval commanders on the Tangtae* Be informed 

the Navy Department the next days 

unless you direct otherwise reference QAH0 [message] of 
yesterday will reply Admiral Oikawa that while cannot 
relinquish any right of free navigation Yangtae River 
by our vessels am prepared recognise special situation 
now existing below Kiukiang and will delay sailing 
MONOCACY until later date* Will accept Japanese offer 
transportation fuel provisions personnel since we lack 
any information of military operations now taking place 
near ttatung boom and conditions in river* Consider it 
advisable retain MONOCACT Kiuklang until Japanese coopera- 
tion for her passage down river is secured. ••*« 

As the fuel supply of the JONQCACY approached its very end. Admiral 

Tarnell commented to the Chief of Naval Operations that? "Before informing 

Japanese Admiral that MQ8DCACY must proceed Shanghai prior ten September due 

shortage fuel and provisions request your view*" ' The Corfraander in Chief 

Asiatic fleet was informed the next day that the Navy Department "desires that 

*CIHGAF to CNO, 20 August 1933| /$20. 

CBJCAF to CMO, 29 August 193<3j /#>3. 

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you again discuss with Japanese corciand on ths Yangtse the necessity for the 
OSS MONXACY to either proceed to Shanghai or to obtain ooal from mill 
belonging to Anderson Myers, and that you -very much prefer having the MQNOCACY 

proceed to Shanghai* request escort through Matting boom at the same tins for 

subject vessel* n 

In the 2fer Eastern Division of the State Department the problems of the 

KONOCACY were also being discussed* hi a memorandum of August 30, Hamilton 

briefed the Secretary of State t 

The Navy Department has just informed me that Admiral 
Leahy has an appointment with the President at lltlS this 
morning* If you are still at the White House at that time 
you and Admiral Leahy may care to speak to the resident in 
regard to the question of the U3S Monooacy proceeding to 
Shanghai* •• [The records in the archives do not show the 
subsequent development of this suggested conversation*] 

It is our belief that the Japanese will continue to 
object to the Monooaoy proceeding down the river to Shanghai* 
Admiral Yarneli has no information in regard to the situation 
near the Matting boom* Should the Monocacy decide to proceed 
down river in face of Japanese objections; the Japanese could 
easily prevent the passage of the rtonooaey through the boom* 
A Japanese pilot mirht be needed for pilotage through the 
boom* There would also be danger from mines* 

m view of the foregoing* we do not believe that the 
issue or issues involved warrant (a) insistence on our part 
that the Japanese withdraw their objections or (b) the 
sailing of the vessel in the face of Japanese objections* 
Moreover, in view of the fact that we believe that a further 
approach to the Japanese would be unsuccessful, we suggest 
that no such further approach be made* Also, if by the 
time the Monocacy has exhausted its supply of fuel and 
provisions the situation on the river remains unchanged, 
we suggest that Admiral Yarnell*s recommendation that he 
accept the Japanese offer for transportation of fuel and 
provisions be approved* 2 ? 

Admiral Yarneli informed his representative in Hanking tot "Gall on 

Admiral Oikawa and tell him due to low provisions and fuel most necessary 


CNO to CINCAF, 30 August 1938; Ibid* 

Memo: Max Hamilton to Sec. State, 30 August 1938; /S63 1/2 

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H3N0CACY leave r for] Shanghai by 10 Septcstor»,***?hataver the reason given, 
the fact remains the channel is open through Matung and the passage down 
river of one small vessel surely could not inoonveniance operations* Also 

inform him the JTNOCACY was refused access by the Japanese military to coal 

at Anderson layers mill*" 

Admiral Yarnell's message setting September 10 as a deadline for the 

WOHQCACY to move down river prompted Admiral Oikawa* in a most unusual show 

of trust in Admiral Yarnell'a integrity* to confide in the Americans the 

difficulties experienced by the Japanese in their river operations and to 

show the Inconvenience of moving the MOSOCACY at the time* 

The Japanese Adsiral is anxio x -ou more fully 
understand his position and states therefore that he is 
Impelled to discloss information most of which he considers 
most secret and requests precautions be taken to prevent 
leaks to Chinese or third powers* Have swept only narrow 
channel between Wuhu and point l£ miles above Xiukiang* 
more than TOO mines destroyed and numerous casualties 
sustained by their ships •••Below Kiuklang and at 6 locations 
pointed out on clwrts Chinese detached units very active* 
necessary above Wuhu that all ships proceed in convoys with 
destroyer escort* all convoys subject sniping and indirect 
fire of Chinese field and heavy artillery located inland 
from river* Congestion in river oausod by operation of 
hundreds of large ships and thousands of small craft above 
Wuhu* presents serious problem which would be complicated 
by psssags even small gunboat* m addition passage down of 
MDBOCACY would undoubtedly be followed by similar British 
demands for Cockchafer and passage up of reliefs and ships 
of third powers and proportionately increase difficulties j 
states his belief Japanese foreign office has never 
questioned fundamental right third powers to free navigation 
of Yangtse but Japanese navy does claim control passage 
through barriers by virtue their capture and military 
nature* •• Z9 

Admiral Yarnell answered the following dayt 

28 CrdCAF to QAHU* 31 August 1933j /S73. 
^QAHTJ to OBICAF, 2 September 1933} /56U* 

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(Jive my regards and thanks to Ad&iral oikswa for 
courtesies and frankness of hip confidence which will be 
respected and also convey to hia my regrets that ho has 
been unable to assist in the passage of the Monocaoy down 
the river at the present also tell bin that in view of 
his consideration and friendly attitude I am willing to 
accede to his wishes and hold the USS *f>NDCACT at 
Kiukiane for the time bsing«3° 

Meanwhile in Washington liaison between the working levels of the State 

and 'lavy Dspartments showed agreement that the Navy Department "would send 

no reply to Admiral Taroellt in other words, the Havy Department would leave 

Adairal Tarnell free to accept the Japanese offer to transport mil, supplies, 

and possibly personnel* n Admiral tarnell accepted the Japanese offer to 

aupport the M0H3CACT, and on September 3 the flow of provisions upstream began 

from Shanghai for the fONOCAOY. The first shipment of 16,000 pounds of naval 

stores, motion picture films and mail was shipped via BUM STBSHIO KARU« 

A few days later HIJ& AOTKI HAJITJ departed Shanghai with 68 packages 

refrigerated provisions, ships service and medical stores and one bag mail 

for the M01DCACT* 33 

Coal continued to be a critical item for the HOKOOACT* The USS oAHU was 

ordered to "inform Japanese naval authorities that while periodic access to 

Anderson Myers coal pile now permitted M3NXACY had no adequate equipment Tor 

transportation this fuel, SNQ Kiukiang agreed to deliver fuel but yesterday 

stated navy has no facilities and unable arrange army to do so* Request that 


Memo? ff M,M,H.» (Initials of Hex Hamilton) to State Department, 

3 September 1933j /£6It. 

Despatch} Jiavy Purchasine: Officer Shanghai to MGNOGACT, 8 September 
1939j /566. 

33 Despateht Navy Purchasing Officer Shanghai to H5N0GACI, 12 
1938| /576. 

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Farther cooperation In Kiukiang was evidenced by a report from the 

MONOCACY that arrangenents had been made with the Japanese Amy "for 

K7N0CACI officer [to] visit various missionaries to ascertain their needs and 

explain method of obtaining sane from Shanghai* All contact since 6 August 

has been by letter through Japanese*" The following day* September 27* 

two months since the Japanese had taken Kiukiang* a MQlbCACY officer 

"accompanied by army officer and Vice Consul visited Americans in city* they 

comfortable* no actual food shortage at present except staples becoming 

scarce* believe they now understand how obtain material from Shanghai*" 

Late In September the American Consul General in Shanghai reported to 

the Secretary of State the completion of one of the most interesting airlifts 

of the Sino-Japanesc War* 

Qm September Hi twelve sailors relieved from duty on 
the MOHOCACY were returned to Shanghai by Japanese airplane* 
On September 2h two officers and thirteen men replacements 
were flown from Shanghai to Kiukiang and on September 25 
two officers and thirteen men relieved from duty on I43NOCACY 
were returned to Shanghai by Japanese plane* this completes 
the transfer of the USS MOUDCACY personnel* J ' 

The lONOCACY episode pointed up a number of factors which would bear on 

future Japanese-American relationships over the Asiatic Fleet forces* First. 

Itespatoht Commander Yangtse River Patrol to OAKV* Ik September 1933? 

MOBG&r. to COMYAUOPAT, 26 September 193Bj /608* 

KWOGACT to caHXAHQFAT* 27 September 1938| /613* 

Telegram j American Consul General Shanghai to See* State, #1267. 
26 September* 1933 3 /6C9* 


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the Japanese military forces in China were the ultimate authority on relations 

with third powers where military operations were involved* Second, the 

Japanese Army held higher authority than the Japanese Navy and was prone to be 

less cooperative with the Asiatic Fleet* Third* the Japanese were meeting 

unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance which necessitated heavier Japanese 

effort than had been planned* Convenience to third powers would have a low 

priority* Finally* t!» Asiatic Fleet forces had to rely upon diplomatic 

repreeentations to a government whose authority over its Army in China was 

limited at best* The safety of American naval vessels and cltlsens and 

the security of property were in the hands of the Japanese military forces 

in China* In 1936 the Japanese still needed American oil. machinery and iron 

for her war machine so limited cooperation with the Asiatic Fleet was to 

their national interest* 

Admiral Yarnell •s letter to the Secretary of Navy upon his being 

relieved as Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet contained his evaluations of the 

effectiveness of American foreign relations in the Far East and his military 

iion for strengthening the hand of the diplomat* 

During the present controversy, the rights of Americans 
in the Par East have been upheld vigorously by the State 
Department* Had our notes been addressed to a government 
which retained control over its armed forces* sons recogni- 
tion of our rights might have been obtained* Xt is difficult 
to see how our position and policies could have been stated 
more clearly or more positively* It should be recognised 
however that the Tokyo government is generally impotent to 
deal with or give decisions regarding affairs and incidents 
in China* In many cases it is entirely ignorant of what is 
going on* •••The Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet has 
recommended that for every note writte> there should be 
some increase in the TJhited States armed forces in the War 
East* When dealing with a nation whose policies are 

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determined by a ruthless military clique which worships 
the sword and understands nothing but force, such a 
procedure may have merit** 3 

Relations between Admiral Thomas Hart and the Japanese Naval Forces In China * 

Admiral Hart, who relieved Admiral Yarnell as Commander in Chief Asiatic 

fleet in April 1939, was as opposed as his predecessor to Japanese restrictions 

on movements of his units* Tensions over movements of the river gunboats 

continued, but fortunately for both sides there was nothing to compare with 

the MQNOCACt ease* On April 27, 19hp Adadral Bart reported to the Chief of 

Ravel Operations} 

we are again having troubles with the Japs when 
Class ford wants to move his gunboats. One such case it 
on right now* ;* are giving In on those points to an 
extent that irks me considerably* I sometimes feel that 
we are not taking stands which are strong enough* But 
1*11 have to risk my personal reputation as lone as the 
respective eases are in themselves unimportant* Don't 
want to have an "incident" over something which does 
not amount to much, p«r se*3° 

Admiral Hart in reviewing his first ten months of his assignment restated 

the fact that delays in moving the gunboats were almost always caused by 

requests by the Japanese Navy at the insistence of the Japanese Azmy* He 

further believed that "their Army and Navy in Central China did not want any 

discussions of [delays] by the respective eapitols«***Our record during the 

ten months that I have been here is that in every instance we have had our 

way, though quite frequently having to delay a bit to get it*" 

Letter* Admiral Yarnell to Secretary of Navy, Al6-3(190) 20 July 1939; 
HA 793*9fcAS339. 


•"Letter! Aasniral Hart to Admiral r>tark, 27 April 191*0 J HHD Filei 


Letter* Attodral Hart to Admiral Stark, 7 June 19l*C>$ ' .d* 

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A year after the JCNOCAGy incident another event involved Asiatic Fleet 
forces with the Japanese* This time the event occurred upon the hi$i seas 
and resulted in a charts of violation of international law being leveled at 
the United States Havy* This incident varied from the previous oases in two 
significant ways? (1) This tins the Japanese initiated the casplalnt* and 
(2) the complaint was handled in proper diplomatic channels rather than 
between the military oasmanders directly* The Consul at Canton reported to 
the Secretary of State the initial facts received from the Japanese Consul at 
Canton* A destroyer division of the Asiatic Fleet was reported to have 
ordered a Japanese military transport to heave to on the high seas* The 
Japanese Consul requested "that appropriate steps be taken through your good 
offices in regard to this incident which creates a violation of international 

law and that Z be informed of the results thereof | furthermore* that measures 

be taken to prevent its repetition*" 

Admiral Hart*s investigation determined that the Japanese had mistaken 
a tactical signal flag being used by the destroyers to be an international 
signal directed to the transport* The relay of Admiral Hart*s report by the 
American Consul in Canton to his Japanese opposite in Canton ended the case* 

A second incident on the high seas occurred in January 19lil when a crew 
member of the U.S.S. MIWDAKAO took a photograph of a Japanese destroyer as 
the two ships passed in the South China Sea* The "Japanese Consul General 
acting on instructions from local naval authorities has registered verbal 
protest against passing too close and photographing Japanese naval vessel* 

Telegram? American Consul Canton to See* State. 7 June 191*0} NA 811*30 

Telegrams American Consul Canton to Sec* State. 31 July 19l<0; Ilk 311.30 
A?/a$5, 869, 911. 

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JapimM naval auth<wities demand apology, immediate surrender of film and 

assurances that there will be no recurrence* " ' AAniral Hart's handling of 

the report was sufficient to cause the withdrawal of the complaint* m 

directed Hear Admiral Olassf ard to inform \<*&ral Shimada, Comaander in Chief 

Japanese naval forces in China that he was aaased that the Japanese naval 

authorities at Canton should make such demands and that "he personally had 

witnessed the photographing of his own flagship 07 persons on Japanese men 

of war, notably the xnZW0 9 and that he never dreamed of protesting sueh 

act ion* 9 

This Incident, which started in the same pro c ed ural sequence as the 
earlier one at Canton described above, was resolved by Admiral Hart's direct 
approach to his Japanese counterpart* Under the circumstances it was ty far 
the easiest way to end the matter, because Adtairal Hart obviously had the 
basis of a similar charge against the Japanese* 

Admiral Hart's direct relations with the Japanese were much less frequent 
or involved as the relations b e tw e en Admiral Yarnell and the Japanese* Among 
the reasons for the differences between the two commanders ares (1) The 
personalities of the two Admirals* Admiral Tarnell was more aggressive and 
outspoken than his successor* Admiral Hart, according to the records in the 
archives, was nvmr in a position of having advocated a policy against the 
Japanese such that unfavorable reaction and oountermeasures came from the 

Telegram American Consul Canton to Sec* Btate, 15 January 1°UL| HA 

311*30 AF/919. 

Telej-Tssw American Consul Canton to Sec* State, 22 January l°Ulj HA 
811*30 AP/922* 

Telegramt Consul General Shanghai to See* State, 13 January l°blf NA 

911.30 AF/921. 

► \ 

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State Departmentj (2) The area of fighting between the Japanese and Chinese 
had waved inland and beeone more stabilised* River traffic congestion was 
much less critical during Admiral nart*s tenure and, though his gunboats 
experienced delays in reaching stations* none was isolated like the ff)NOCAC¥. 
(3) Tensions over strategic problems increased as war approached* Admiral 
Hart had problems of positioning his forces and timing their withdrawal at 
exactly the right time to meet his future mission of defending the Malay 
Barrier* He could not afford to get involved with the Japanese over minor 
incidents when his future assignment depended upon his flexible employment 
of forces* 

In August and again in October 191*1 the question of withdrawing the 

marines and gunboats from China was discussed between the Navy and State 

1*6 47 

Departments* In November the decision was made to withdraw the marines 

and two of the river gunboats to the Philippines* Admiral Hart* who had 

been given the discretion of employment of his forces to defend the Malay 

Barrier under the terms of war plan Rainbow 5* began to deploy his forces on 

November 20. Pour destroyers and an auxiliary were sent to Balipapan and 

five destroyers and a cruiser to Tarakan. both ports in Borneo* Bis second 

cruiser* four other destroyers* six gunboats (three of which were Yangtse 

River gunboats) and submarines were in Philippine by the end of November* 

The Fourth Marines were evacuated from Shanghai the first days of December, 

but the transport bound for Northern China to evacuate marines from that area 

Memo: State Department 26 August 19l*X| NA 811*30 AF/?1*1 and Letter i 
OHO to Sec. State, 3 October 191*1; HA 611*30 AF/951*. 

I earl Harbor Attack , Part 16, p. 21*56. 

Memo of Conversation i State Department, 18 Sfovember 191*1; HA 811.30 

AF/95U 1/2. 

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AK {UkI -i9dmBVd& U ,in»ainaq»a aia^ \ ? ojMH 

was captured by the Jammw on December 8. By th© first nart of Karen the 
British, Ooteh «nd Asiatic flemt surface forces had been expended In 
attempts to hold back ths suoarler Japanese Havy with its sup ->ortln^ air 
cover. Six destroyers, "the cruiser HA^LRRRAD and two gunboats were the 
only surface fighting ships of the old Asiatic F1-; at to survive the Ave 
campaign*" The defense of the Malay Barrier was a military failure , but 
the Intangible example of gallant f ightln;-* spirit could be credited to the 
United States Nary. 


The Asiatic Fleet holds a unique place in the history of the United 

States Nary. Its beginnings predated the opening end modernization of the 

Oriental Power which ultimately proved to be its major opponent* the 

mission of the Fleet changed ae American interests changed from the original 

coastal trading to extensive investments in China' s commercial and religious 

levelopment* From the earlier protection for almost purely commercial 

reasons the mission of the Asiatic Fleet took on a higher moral sense in the 

twentieth century* There was more than Just a trace of prestige and symbolism 

in the presence of the naval vessels from the country which sponsored the 

Open Deer Policy* The Asiatic Fleet represented a country which defended 

the principles of that policy by diplomatic maneuvers and moral influence to 

gain acceptance from other commercial powers* 

The renewed fighting between China and Japan in 1937 rapidly spread into 

the rich Tangtse Valley where extensive American investments and naval units 

Samuel Morison, Vol* IH* Rising Sun in the Pacific, op* oit ** p* 375* 
to Ibid.. o. 180. 

3 Ibld* » p* 380, 

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were located* It mi inevitable that the Sino-Japaneae military operations 
would adversely affect American interest and naval finite* The diplomatic 
procedures followed by the United States on such occasions can be dratm from 
the records of the actual incidents. In the PAHAY case the State Department 
handled the diplomatic demands on Japan, while the i&vy carried on the 
military procedure of a court of inquiry* fhev^ was no attempt to make a 
show of naval strength as suggested by the British* Diplomatic procedure 
was effective and successful* 

In subsequent eases the issues were not as clear cut or as dramatic as 
in the PANAX case* In the ?f )M0CAGY incident military convenience and the 
principle of freedom of navigation were balanced against the inconvenience 
to Japanese operations* In the procedural handling of the ease are examples 
of the possible relationships which could have been used* The Japanese 
initially had warned the United States through diplomatic channels that 
impending fighting approached the MOflDOACYte position and requested that the 
vesssl be removed from possible danger* A Navy decision kept the vessel near 
American missionaries and an oil installation* For the next three weeks 
Admiral Yarnell made his requests concerning the movements of the HMQCkGI 
directly to the Japanese naval authorities on the Yangtze* The Japanese fiavy* 
limited In its authority by the Japanese Army who was in charge of the 
China operations* could not give satisfaction to Yarnell* Had the military 
situation been different on the Yangtse so that the MHNQCACT's movement would 
not have involved the Army*s operations* it might be reasonable to assume 
that the Japanese Navy would have cooperated to the extent desired* Admiral 
Yarnell* s appeal to the Navy Department for State Department help was his 

null, op* cit ** p* $61* 

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only recourse at the tiaa* The failure of the diplomats to got permission 
for the MOJDCACY to move on an international waterway was due primarily to 
the weak position of the Japanese Foreign Office relative to the military 
conmanders in China* Svon if the Foreign Office had agreed with Mr* Grow, 
it is possible that tho Japanese Ar^y would not have obeyed until it s Jited 
their operations* 

Cooperation between the State and %'avy Departments appears to have 
improved with tlxsu The discussions over curtailing Iamell»s prass releases 
in 1937 were referred to the President* Later discissions <m Yarnell's 
acceptance of the Japanese offer of assistance in the logistical support of 
the &)?*DCACT though less Important* were mutually agreed upon at ths working 
levels in ths Navy and Stats Departments* 

Admiral Hart's relations with ths Japanese did not necessitate having to 
resort to diplomatic help or prolonged arguments with ths Japanese naval 
commanders* In the two examples of naval involvement* one was handled 
completely within the framework; of international diplomatic procedure* while 
the less serious "picture taking incident" was taken out of the diplomatic 
channels and handled directly between the senior naval off icero of the 
respective navies* 

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Introduction . 

r T The gains from naval ships visiting foreign ports fall into two broad 
categories) military and political. In the military category, the acquisition 
of intelligence in the broad spectrum of useful war planning information is 
the primary objective, while a show of friendly relations on the part of the 
visitors and an expression of good will on the part of "the host country are 
the usual motivations on the political side* The desires for American naval 

visits to Japanese ports, therefore, stemmed from motives not unlike those 

which inspired the Japanese visits to American ports* m seme eases the 

issue of military information by far outweighed the political consideration* 

Such a case was the Navy's desire to visit the Japanese Mandated Islands* 

On the other hand, a visit to the Home Islands of Japan by the Admiral of the 

Asiatic Fleet leaned heavily toward the political motive* 

The Japanese visited with their naval vessels Manila, the Hawaiian 

Islands and the west coast of the United States* Since each individual visit 

involved entering territorial waters, a formal request was necessary from the 

Japanese Foreign Office to the State Department* The State Department, in 

turn, checked with the Navy Department to ascertain whether the Navy had 

objections to the visit at the time and place requested* Occasionally, fleet 

maneuvers or movements congested certain areas and the Navy suggested delaying 

or advancing the arrival time or destination to avoid confusion (and spying . 

An obvious exception to the comparison was the use of Japanese naval 
tankers to carry oil from the United States to Japan* Of. Chapter Eight, 

m* b ^ * -o 
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The State Department informed the Foreign office which passed the clearance 
to the Japanese Navy* Naturally* American naval requests for visits to 
Japanese ports worked in reverse* 

American naval visits to foreign ports* 

One of the most frustrating problems feeing naval war planners was the 
almost complete lack of Intelligence on the Japanese activities in the 
Mandated Islands* The presence of military bases , even small ones capable of 
supporting submarines or aircraft* posed a threat to the lines of communica- 
tions to Ooam and to the Philippines* As previously noted, CSuara was 
effectively surrounded by potential island bases* Although the mandate 

absolutely forbid the construction of fortifications, the American Navy was 


vitally concerned whether the mandate was being honored* Early war plans 

called for immediate reinforcement of the Philippines in the event of war* 
Later plans were more realistic and called for a progressive movement across 
the Pacific* Under either contingency* knowledge of eneny capabilities in 
the islands, which stretched across the shortest route* was a sine qua non 
to effective planning* 

Since the Navy periodically replaced ships in the Asiatic Fleet, often 
there were ships traversing: the Pacific near the islands* To get close 
enough to observe bases and defense works necessitated entering territorial 
waters and that required prior permission* An occasion presented Itself 
neatly to the scheme to see first-hand what was going on when the M ALDEK 
was scheduled to sail for China and duty In the Asiatic Sleet. 

In a letter of June 5>* 1936 the Secretary of the Navy presented his 


Cf* Chapter Three for discussion of War Flans* 

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eaat to the Secretary of State; 

For some tine there has been a strong undercurrent of 
conjecture and suspicion regarding the harbor development 
or fortification of the Pacific possessions of both the 
United States and Japan* With a view to allaying any such 
suspicion which might be held by the Japanese Government* 
the Navy Department recently has taken the stand that it 
would welcome the visits this year lay two Japanese public 
vessels to certain of the Aleutian Islands and other 
ports not normally open to foreign vessels* 

The voyage of the USS AIDEN to the Asiatic station 
offers a similar opportunity to the Japanese Government* 
It is therefore suggested that the State Government inform 
the Japanese Government regarding the proposed trip of 
this destroyer and suggest the desirability of an invita- 
tion from that Government for the U«S»S* Alden to visit 
informally certain of the larger unopened ports of the 
Mandated Islands, as well as the open parte of Saipan, 
Anguar, ^alau, Ponape, Jaluit, and Truk*.»3 

This first approach was to solicit an invitation to visit the former Gerraan 

Islands and to offer as a quid pro quo , visits to unopened Aleutian ports* 

The American Ambassador, Mr* Grew, did not sound optimistic in his 

telegram from Tokyo a few days later? 

If the Japanese Government decides against favorable action 
on my informal suggestion that an invitation of its own 
volition be extended to the destroyer ALHEN to visit the 
closed ports of the Japanese mandated islands, it is quite 
possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will avoid 
coraimuiicating to me the unfavorable reply and will tacitly 
let the matter drop*»**Xf such proves to be the ease I can 
see nothing to be gained by pressing for an answer because 
failure to extend the suggested invitation would be tanta- 
mount to a refusal ••• if the Department ... feels that a 
definite even if adverse reply is desirable, it might be 
well that I seek a further interview with the Foreign 
Minister a few days before July 21* I shall not ••• do so 
unless so instructed*** 

On July 21 the USS ALDBH was scheduled to depart Hawaii on its next westbound 

Jetton Sec. Mavy to Sec. State 8D211/aU-S(3) (36o6g$) $ June 1936j 
NA dll*339li/&l* 

^Telegram Am. Arabass. Tokyo to Sec* State #153 July 13 , 1936 J NA 311. 

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log. the Navy desired an answer If possible before that date* 

On July- 13 Captains Oanaga and Puleston of the Central division of the 
Chief of Naval Operations* Office inquired of Mr* Max Hamilton of the Far 
Eastern Division of the State Department if anything further had been heard 
from Tokyo in regard to the visit of the ALDBH to the closed ports* Hamilton 
informed them of Ambassador Grew's telegram #iich is quoted above* 

Their first reaction was that if the Japanese did not 
respond favorably to the approach which had been made by 
Mr* Grew, the American Government might notify the 
Japanese Sovernmsnt in the usual way that an American naval 
vessel desired to visit the open ports of the Mandated 
Islands* I replied that it seamed to me that as the 
approach which had been mads to the Japanese in this 
instance had been based at least partially xtpon the thought 
that the Japanese might wish to extend such an invitation 
as a good will gesture, we mi$Jt well await the outcome of 
the present approach before giving consideration to the 
question of an American naval vessels visiting th© open 
ports of the Japanese Mandated Islands* Both Captain 
Canaga and Captain Poleston indicated they concurred in 
this view* 

Captain Canada said that he would speak to A&airal 
Standley in regard to Mr* Orew*s telegram of July 13 and 
would ascertain Admiral Standley* s view in regard to the 
question presented by Mr* Grew as to whether or not it 

I be advisable that Mr* Trew again seek an interview 
with the Japanese Foreign Minister with a view to pressing 
for a definitive answer*^ 

Admiral Standley, the Chief of Naval Operations, conferred with his 

assistants in War Plans and Central Division on the subject of AUXSN't visit 

in the light of Mr* Qrew»s telegram* On July IS Comnander Hill of the 

Central Division called Mr* Hamilton on orders of Admiral Standley to toll 

the Far Eastern Division of the Admiral's views* 

» • tAdbuiral Standley was of the opinion that Mr* drew 
should press the Japanese Foreign Minister for a definitive 
reply for the reasons (t) that in the past we had never been 
able to get a formal reply from the Japanese Government to 


by Mr* Hamilton July lli, 1936 j Ibid, 

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VI I tf'v- 

previous approaches which we had made to the Japanese 
Government with a view to the Japanese Government granting 
permission for American naval vessels to visit closed ports 
in the Japanese Mandated Islands, and (b) that should the 
Japanese Foreign Minister return an unfavorable reply, the 
Savy Department would then be In position and would wish to 
ask the Department to notify the Japanese Government that 
the Navy Department desired to have the U*S*S* AlDB&l visit 
certain open ports in the Japanese landated Islands* 
Commander Hill said that Admiral Standley felt that in the 
event the Japanese Foreign Minister should be unfavorably 
disposed in regard to the question presented to him by Mr* 
Grew it was desirable that notification be made to the 
Japanese Government that American naval vessels proposed 
to visit open ports of the Mandated Islands in order that 
there might oe inaugurated as a regular thing such visits 
by American naval vessels to the open ports of the Mandated 
Islands, or in order that this Government might have on 
record any disposition on the part of the Japanese Govern- 
ment to raise objection to visits of American naval vessels 
to open ports of the Mandated Islands *° 

A formal request at this juncture for the ALHSN to visit the open ports 

would have put the Ambassador, Mr* Grew in an undesirable position* Having 

entered into informal discussions in a spirit of good will and asking for a 

mutual exchange of visits to show good faith, Mr* Grew was being asked by the 

Navy Department to change his approach to a more demanding formal one in 

which a definite answer would be required instead of the more discrete 

diplomatic silence* If the Foreign Minister for reasons which he could not 

disclose to Mr* Grew could not give an affirmative answer, he still was in 

a position to keep friendly relations by remaining silent* to force the 

issue after having tried to get mutual visits by the informal gambit would 

most probably embarrass the Foreign Minister and strain the existing good 

relations. In addition, to request to visit the open ports without waiting 

for an answer to the informal request to visit all ports would make it 

particularly difficult for the Japanese to accept, for it would show the 


Memo by Mr. Hamilton, July 15, 1936, Ibid, 

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actual motive was to see the Mandated Islands and not to promote good will 

by mutual visits* 

• ••U]fter sons consideration, Admiral Standi*? said 
that he thought the best thing to do would be to let the 
ease of the SS (Sie) ALBKN run its course} to send no 
further instructions on this case to Mr* Grew; and, in the 
event that the invitation should not be forthcoming from 
the Japanese Government, the ALDKH would proceed to the 
Asiatic station and the Navy Department would not request 
in the ease of the AIDSN that this Government notify the 
Japanese Government that the ALDSN would visit the open 
ports of the Mandated Islands* Admiral Standley said that 
later the Havy Department would give consideration to the 
question of routing a naval transport which was proceeding 
to the Far Sast via certain of the open ports of the 
Mandated Islands and would make the usual requests of this 
Department that diplomatic notification be made to the 
Japanese Government of the proposed visits to open ports of 
the Mandated Islands*? 

the naval transport to which Admiral Standley had referred was the OSS 

COW STAR scheduled to make an Oriental cruise the following year* In 

February 1937 the Navy Department requested through the State Department 

permission for the OOLD STAR to make informal visits as follows s Saipan, 

Yokohama, Kobe, Milks, Falau and Truk* After months of waiting for a reply 

the American Ambassador finally received the inevitable decision* Answering 
a telegram from the State Department, sent at the request of the Navy 
Department, "inquiring whether the proposed informal visits of the U.3.S. 
OOID STAR to certain ports in the Japanese Mandated Islands would be agree- 
able to the Japanese Government," Mr* Grew stated that he was "in receipt of 
a reply from the Foreign Office. ••dated July 31, 1937* stating that 
the Japanese Government is unable to give consent to the proposed 

'Memo by Mr* Hamilton, July 16, 1936, Ibid, 

Telegram Secretary of State to American Embassy Tokyo 3 February 1937f 
MA 8U.3O/250* 

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visit •* No reason was given since nana was reqilred, but the fact that 

earlier in the month Japan had renewed the conflict with China would indicate 

an unwillingness to be involved with African visits at that tine. No 

follow-up request for other visits appear in the archive files* It must be 

assisted the Navy gave up trying to get Japanese permission to visit even the 

open ports in the Mandated Islands* 

In the Japanese hone islands the star:' was different* There United 

States naval ships visits frequently and generally were well received* 


Usually during a tour in the China Station, the Admiral of the Asiatic fleet 

made a formal visit to Japan* Since Admiral tarnell had not visited Japan 

since taking command of the Asiatic Fleet* he planned to visit that country 

in the summer of 1937* In Kay before hie cruise to Japan he requested 

authorisation to visit Vladivostok in July* Since the visits of an Admiral 

of a Fleet had political ramifications in the diplomatic frame of reference* 

especially if a second country is involved in the visit, the State Department 

advised the Ambassador in Tokyo of the Admiral »s tentative plans* The 

Department also stated that it 

• ••conceives that it might possibly be advantageous 
from point of view of psychological effects, both positive 
and negative, upon both Soviet and Japanese officialdom, 
for Yarnell to make the visits to Vladivostok and to Japan 
on and as parts of one trip rather than as separate and 
therefore more conspicuously special visits* Department 
therefore desires that you lay this suggestion before and 
discuss it with your Naval Attache with a view to its 
being conveyed if only informally to Xaraell, perhaps with 
your comments, for his consideration* 10 

The Ambassador replied to the Secretary of State the next week that the 


'Lettert American Embassy Tokyo to Sec* of State ^'2522 h August 1937 1 
NA 311.33914/270. 

telegram Secretary of State to American Kmbassy Tokyo #68 May 11, 1937} 
NA 811.3391^255. 

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Raval Attache concurs In n^ opinion that a naval visit 
to Japan during the summer months should be avoided, and ha 
has recommended to Admiral Xamell that considerations be 
given to a visit between October 1st and 20th or after 
November 15th owing to Japanese naval and military maneuvers 
between those dates or next Spring*** •Naval Attache feels 
and has so advised Xamell that same political ends will be 
gained if announcements of proposed visits to Vladivostok and 
to Japan be concurrent but that the visits themselves need 
not be concurrent* I eoneur.t. 1 * 

The recommendation that the summer months should be avoided was very 

prophetic* On July 7, 1937 the Japanese invaded China over an incident near 

Marco Polo Bridge, and Admiral Yamell had to forego his formal visits for 

more active relations with the Japanese* 

~>C..h9 the Sino-Japanese conflict spread and tensions between the United 

States and Japan increased, the use of naval visits took on new color* In 

March 19U1 a formation of four cruisers and nine destroyers, on a hi^ily 

secret mission unknown at the time of sailing even to the Commander of the 

Pacific Fleet, left Pearl Harbor ultimately to visit Australia, New Zealand, 

Tahiti and the Fiji Islands* The purpose was to emphasise "to Japan 

solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to 

indicate to Japan that If British interests were attacked that the United 

States would enter the war on the side of the British*" 

The cruise to Australia had been on the recommendation of the State 

Department and it involved naval units which Acfedral Stark wished to keep 

concentrated at Pearl Harbor* His taking of definite exception to the 

precedent set by the Australian visit was shown in a letter to Admiral Kimmel 

Telegram* American Stoibassy Tokyo to Secretary of State #132 19 May 
1937| SA 311.33917257. 


Pearl Harbor Attack* Part 26, p. 31*1* 

13 Ibid., p. 267. 

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on 19 April !9hXm 

The resident said* • .just as soon as those ships cons 
back iron Australia and Slew Zealand, or perhaps a little 
before, I want to send sons more out* I just want to keep 
then popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing* 
This, of course, is right down the State Department's 
alley* To ray wind a lot of State Department's suggestions 
and recommendations are nothing less than childish (don't 
quote me) and I hare practically said so in so many words 
In the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they 
finally got it going.* .we did keep them on a flank to be In 
position to go to work or to retire if something broke. •• 
How when the question of "popping up everywhere" came and 
having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the Presidents 
"How about going North?" He said: "*ies, you can keep any 
position you like, and go anywhere."!** 

The Chief of Naval Operations had the carte blanche he wanted from the 

* III! 

President. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy he described a "project 
for carrying out the directive by the President for a northern cruise by 
units of the Pacific Fleet*" The plan was timed to take place a few days 
after Matsuoka arrived in Tokyo from his Berlin visit* One carrier, one 
cruiser division, one destroyer squadron and a tanker were to maneuver off 
Attu, to inform the U»S*S.R. of the maneuvers and to request the visit of a 
few cruisers and a destroyer division to Petropavlovsk. The carrier and the 
remainder of the ships were to stay in the Aleutians during the visit* The 
visiting ships were to rejoin the carrier group and visit Kiska, Unalaaka, 
and Kodiak before returning to Hawaii* On the day of arrival at Petropavlovsk 
the American Ambassador would inform the Japanese of the visit and "that it 
does not reflect on our relations*" If the *J.S*S.R. refused permission to 
visit, the plan was to be executed without the Russian visit. The motive 
was to influence Japanese policy* 


Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 2163. 


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.,:' U 

The trend of Japanese policy at the moment appears less 
aggressive than it was up to about two months ago* Japan 
has apparently not yet reached a decision concerning further 
mores to the south, even into Indo-China* the Japanese will 
probably have extended discussions as to future policy after 
Matauoka returns* Within two weeks after his return we may 
be able to discover what decisions they have reached* The 
effect of the proposed norther^ cruise upon the Japanese 
ought to be carefully considered before the cruise starts* 
It might accelerate the present recession from their previous 
aggressive attitude* On the other hand* they mi$tt view such 
a cruise as an open threat* and minht become more than ever 
determined to stick to the Axis and proceed with the southern 
program*. .Please note that the force recommended for this 
demonstration is considerably greater than was suggested by 
the President* It is a real striking force, operating in an 
area well situated to cause concern to a people which mi$it 
fear bombing raids* Because it is stronger, and because of 
the necessity for a concurrent diplomatic effort, you will 
doubtless wish the President to re-examine the project* •• 
When you subsequently take this up with Mr* Hull, I suggest 
you ask that the least possible number of persons in the 
State Department learn of it* You will recall that three 
or four times recently matters under discussion by the State 
and Navy Departments have promptly found their way to one or 
the other of two pairs of newspaper columnists* If this 
project be approved, we want, so far as possible, to insure 
no leak* 1 ? 

The northern cruise rmror took place because, as Admiral Stark had hoped, 

it was vetoed by the State Department* Admiral Stark continued his letter 

to Admiral Kimmel quoted supra * 

7; There was a little method in my madness as to the 
Northern cruise; I thought for once, if I could, I would 
give the State Department a shook which might make them 
haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many 
good points* It still conforms to the flank, and a detach- 
ment on an occasional sortie up in an unexpected direction 
might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a 
cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to 
ask* Of course you can see what a striking force of the 
composition I gave you, and known to the Japs, would mean 
to them, in view of their unholy fear of bombing* This 
striking detachment would have been right in position for 


Memoi CSO to Secretary of Havy, 7 April 19ijlf NHD Filet Director WPD 

Special Pile* 

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most anything. 

I bad a broad inward smile when the State Department 
in effect saidj "-lease Mr. ^resident, don't let him do it"} 
or words to that effect* It was a little too much for 
them, 16 

There were no more visits by groups of naval ships after the Australian 

cruise. Admiral Stark had won his point* Fear that the resident might 

succumb to suggestions to send ships to visit Singapore was gone and the 

policy not to divide naval forces and to keep a strong group on the flank of 

any southern movement by the Japanese remainded as the deterrent threat* Stark 

would be ready to move addition ships to the Atlantic on entry of the United 

States in war, since Germany, and not Japan, was the primary enemy. 

visits to American controlled ports. 

In Guam the Japanese were allowed to operate a y^ry old transport, the 
MARIANA HARU, in the copra trade during the depression years. Since the 
administration of the island was a responsibility of the Navy, the Governor 
of Quam sought Kavy Department authority to terminate the privileges of entry 
on September 30, 193$, the expiration date of the current permit. The 
Gov ern or had information that upon renewal of permission of entry authorisation, 
the Japanese planned to replace the MARIANA HARU with a bigger more modern 
transport and to ask that the entry privilege be transferred to the newer 
vessel. At that time the Hepburn Board, appointed by the Secretary of the 
Navy to investigate and make recommendations on air and naval base needs, was 
looking at Quam as a future bastion in the Pacific. 

In a July 28, 1938 letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the 
Navy reviewed the Quam situation in the light of Japanese visits and defense 


■'earl Harbor Attack, Part 16, p. 216U. 


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nseds and suggested action by the State Department* 

For your information, the Executive Order of September 
23 , 1912, to which reference Is made in paragraph h of the 
(iovemor , s letter, states that Guam Is not, and that it 
shall not be made, a subpart of entry for foreign vessels 
of commerce, and that said harbor shall not be visited by 
any commercial or privately owned vessel of foreign registry! 
nor by any foreign national vessel, except by special authority 
of the United States Navy Department in each ease*** 

In view of present developments as reported in the 
lnclosure, the Navy Department is approving the recommendation 
of the Governor to revoke the privilege of entry of the 
MARIANA MARU when the term of her current permission expires* 

It is therefore suggested that the Japanese Ambassador 
be informed that no action on his request to replace the 
MARIANA MARU appears to be necessary since the Navy Department 
has recently decided to close Quam to the entry of all vessels 
of foreign registry, and that pursuant to this decision the 
temporary privileges of entry previously granted the MARIANA 
MARU are to be revoked on the expiration date of the current 
permission September 30, 1938*17 

Ironically, the first step in the improvement of Quam as a base, a bill to 

authorise dredging Aprs Harbor, failed to pass in Congress* There was almost 

nothing of military interest in Quam* m the Hawaiian Islands the attempts 

by the Navy to close ports other than Honolulu were not so successful* Visits 

by naval vessels of Japan to the porta of ^llo, Hawaii and Honolulu, Oahu 

were a cause for much alarm among the intelligence and security officers in 

the Hawaiian Islands* The largest foreign ethnic group in the islands were 

Japanese and the occasion of visits by Japanese ships were usually festive 

with deliberate programs to promote goodwill on the part of the Japanese Navy 

and the local Japanese citizens. Numerous instances of photographing of 

facilities, measuring piers and buildings and exchange ot packages were 

observed by American personnel* In Kilo lack of customs and immigration 

officials made the problems of control even worse* 

Letters Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, :£05li/L21-l, 

28 July 1938j NHD Filet CNO July 193% 


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TITO laXi* 1 5W xt«V Bt 

The concern over Japanese visits to the Hawaiian Islands was not solely 
a naval officer's phobia* As far back as August 10, 1936, the Coanandsr in 
Chief expressed himself in very positive languages 

One obvious thought occurs to ma — that every Japanese 
citisen or non-citlsen on the Island of Oahu who meets 
these Japanese ships or has any connection with their 
officers or men should secretly but definitely identified 
and his or her name placed on a special list of those who 
would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in 
the event of trouble* 

As I told you verbally today* X think a Joint 3oard 
should consider and adopt plans relating to the Japanese 
population of all the Islands* Decision should be aade as 
to whether the island of Hawaii could or should be defended 
against landing parties* From my personal observation X 
should say off-hand that it would be extraordinarily 
diff icult* as the Island is quite far from Oahu* The chief 
objective should be to prevent its occupation as a base of 
operations against Oahu and other islands*^ 

In October 1939 the visit of a Japanese Training Squadron to Kilo* 

Hawaii generated a new request from the Mavy to close ports in Hawaii other 

than Honolulu to visiting foreign ships* Among the irregularities during the 

visit were the posting of an armed sentry on the dock and the abuse of mail 

privileges • The Secretary of state's reply referred to a discussion at an 

inter-Departmental committee meeting in November 1937 » when it was decided to 

make a recommendation to the Iresident as follows t "the State Department to 

consider* in consultation with the Kavy Department* withholding from Japanese 

public vessels permission to visit ports in the Hawaiian Islands other than 

Honolulu, «t 

This Department is of the opinion that the recommendation 
of the Havy Department* if affirmatively acted -upon at the 
present time* might adversely affect the relations between 
our naval forces in China waters and the Japanese 8avy and 
might be prejudicial to the efforts o£ our naval forces to 

nemo? President Roosevelt to Chief of Naval Operations* ID August 1936$ 

NRD Filet A3/Xntelligenee. 

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render protection to American interests in China during the 
eontinuanoe of the current hostilities in so far as such 
relations and such efforts are dependent upon the good-will 
ot the Japanese Navy*.* 

In the circumstances this Department inclines to the 
Tiev that the present would net seem to he an opportune 
time to put into effect the recommendation under considera- 
tion. However, should the '*avy Department still consider 
that in the interest of national defense its reootamendation 
should be adopted, this Department would be disposed to 
agree in principle provided that it was wade applicable to 
the government vessels of all foreign countries **9 

Farther discussions on the subject took place between Admiral Stark, 

General Marshall and Mr* belles of the State Department* On June 23, 192<0 

General Marshall recommended, and Admiral 3tark concurred, "that the 

Department of State, when presented with future requests from foreign 

governments for permission for their public vessels to visit ports in the 

Territory of Hawaii other than Honolulu, will replp that such visits are 

inconvenient •" In identical letters to the ftfer and JJavy Departments on 

July «>, 19h0 the State Department reiterated its position* 

The Department of State is doubtful whether, apart 
from the legality of such action in time of peace, it would 
be practicable from the standpoint of policy to close open 
ports in the Territory of Hawaii to visits of peaceful 
foreign merchant ships even though it may be suspected that 
their primary purpose in making such visits is other than 
commercial* The Department of State ventures to suggest, 
however, that the wide police powers accorded to the United 
States Customs authorities by the Presidential Proclamation 
issued June 27, 19l£ under the authority of Section 191* 
Title 50, of the United States Code may afford the 
opportunity to institute routine safeguards which would 
seriously hinder any propaganda activities in the Hawaiian 
Islands* The War and Navy Departments may care to consult 
in this connection with the appropriate officials In the 
Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department* 20 

9 L»tten Secretary of State to Secretary of Navy, 81 February 19l*0| 


Letter* Secretary of State to Acting Secretary of the Navy, $ July 
19i£| Ibid. 

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A letter from the Chief of Javal Operations to the Commander of the 

Fourteenth Naval District, which encompassed the territory of Hawaii in 

March 19J&* is the last evidence in the %vy files of the final position of 

the flavy relative to visits to Hilo* 

The Navy Department does not desire at this time to 
recommend to the Department of State that the government 
vessels of all foreign countries be excluded from all ports 
in the Hawaiian area except Honolulu* • .When it appears in 
individual oases that the visits of Japanese public vessels 
to Hilo will not be agreeable, the State Department will be 
so informed and Honolulu or some other port will be 
suggested as an alternate port of call* 21 

The National Archives files do not show further request to visit Hilo or 

other Hawaii ports after this date* Thus* in effect* the Japanese solved 

the problem by using their ships to better advantage elsewhere* 

(Visits of Japanese ships to west coast ports will be discussed in the 

next Chapter in conjunction with a discussion of the oil embargo*) 

In retrospect the value of the ship visits by the American and Japanese 
Navies In the period prior to *orld War II pales into insignificance* 
Neither the good will derived from American visits to Japan nor the indica- 
tion of solidarity with New Zealand and Australia by visits there noticeably 
affected Japanese policy toward the United States* Japanese visits to 
Hawaii had certain military advantages* but post war analysis showed that 
most military intelligence work in Hawaii was by trained military personnel 
working in the area* Japanese naval attempts to weaken the Japanese* 
American loyalty to the United States failed miserably* Japan did have one 

21 Letter» CMO to Commandant liith Naval District, 26 March 191*1 f NMD 
PUerCHO Aa-5(l)/FJP12. 

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big success j that of keeping American ships out of the Undated Islands, the 
one place where visits were most desired* 

In this study the significance of the visits was not so much that which 
was gained, but the relationships between the State Department and the wavy 
Department cnmr what steps should be followed* The State Department was not 
willing to risk a crisis to force the Japanese to give permission to visit 
their islands to verily suspicions of illegal fortifications* On the other 
hand, the State Department did not want to close our ports in Hawaii other 
than Honolulu to Japanese visits for fear of repercussions in China, where 
the safety of Americans and their interests depended on the tenuous good 
will of the Japanese* From the Navy point of view, it was a frustrating time* 
It could not get support in their own rjovernment to penetrate the restrictive 
wall around the Mandated Islands, and it could not restrict Japanese 
activities by denying ports in Hawaii*^ Admiral Stark »s planning of the 
northern cruise to force a change in State Department suggestions on the 
use of American naval ships for visits is indicative of the lack of 
harmonious cooperation between the two departments* Fortunately for national 
strategy, the visits by both Navies played a miner role* 

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Tvo of the major prerequisites to any war machine are steel and 

petroleum and in both categories Japan since its modernisation depended 

heavily upon imports* The necessity for oil in modern warfare encompasses 

the needs for aviation gasoline and lubricants* fuel oil for ships, gasoline 

for land vehicles and the various forms of oil used in the civilian economy 

which supports the war machine* Approximately eighty per cent of Japan's 

crude oil and refined stocks in the early 1950* s was imported from the United 

States and from those Imports Japan be^an to accumulate an oil reserve for 

war* By 1939 that reserve had grown to a peak of 55*000,000 barrels* With 

a subsequently reduced oil reserve Japan went to war with the United States 

and "it is highly probable that the aircraft which attacked Pearl Harbor and 

the carriers which transported them across the Pacific operated on American 



The heavy use of petroleum products in the Sino- Japanese War cut into 
the reserved oil* Only an increase in volume of imports would allow the 
reserve to be maintained and, of course, to build up the reserve in the face 
of increased use required an even larger volume of imports* Reports of the 
startling demands made for accelerated imports reached the State Department 
in June and July 19l|0* France recently had fallen and Britain was fighting 
for her existence* Did the Increased demands for oil portend a Japanese move 

oil in Japan's War* Peport of the Oil and Chemical Division, United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey (a copy in »KD Files), p* 11 j Herbert Feis, 
The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princetons Princeton University Press, 1950), p* 263* 

2 oil in Japan's War, op* clt ** p* 1* 


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to the south or were they part of a build-up of a larger reserve for a long 
war In the Pacific? 

Before Secretary Hull departed for a conference in Havana on July 19 

he rejected suggestions that he advocate to the Jfresidsnt the cutting of 


Japanese exports to their normal dimensions. Perhaps Mr* Hull remembered 

the words of warning of Ambassador Grew to President Roosevelt in 1939 1 
"I •••said that if we out off Japanese supplies of oil and that if Japan 
then finds that she cannot obtain sufficient oil from other commercial 

sources to ensure national security, she will in all probability send her 

fleet down to take the Hutch East Indies •" 

On the day Hull left for the Havana meeting the President conferred with 

stimson, Knox and VfeHss on a proposal passed to him toy Secretary of Treasury 

Morgenthau* The proposal had been suggested in part by Lord Lothian, the 

British Ambassador, who had discussed the matter with Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau 

and the Australian Minister at a dinner party the previous evening* 

This was the plant The United States was, on the 
ground of national defense, to stop all exports of oilf 
Britain was to get all its oil from the Caribbean area; 
Britain was to arrange with the Dutch government to 
destroy the oil wells in the Indies} and, finally, it was 
to concentrate bombing attacks on the synthetic oil 
plants in Germany* Where then, and how, would Japan and 
Germany get oil for war? 5 

Welles, who objected to m embargo against Japan because he believed that it 

"would cause Japan to make war on nreat Britain, ••• "entered into a series 

of consultations with the President and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval 

operations •" A ban on oil might force the Japanese to make a decision about 

*sis, op* cit * # p* 89* Ibid ** p* !*1« 
Ibid ,, p* 90. 

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arte fflaJrf#aJ foaJ \j. ; #vaq ol aatMajiPa naad InnC XaMtajave; adT «sa**Majrxolf 

nadl^M* 4 aso* .,-wbr^. KJlv «4a« aitt caaavaala baa! a*r t «wl»aaaa>iA jfaillsl 

ilnaia a u o l r t -rg adl Kjfeaq wtil* a 1* laJslolX naJtfailata arte fcna 

aaH aa) ^aav aafaftt Jba&nO arft toaXq acU aa«r aitft 

i *aala* faati#iM la aavanoi 

i*<rt* aa* uM *o*l Xta all XXa **% •* aa* *±m*Xi 

al latum ia«nj naluG Mil /i.tlw avuma e* aaar «l> 

ana 11 tiUanll t lw* <aaU*X ad* iU aXXaw U* aril aa 

o al4ari*rp ariaalla soMajaa* aAvaaoaatiaa al 

aa* oaqal bhmm % ncd mm* «oaiU jnadW «^Mavaau al alixalq 

.*/ «p.l Xi« ins \iW«K 

At laril ftavalfy* ad aaataatf n*ot*» fmttt- ja agvaafca aa al halo* . 
taltaa a cam Iwwmi jXritti *oa*> no *aw ratas al aaqat aaaat i-Xmov« 

£*r»B la laJaffi , vu>"i iaviaaai ana UaaHtwfT Mil d civ aaailalltfasaa la 
JsaxJa nalalaab a aHaii al aaanwpl &J a»tal Itf^ln J i D «anallafiaqC 

golng into the Indie* and Welles doubted that the American people were ready 

to support a counter military move« He thought he had impressed the 

President with his arguments, and, from later evidence, he most probably had 

Stark's support* 

Other members of the Cabinet were mush more prone to take a firm stand 

against Japan* The "hard line element" of Horgenthau, Stirason and Knox 

actually succeeded in getting the resident to sign a proclamation on July 25 

to establish export controls over all kinds of oil and scrap metals* Welles 

and "his worried subordinates' 1 in the Far Eastern Division were disturbed on 

learning of the President's move, because they feared that the embargo would 

"provoke a crisis with Japan sooner or later, and probably sooner* " Velles 

argued his case again and managed to persuade the President to issue a State 

Department version of a control proclamation "to make clear the proclamation 

of July 25*" That version applied export controls only to "aviation motor 

fuels and lubricants and HO* 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap*" 

The term "aviation motor fuel" was further defined in the Presidential 

Proclamation of July 26, 19hP act "high octane gasolines, hydrocarbons, and 

hydrocarbon mixtures which, with the addition of tetraethyl lead up to a 

total content of 3 c.c* per gallon will exceed 3? octane number, or any 

material from which by commercial distillation there can be separated more 

than 3 per cent of such gasoline, hydrocarbon, or hydrocarbon mixture*" 7hs 

question of circumventing the restriction on petroleum exports based on octane 

level became the center of controversy between those who viewed the 


, pp» 90-91* Ibid ** pp* 92-93* 

moot Commander ftoCollum to Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 November 
19l£f HHD Files CNO L11-I*/EF 37. 

O0> h tt mnyd boil Ml Jrfeoofl* oH »ov«b ^stJUln -wJ-a-tfr a *«Mffpt °* 



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liuobieort »cW *j AooJ&oo tocttnrl *aw * ftri* m * m *oi4o*T»* mrni orfT 

br a ,«oo#BBoeti7V^ t ooatlr*oQ *flo*oo H^ltf* i*» C>m 

a 44 qe faool lyf—oifo* icr mttthba mC# *#** , dolt* aarwfrim KooHoteibyi 

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roelamatlon as a oiniansm move in the right direction and who wanted "tight" 
control and those who viewed the proclamation as a guide to maximum Unite 
of control ^gainst Japan* 

Within the Navy were many officers who wanted the export controls 
rigidly enforced by applying restrictions to all fuels which could be made 
to serve as aviation fuel throng the use of additives and/or further 
distillation* The one section of the Wavy Department best informed on efforts 
to circumvent the octane limits and who were anxious to restrict the 
Japanese efforts to increase their reserve was the Office of Naval 
Intelligence* The Director of Naval Intelligence informed the Chief of Naval 
Operations t 

1* Information from highly reliable sources has 
reached this office regarding negotiations being carried 
on between the Associated Oil Co** Standard Oil Co* of 
California, and Japanese oil Interests which appear to be 
aimed at circumventing the export on aviation gasoline* 

2. Specifically, it appears that Japanese interests 
are now able to obtain not only Kettleman fuel oil, but ft 
special blend of crude from Kattleman rated at 59 octane* 
The U*S* oil oompanles concerned are negotiating with the 
Japanese interests to supply this special 89 octane crude 
against outstanding large orders for 9? octane, 92 hi- 
ootane, and 37 octane fuel* It is contemplated that by 
suitable leading of this special blend with ethyl, 
practically all Japanese requirements for high octane fuel 
can be net regardless of export control* 'Whether or not 
this "special blend" is a commercial grade, or a blend 
developed for the above outlined purpose, is not known 
from information at hand*? 

By using the special blend of crude oil, which was not restricted, the 

Japanese could meet their gasoline needs* 

Records do not indicate what, if anything, Admiral Stark did or thou^it 

about the specific information on cirmimvention, but four days later the 


Mom©! Director of Naval Intelligence to CHO, 26 August 191*0 j MKD Filet 
CMO JJ7 19l4l. 

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toin am tOiVi #«fyrA dS «0K0 o* ewtosta^i 

Director of Naval Intelligence, Bear Admiral Walter Stratton Anderson wrote 
directly to the Secretary of the Navy vith a carbon copy to Clff and Naval 
Aide to the President* After reviewing the circumvention techniques being 
worked out by certain American oil companies with the Japanese, Aetoiiral 
Anderson continued} 

An official of an oil company, which has proved itself 
cooperative with government policies, has iiade the suggcs- 
tion that the desired dsgree of embargo against Japan can 
be made air-tight and defeat such schemes as the foregoing 
if the following two conditions are met* 

First, for the proper governmental authorities, 
presumably the State and Treasury Departments, to sot forth 
exactly what degree of embargo they desire to enforce* 

Second, qualified commercial oil experts could then 
implement this policy by writing the necessary roles with 
the proper technical specifications to make the policy 
really binding.*** 

While the JJavy is not charged with primary responsi- 
bility in connection with the enforcement of any embargo, 
such embargo is definitely of Navy interest, and it is 
believed the Departments charged with enforcing the embargo 
would welcome suggestions from the %vy in the premises* 3 -" 

The memorandum from Admiral Andersen was dually significant* First, it 

stated a position for the '"avy, namely, that since the embargo ot oil was of 

interest to the Ktvy, the Navy was ready to <;ive suggestions on how better to 

enforce that embargo* The feeling expressed by the head of Haval Intelligence 

was not shared by the military head of the 3favy, which prooab3y accounts for 

the direct correspondence with the Secretary* It was quite "legal" for 

Admiral Anderson so to correspond, but It was not the accepted procedure* The 

second significance of the memorandum concerns its treatment after Secretary 

Knox received it* Hot only was Knox in agreement with the suggestions 

contained in the subject memorandum, he wanted to share them with the leader 

Memo i Director of Naval Intelligence to Sec* liavy, 30 August 192*0 j 

?«tefw LWvr.9iiCii jio&Jir'MfS *i»Slntl Xi*"X^bA *x**3# itajajajIftMaa 1 .ri?¥£~; ':< 

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as »o« «4n*«MB £4t I&UMN fcaiauUtaf; 

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wabaaX acU rf#i» uaxtt ruwla oi ba^oaw ad % mAaarmmm tomltitm *£S al Jbafilatma 


of the "hard-line" ^roup, Secretary Horgenthau. Attached to the memorandxim 

la an undated pencilled note from the Of flee of the Secretary of the Navy 

which reads t 

Jim, /presumably James Forreatal, Under-Secretary of the 

Take this up with Henry Morgenthau early next week* 
Ask Adm Anderson for a copy of letter he has on this 
subject I give that to H*K. also. 

/a/ F.K. 

Obviously part of the ttavy favored ti^ht controls* 

^One of the first indications of the feelings of the Chief of Naval 

Operations on the subject of embargo of oil to Japan was contained in a 

letter of September 2k $ I9h0 to Admiral tiiehwrdson, Commander in Chief, 

nited States Fleet* 

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too 
well* Spent over three hours in the State Department 
yesterday— something over two in the morning with Mr* 
Hull, Welles and Bornbeek, and then again in the after- 
noon or&r an hour with Mr* Welles* I believe had you 
been present you would have been in agreement with what 
I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I 
could. • • • 

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, 
an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to 
you and with which I may say I think the State Department 
is in concurrence* I believe Mr* Hull brought it up to 
get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr, Welles 
said he was in complete agreement with me** 2 

Stark was in the camp of Welles and certainly not that of Morgenthau* 

If Stark did not like the look of things on September 2u, he would like 

them less three days later* On September 27, the Tripartite act between 

Japan, Germany and Italy was signed, leaving little doubt that the united 

U Md, 


earl Harbor Attack, Part m, p. ?6l. 

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Statee would eventually fight Japan* A clash was possible If the United 

States in support of Britain against her opponent Germany encountered the 

Japanese in support of Germany against Britain* Fear that the new formal 

alliance was a prelude to a Japanese more against Singapore or the Indies 

prompted many discussions in Washington* Within the State Department, one 

faction* including Hornbook and Norman Davis* stood for further use at once 

of American economic power as a deterrent* while Hamilton and his associates 

in the far Eastern Division advised otherwise e» unless the United States was 

prepared for war* Horganthau, Stimson and Ickes wanted to lower the octane 

levels of exports* and in the Navy* though Knox still seemed inclined to 

use pressure* Stark and his admirals said that the Navy was not ready for war* 

Meanwhile the Dutch were asking the State Department to refrain from actions 

which would increase Japanese pressure against the Indies* Stirason's 

suggestion of sending a flying squadron of warships to the Indies to deter 

Japanese actions was strongly opposed by Admirals Stark and Hichardson* The 

Navy was in no state of readiness to oppose Japanese action in the Dutch "iast 


A naval intelligence report on November 2 showed that despite the 

licensing of exports since July* the aviation gasoline exports to Japan jumped 

to a new height two months later* Department of Gonmerce figures for exports 

to Japan in barrels readt 

Aviation Gasoline Other Gasoline 

July liO,938 119,277 

August %#j0 233,550 „ 

September ll£,0$l U3U*23It ^ 

Memos Commander teCollum to Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 November 

191*0 j NHD Filet CNO U1«VSF 37. 

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The intelligence report continued. 

The Division of Controls (State Department) inferos us 
that while the Commerce Department figures are accurate 
they are based upon the presumption that any gasoline 
suitable for use or actually used in aeroplanes is 
"aviation" gasoline) the Controls Office uses a stricter 
definition in terms of octane count* It is recognised 
in that office that a very largs proportion of the 
gasoline now being sent to Japan is actually used In 
planes and can be stepped up by "boosters" to high 
octane count* It is also stated that the question is 
essentially political insofar as the Controls Office is, 
under instructions » following a lenient policy designe d 
to appease Japan and relieve tlw Motherlands Sast Indies 
of pressure *-"* (Kmphasis mine*) 

Under the circumstances the State Department had little choice. The %vy was 

reluctant to deploy forces to the Far Sast and was not ready to fight Japan* 

Tir:ht restriction might force Japan to take the alternate source of supply* 

Lenient policy might buy sons time to prepare for war* 

m the setting of the Fall of I9I4O ^resident Roosevelt received advice 
from every quarter on actions against Japan* Into the hopper of suggestions 
Admiral Stark dropped one of the more important analyses of the international 
situation and the courses of action which the United States could follow* It 
was his ?lan Dog* which proposed American military support to Britain to 
defeat Germany and if forced to fight in the Pacific against Japan* to fight 
a defensive war using economic restrictions to limit the Japanese* The 
economic measures were to be used in a war* Stark looked upon the embargo of 
oil to Japan as an unnecessary risk of war where he wanted no war until 
Germany was defeated* 

While Stark was working out his Flan Dog memorandum, the British were 
active again in attempting to get United States cooperation against Japan* 

lk n*4. 

i\: .' 

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•uul tabs* isel#M»qoM «M»ie betfi «•• •***•« 

Lord Lothian on ffovembor 1 asked the Amerloan Government to join the 

British Dominions and Empire "in limiting the total export to Japan of all 

essential goods to what oould be considered * normal » amounts •» Later in 

the month the question of restricting oil exports boiled up again* On 

November 2C the British sent a long taanarandum entitled "Japanese Oil 

Situation" which reviewed in detail their intelligence on the matter* The 

key to the figures in the papers relative to the reserve of Japanese oil were 

based on the United States Navy's estimate of consumption for the last three 

years* The British were of the opinion, based on their war experience* that 

the estimate of consumption was too hi^h* They made a specific point 

• ••to inform the It* S* Government that if, on reconsideration, 
the TJ*S* Navy were to lower their estimates of consumption* 
H*M*G* took the view that the only reliable means of dealing 
with the very undesirable situation inherent in further 
accumulation of stocks by the Japanese would be by a joint 
policy designed to curtail Japanese chartering of foreign 
flag tankers* ••Our policy is not to cut Japan off from 
supplies but to oo -operate with the >?*£* Government in 
restricting by the least provocative means* Japanese imports 
of oil now going forward at a rate for which there is no 
commercial justification* 10 

The offer had merit but Hull insisted that any action which might provoke the 

Japanese was unwise unless the British and American forces in the far East 

were stronger* The senior a<b*&rals of the Mavy were saying the ?&vy was not 

ready* "Hull and Admiral Stark, to whom the British proposals were primarily 

directed, let them rest*" Stark had already proposed joint discussions with 

the British to arrive at a better basis of possible future operations together* 

Although the British Government "accepted toe decision" of Hull and Stark, 

F#i8 » op * clt ** p* 136* 

nemo; "Japanese Oil Situation," dated 20 November 191*0, Enclosure (A) 

to letters Rear A<todral Ohormley to CNO, 11 February 19lil$ MiD Piles CNO 


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tfrtitjt* tatatqal f anttii OfOtaatftvq iataX at* \p 

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rtarftagoJ aoailtvtqt 0m*fX tJrfltatft It a£ttt* it#l t0 * it trim 0^ ittJtiiifi trfv 
s?. bnt XX0H to "taoJbtltoh ma Iwit^ttt" lafntttO rinJbil^S mH d^aad-i 

MBraoXta? itrtetnrtlf 

QUO i am c:v jX;lvi ttJunKft 

according to Herbert Feie, there was another attempt to get consideration 

on their memorandam on the "Japanese Oil Situation*" A copy of the paper 

was given to Rear Admiral Ohormley, the Special Naval Observer in London, 

who forwarded it to the Chiex of Haval operations* 

3* Flease note Paragraph lh» Enclosure (a), [the 
subject memorandum] that the proposals contained herein 
were presented to the State Depavteaent on November 20th, 
19hP $ but no reply from the State Department has yet been 

li* In view of present conditions in the Far East* it 
is recommended that the suggestions contained herein be 
given careful consideration as a possible deterrent to 
Japan becoming engaged in war at this time* 3 -® 

Ghormley did not know that the suggestions had been carefully considered by 

Hull and Stark and shelved* 

Discussions within the Cabinet and the State Department through the 

following months concontrated on freezing Japan's American assets and further 

restrictions on oil* In the meanwhile Japanese imports of gasoline and 

crude oils from which aviation gasoline could be obtained continued to 

increase* State Department estimates in April 19b! were that the Japanese 

would receive from the United States and the Dutch Bast Indies 12 million 


barrels during that year or three times the normal amount* 

Despite Admiral Stark's feeling on embargo of oil* Japanese practices in 
the procurement of oil on the west coast could not continue without comment 
to the State Department* For each Japanese naval ship visit to United States 
ports permission was obtained from the State Department by the Japanese 
Government* The State Department always advised the Navy Department and 


Feis* op* cit #, p* 136. 

Letter t RAM Oiormley to CNQ* op. cit ., nl6 supra * 

F®* 8 * Btg cit »» P» 199 nlO* 

b&cJ. at Mil* 


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requested comment* In April the Secretary of the *laiy informed the 
Secretary of State that the Navy Department had no objection to a proposed 
Japanese ship visit, btit called attention to the recent frequency of naval 

• ••a total of twelve Japanese naval vessels will have 
obtained a cargo of oil from the United States within a 
period of six months, five of these within a period of 
sixty days* 

Certain of the vessels now listed as naval vessels 
have made previous similar trips in their original status 
as eomneroial vessels* It appears more than probable 
that their current naval status has been devised to bestow 
upon them, and upon their obvious purposes, a degree of 
immunity which a commercial vessel could scarcely command* 

It is suggested that the frequency of such visits is, 
to say the least, unusual} and a matter regarding which it 
is considered that some restrictive policy would be a 
timely precaution to prevent the abuse of international 
courtesy in a manner which appears contrary to the best 
interests of the United States** 

The fact that the frequency of the visits had increased to one naval 

tanker every ten days throu#i Fetoaroary and March was disturbing: enough, but 

the abuse of designating commercial vessels as naval vessels was more than 

the Naval Intelli, ; 'ence Division cared to tolerate* the courtesies of the 

oort allowed too much freedom to the crew for the many facets of espionage 

work and to accord commercial vessels the honors 6m to men of war was 

highly unpalatable* On the recommendation of the Director of Naval Intelligence 

the Secretary of the Navy informed the Secretary of State on May 23 s 

Although the matter was not pressed during the 
previous visit of the KOKUYO MARU to San Prancisco 
April 13, to April 21, the Wavy Department is unable to 

Letter! Sec« Navy to Sec* State, 3 Aoril 19Hs WHO Fllex CNQ AiH>(2) 


"letter* Sec* Navy to Sec. State, Serial 07813, 1$ April X9Ul{ MB File* 
CMO Ali-5(3)/3F37« 


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identify the K0&J70 MAflA as a bona fide vessel of the 
Japanese Navy and it is therefore in soae doubt as to the 
interpretation of the courtesies and facilities which are 
requested. When a bona fide nian-of-war visits a port it 
is courtesy and custom that the name of the commanding 
officer be furnished* However the request in this ease 
specifically states that the senior officer on board is an 
inspector* and in no way indicates that the ship is under 
his command* In view of this unusual situation the 'Navy 
Department would appreciate some application of the exact 
status of the ship* If she is merely an oil cargo ship 
aboard which has been placed a naval inspector* the wavy 
Department fails to see any reason why she should be 
accorded the privileges* imsunities and courtesies i&lch 
would be accorded with pleasure to any recognised ship of 
the Japanese ftavy* 

If* under these anomalous circumstances* the KOKUYO 
*ARU enters Los Angeles as a merchant ship subject to all 
applicable regulations the matter is beyond the cognisance 
of the Navy Department* Should the Japanese Government 
insist that the ship is entitled to the courtesies and 
privileges of a bona-fide man-of-war* the Navy Department 
does not consider such requests as legitimate and 
recommends that in this ease* and all subsequent similar 
cases* the Japanese Government be informed that the visit 
is not convenient* 22 

The Navy would not have to concern itself about Japanese naval talkers 

for many more months* On June 20 due to an actual domestic scarcity on the 

east coast and as a move against the Axis Powers % oil exports from uie east 

coast were restricted to the British Empire* the British forces in Egypt 

and the Western Hemisphere* Arguments within the Cabinet ever restricting 

oil exports from both coasts resulted in Secretary Icfces resigning* Stark 

and Welles had delayed again cutting off oil to Japan* In July the tempo 

quickened* Japan was poised to acquire additional bases in Indo-Shina* On 

the direction of the President Acting Secretary of State Welles informed 

British Ambassador Halifax that "If Japan now took any overt step through 

force or through the exercise of pressure to conquer or to acquire alien 


better j Sec. *?avy to Sec* State, Serial 011B13* 23 May lyijlj HHD 
Filet Ibid* 

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territories in the Far Stat* the Government of the JJnited States would 

immediately imnose various embargoes, both eoononlc and financial. .." Umi 

showdown on the embargo (question grew near. 

Among those with whan the resident conferred on the oil embargo was 

Admiral Stark. Stark described his feeling to belles in a letter afterwards. 

The latter part of last week the President asked my 
reaction to an embargo on a number of commodities to Japan. 
I expressed the sane thought to hits which I have expressed 
to you and to Mr. Ball regarding oil, but as to the subject 
in general I would be glad to have War : lans division nake 
a quick study. This study was finished yesterday. I sent 
it to the President and told his Aide I should also like to 
send a copy to Mr. Hull, which I have done; ana to talk it 
over with you. 2 ** 

The "study of the Effect of an Embargo o£ Trade between the United 

States and Japan" was prepared by the War lans Division (OP 16) under the 

direction of Rear Adsdral Turner. It read in part as follows s 

It is generally believed that shutting off the American 
supply of petroleua will lead promptly to an invasion of 
the Netherlands East Indies, foliile probable, this is not 
necessarily a sure immediate result.... Japan has oil stocks 
for about eighteen months war operations. Export restric- 
tions of oil by the nited States should be accompanied by 
similar restrictions by the British and Butch.... An 
ttobargo on exports will have an immediate severe 
psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. 
It is almost certain to intensify the determination of 
those now in power to continue their present course. 
Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then 
take military measure against the British and Dutch, she 
would also include military action against the Philippines, 
which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war.... An 
embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by 
Japan on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, and 


Feis, op. cit ., p. 227. 

Letter* CHO to Mr. Welles, 22 July 19i*lj HA 69U.2VUi98 1/2$ (2) earl 
Harbor Attack, T art 5, p. 23^2. 

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possibly would involve the united States is earl/ wax* in 
the Pacific ...•Recomi^ndationj That trade with Japan not 
be embargoed at this time* 2 ? 

Co the copy of Admiral Turner 9 ® study sent to the President, ::tark wrote 

"I concur in general. Is this the kind of picture you wanted? 1 * 9M 

resident does not appear to have heeded the evaluations of Turner or Stark* 

IHs actions in ordering a freese of Japanese assets on 25 July after the 

Japanese entered southern Xndo-China showed that he was less worried about 

immediate Japanese reaction against the ftited States than were his military 

advisers* Aa long as Britain stood, he thought, the Japanese would not 

enter the war, because they did not want to fight the British Empire and the 

United States together. 

The Navy through the period of embargo considerations was divided. The 
Secretary of the Navy and certain officers below the senior admirals were 
for tight controls or even complete embargo* The Chief of "rfeval Operations, 
who had the advantage of personal contact with the -resident and who agreed 
with the President's trusted Mr, Welles, opiosed actions which would result 
in war with Japan* To the v^ry end Stark held his position, so wrapped up 
in the problems of the Atlantic that he veered away from eny action which 
would commit his limited ships to the Far ast against Japan* Stark accented 
the calculated risk of allowing one very potential enemy to build up huge 
petroleum reserves in order to keep peace in one ocean while defeating an 
enemy considered more dangerous in another oce n. 

Letter: Director, ^ar lane Division to CNQ, 19 July l?ULj HHB Filej 

Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 5, pp. 2382-238U. 

Feis, op* cit« , p* 21*1. 

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t9 in Off* |l4<tf %M. o* nol^rra mibj ^^ 


Intro Motion * 

There are generally two roles for naval and military forces in a 
democratic nation* First* the ultimate fixation of any military force is to 
wage war* and the ability of a democratic state to muster its manpower and 
productive capacity to form a successful war machine when necessary is one of 
the prerequisites of national survival* A short step from the ultimate use 
of force is the second function — the effect of military capability in foreign 
relations* The diplomat who negotiates without actual or potential force 
behind him, negotiates from a weak position* If circumstances are such that 
his opponent has decidedly superior actual and potential force, that opponent 
may with impunity ignore or reject any proposals or agreements* The 
democratic state, net Choosing to field large military forces unnecessarily* 
usually seeks by a combination of existing military force* diplomacy* 
economic pressure and cooperation with other like-minded powers to deter any 
aggression or acts by other powers in violation of principles or national 
interests* In broadest terms, then, the strategic thinking which is a major 
component of international relations in a modern democracy is based on a 
deterrent concept* 

From a vantage point bought with time, one can see in American polities 
in the Pacific a definite pattern of strategic thinking before Pearl Harbor* 
For moral and commercial reasons the United States took on almost a 
paternalistic national attitude toward China in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries* m the same period various island groups with potential 
bases were acquired* ?or reasons already discussed, decisions were made not 

lift ^n 1c ne^wtfl »*»ial* oo«ftl> 

toft 'iS**>CTJl :*#•» 9* <K'^ : 90Tiifo « It *» «w iS*" 

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to build strong bases and support a large fleet in the Orient* The 
substitute for naval force to back the Open Door Policy was moral influence 
and diplomatic agreement among; the commercial powers in the area* Implicitly 
behind the agreements in China, but not formally cossaltted to use* was the 
collective military potential of the participants* 

An indication of the precarious balance of forces in the deterrent 
arrangement in the Orient was seen daring World War I* Japan, with little 
hesitation, made her twenty-one Demands after most of the European naval 
forces were withdrawn and attention was centered in Europe* Subsequently, 
the provisions for naval limitations and the non-fortification of Pacific 
islands in the Washington treaty, and the agreements to recognise national 
rights and China's integrity, in the Four J ower and Nine Power treaties, 
respectively, aimed at deterring future aggression by agreements only* Japan 
obviously was not deterred by the existing arrangement from taking military 
action in Manchuria in 1?31* The absence of effective Occidental military 
forces in the Orient and the international unwillingness to use collective 
economic or military action blessed the Japanese move* An opposite situation 
relative to the forces or collective action most probably would have deterred 
Japan from the Manehurian move* 

As Japanese, German and Italian military might increased rapidly in the 
mid-1930' a, the American diplomats found themselves in progressively weaker 
positions* The potential power of the United States was still greater than 
any of the militants, but that power was not being channeled into war 
machinery* The existing Army was at a low ebb and the H*wy was not up to 
treaty strength* The actual and relative military power at hand in the Axis 
: ers ave then a terrifyin;: advantu a. Btttfl 0&RA Si M VOsAV DM* 

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Cordell Hull "should be plugging 1 for & bigger Navy" in 1936* 

^ Against Japanese naval strength, their strong Army and tho propensity 

to use their forces to gain objectives in the Orient the Havy and State 

Department representatives had the weak Asiatic Fleet, the presence of the 

United States Fleet at Hawaii and economic presa\ires* Though the areas, 

tines and degrees of use varied, the two main forces used to deter Japan from 

using her localised advantage against United States* interests and assumed 

responsibilities were naval and economic* The problem facing the American 

strategists was how to deter the Japanese from expanding southward into 

Xnte-Chlna and especially the Hutch East Indies using the relatively weak 

forces available* The problem intensified after the decision to concentrate 

American effort in the Atlantic to defeat Germany first* 

Proposals fo deter Japaq ly increasing Far Eastern, naval strength* 

The history of the Asiatic ileet, its mission to protect American 

nationals and their property and its role in tempering Japanese actions 

adversely affecting American interests have already been discussed* The 

effectiveness of the Asiatic Fleet as a deterrent was derived not from the 

strength of the fleet itself but from what it represented* namely, a country 

capable of drastic economic reprisals and additional naval action* If the 

decision were made by the Ja anese to risk the American use of either or both 

of the underlying sources of potential power, the naval forces on station 

in the Orient would be sadly inadequate in &v&ry respect* This fact had been 

recognised clearly since Mahan* 

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In 1935 the Hepburn Board, reviewing the future needs of the Navy, 
specially recommended "adequate air and submarine protection securely based 
on Quam" to make that island "secure against anything short of a najor effort 
on the part of any probable enemy* "^ If the use of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor 
"on the flank of any Japanese move to the south" served Stimson as a deterrent 
against Japan in 1932, would not a secure base at Oosm to which Melts of the 
United States Fleet migfrt deploy to operate thousands of m iles closer to 
Japan and "which would provide for the security of the Asiatic fleet in time 
of sudden emergency" be even more deterring" The Japanese definitely thought 
so earlier* The removal of the threat of a fortified Guam was sine qua non 
to their acceptance of the Washington Haval Treaty in 1922* For many 
reasons Congressmen did not approve the Apra Harbor Improvement bill which 
was the first step in building up the base at 3uam in 1939* In retrospect* 
a defended Guam would have strengthened considerably the Orange and Rainbow 
5 War Plans, most probably would have served as a stronger dete rent than the 
fleet in Hawaii and quite possibly would have received the same treatment 
meted out at ftsarl Harbor. 

Coincident ially, days before the Hepburn Board Report was published, 
Admiral Yamell in a personal letter informed Admiral Leahy, the Chief of 
Naval Operations, of his views of problems in the Pacific. Admiral Leahy by 
memorandum passed extracts of larnell*s letter to ^resident Roosevelt* 
TarneU*s r eco m me ndations weret 

'Tetters Statutory Board on Submarine, Destroyer, Mine and Naval Air 
Bases, 1933 j (Hepburn Board Report)} 1 December 1933, p. 66$ MHD Filet 
Hepburn Board* 

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3* ** An annooneansnt to Japan that the United 
States, freat Britain, France and the Netherlands East 
Indies, that [violations of the Nina ower] Treaty vill 
not be recognised* 

b, No money to be loanod to Japan ty any of the 
signatory powers* 

c* Prohibition of shipssnt of war material to 

d* Strengthening of acific and Guam specifically. 
1. Decided Increase of Aaray and Navy aviation 

in the Pacific* 
2* Increase of submarine force* 
3* Tioerease of base facilities* 
U* Increase of AA defense* 
5* Base an Increased amber of heavy cruisers 
on Hawaii* 
e* The otlier nations to increase their forces 
accordingly and to take similar measures* 

f • For every note written, there should be some 
increase of cur strength in the Far East* 

h» It is only by such means that respect will be 
gained for our diplomatic efforts* Japan at present is in 
a dangerous position with respect to her • • •military men In 
China who must be supplied from overseas* Any threat 
against this line of communications by a competent and ample 
force. ••will have a profound effect on her attitude of mind 
^y regarding the settlement of the present controversy*** 

J&et of A&alral Tarnell's suggestions were adopted, but generally too late 

In 19lil to deter the Japanese. 

Another Admiral who need the Chief of Naval Operations as a pipeline to 

the ^resident during this period was Admiral Richardson* He was vary 

con ce rned about the inadequacy of American preparedness to act alone in the 

Far East against Japan* "When the China Incident started and on every 

opportunity until after I left the Job as Asst* C*M*0* I used to say to Bill 

Leahy, Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to [be] drawn into 

this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us In the 

semot William D. Leahy to the President, 15 December 1933 f Roosevelt 
^pers* Secretary's Files j I Dip* Correspondence, 1933-37, 1939-Ul, Box 11, 
Memorial library* 



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On September 1, 1939 the War : lans Division was concerned over Japanese 
mores "In the event that England and France enter war with Germany" and 
recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations "that the nited States take 

such immediate steps as nay be practicable to provide a deterrent effect 

against such aggressive measures by Japan." Later, in December, the War 

Plans Division was more specific in its recommendations. The Dutch East 

Indies were particularly vulnerable to Japanese demands since England and 

France were fully occupied in Europe and the ifetherlands "are so exposed to 

German pressure*" 

Consideration is therefore recommended as to whether or not 
we should strengthen our military position in that area 
before Spring in order to serve as some additional 
deterrent to further Japanese expansion plans, and possibly 
to make more forceful the efforts of the State Department 
in that direction. Specifically, consideration is recom- 
mended as to the advisability and practicability of 
increasing, without delay and certainly before Spring, our 
Army Air Force in the Philippines and possibly its garrison, 
with an increase of at least one squadron of Navy patrol 
planes to make more effective such an Army augmentation. 

(Written at the bottom of the memorandum t "Discussed in 
Joint Board meeting — no action taken as Army could not 

Since the Army was incapable of reenforcing the Far r,ast forces, the 

tfevy studied actions which it could take alone. On learning that the Japanese 

Navy intended to move into the Dutch East Indies in May 19i|0, Captain Crenshaw 

of War Plans Division suggested that the Havy discuss with the State 

! earl Harbor Attack, Part Ha, p. 921*. 


Memos War lane Division to CflD, 1 September 1939 j T3© File: Al6/Hbb 

Memoi Certain Crenshaw to Admiral Stark, 9 December 1939$ HHD Files 


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Department and the IVesident the interesting possibility of the United States 
Fleet sending a division of OMAHA class cruisers to the Indies to make 


similar mores* Captain Schuirmann, Liaison Officer with the State Department* 

Discussed with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr* Hamilton* Chief of 
Far Eastern Division, the proposal that* if Japan sends a 
small occupation force for protection of Dutch ast Indies 
we send a slmiliar (Sic) force* - and the variant of the 
same idea* i.e** that we suggest or notify Japan that if 
they occupy the islands that the United States share in 
the occupation* Hornbeck and Hamilton were in agreement 
that unless we were prepared to go to war* if necessary* 
in event such joint occupation were opposed by Japan that 
we should not make such a move* The proposal ~ of 
suggesting to Japan some joint occupancy was not feasible 
as Japan has stated they wished the status quo preserved* 
I explained that this was not a proposal but was more 
a suggestion which we were exploring* and in order to 
clarify our own ideas we wished the reactions of the State 
Department *? 

The "grasping at straws" to deny the Dutch East Indies to the Japanese 

gave way to more practical considerations of Joint actions with the Dutch 

and British* Stanley Hornbeck extracted for the State Department the chief 

points of a letter from Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark dated 13 November 19hp* 

Stark earlier had reported to Hart by despatch advanced information 

concerning his Plan Dog and proposals for American representatives to confer 

with British and Dutch force commanders at Singapore and Batavia* Hart • a 

letter interpreted lay Hornbeck read in parti 

$• The only thing which will deter the Japanese 
from an attempt to seise the Netherlands East Indies 
will be their fear of opposing forces* By refusing to 
confer with the British for defense of the Indies* the 
Dutch are only doing themselves harm* 

6* The certainty of British aid to the Dutch would 
probably not be sufficient of itself permanently to deter 
the Japanese* 

^temot Captain Crenshaw to CNO, 15 May 19li0| NHD Files SA-SZ* 

"t R*E.S* [Captain R.E* Schuirmann] to 0m 9 15 May 19l*Dj bid* 

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7* The fullest use of our joint resources calls 
for Staff discussions that would go immeasurably beyond 
the "exchange of information" basis on which we are now 
working* It should be possible for the United States, with- 
out making any political oosnitment, to proceed on certain 
assumptions* if there is a possibility that we will be 
acting jointly with the British or Dutch* 

3* A Japanese attack on British or mrtch possessions* 
or both* is a most likely development unless the Japs are 
fairly certain that we will Intervene. The occasion 
approaches which will be our last chance to maintain our 
right and interests in the Par "ast except entirely on our 
own and starting from scratch* 3 ** 

Cooperation among the Far Kastern Powers was considered fcgr Hahan and f!ayj 

Tarnell and Richardson had seen the nmA to cooperate against Japan, and 

now Hart and Stark proposed agreements with a view to possible joint action, 

yet history shows that the united front came only in extremis and certainly 

too late to deter or to oppose effectively the Japanese* 

On January 16, 191*1 the President in a White House conference announced 
his decision to make no further reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet* The 
background behind the decision is most significant because two schools of 
thought were involved— one advanced by Admiral Stark was much more reserved 
vis a vis Japan than the one advanced by the former Commander in Chief 
Asiatic Fleet, Admiral larnell* Though in this instance Stark again was 
able to persuade the 'resident to accept his reasoning, most of Actairal 
Tarnell *s recommendations ultimately were tried* 

Stark must be given credit for his consistency in the application of his 
concept to naval and economic pressures against Japan* As indicated in Ids 
Plan Dog, Stark did not want to do anything which would bring Japan into the 
war until Germany was defeated. Just three days prior to the Presidents 

Memot HORNBKCK's Evaluation of Letter Admiral flart to Admiral Stark, 
13 November 19*40} Hat 71*0.0011 P.W./72* 

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decision not to reenfarce the Asiatic Floet, he had written Admiral Ximmelt 

Of course I do not want to become involved in the : acific, 
if it is possible to avoid it* I have fought this out tine 
and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully 
realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in 
the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it 
will be one H (sic) of a job... 11 

A month later Stark wrote? "There is a chance that farther moves againt (sic) 

Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. WS want to 

give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities 

with Germany who w© all consider our major problem. w * The degrees to which 

he was willing to go were indicated in his full support of Welles in the 

State Department not to embargo oil to Jar? an and his unrelenting attempts 

to counter the more daring proposals of Admiral Yarnell. )n the reenforcement 

question, Stark had the complete support of Admiral Beeves, who had bBen 

Oommander in Chief. United States Fleet in 1935. 

The record does not show definitely who initiated the proposal which 

triggered the discussion on the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet. It could 

very conceivably have been Admiral Yarnell. The proposal was to send 

immediately to the Asiatic Fleet the aircraft and vessels which in the Navy 

Basic *fer I Ian Rainbow 3 were termed the "Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement ." In 

the war plan the detachment to the Asiatic Fleet was to be sent from earl 

Harbor "as soon after the outbreak of war as it could be prepared for the 

trip." The detachment was not designed for operations in the Philippines, 

Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 16, p. 2!iu. # 


Ibid ., p. 21$1. 

13 m 

Cf. Chapter IGHT, supra. 


Memo? Admiral Reeves to Admiral Stark, 15 January 1#*1? SHD Pile: 
A16-3/EF 37 Document #26879 Central Files. 

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but for operations Initially from bases in the ?felay Barrier "in cooperation 

with the British and Dutch naval, land and air forces there, » "The 

reenforcement...if it had ever arrived, would have about trebled the surface 

power of our Asiatic Fleet. * 

The analysis by Admiral Stark of the effects of reenforcing the 

Asiatic Fleet in early January 19hX continued; 

It is assumed that the reason for sending a reenforce- 
raent to the 9« S. Asiatic Fleet is for the purpose of 
deterring Japan from advancing against Malaya and the 
Netherlands East Indies* It is not known whether or 
not the government proposes to initiate war against 
Japan. If we should do so. the demands of that war 
will be such that we can do little to aid the British 
Isles or to assist the British ffevy in the Atlantic 
Ocean. It is my opinion that the British Isles cannot 
long hold out against Germany unless we continue our 
supply of materials to those Isles and, probably, 
actively enter the war with our major naval forces 
deployed in the Atlantic. Should we make war with our 
major naval forces against Japan, X believe that 
Britain will be defeated by Germany, and that the 
nited States will then be left with decidedly inferior 
naval forces in the Atlantic to protect our national 
position and that it will be unable to withdraw from 
the war with Japan without heavy losses of ships and 
prestige. Should the reenforcement of our Asiatic 
Fleet not deter Japan, but actually encourage her to 
strike, we may be creating a situation that will 
> result in a national disaster. ^Hy advice is there- 
fore, that we avoid war with Japan. 1 ' 

Stark's analysis was consistent with his : Ian Dog and his often repeated 

views on defeating Germany first. He was not willing to risk actions which 

would lead to war with Japan or to risk the loss of his naval forces needed 

Letters Ct& to Pec. Navy, Serial 06212, 17 January 19kl$ ?«© Filet 

A16-3/EF 37* Jan. 15-Dec. ?k» 19U1. 

Supplement to 'Narrative of Admiral Thomas C. Hart, ' S Navy; On file 

in Navy History Division. 

Loc. clt ., nl5 supra . 

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in the Atlantic. 

Admiral Yarnell may be said to have had the opposite perspective. He 
was willing to send naval, forces to the Far "Ast to deter Japan and to use 
force if the Japanese moved into southern Indo-Chlna. His suggestions to 
the Secretary of the Navy may be summarised as follows: Strengthen the 
hilippines with forces from ^anama and Hawaii} send a division of heavy 
cruisers on a visit to Hew "©aland, A^istralia and Singapore; maintain a 
striking force of cruisers and carriers at rearl IJarborj discuss plans of 
coordinate action with the British and Dutch; the British should maintain 
as large a naval and air force in Singapore as possible consistent with the 

situation in dxrorte; and take positive action if Japan moves south from 

Hanoi to Kamranh Bay and Saigon. 

Admiral Stark commented on the Yarnell suggestions item by item in a 

letter to the Secretary of the Navy on 17 January. Relative to the 

strengtheni.jg of the "hilippines, Stark stated? "Anything we can send would 

probably be inadequate for a successful bluff or deterrent to Japan. It 

would certainly be inadequate to defend the Philippines, and it is doubtful 

if it could be withdrawn in time to preserve Singapore, Malay or the Dutch 

Fast Indies. It is inadequate for effective action of any serious nature 

from the Philippines. " On the heavy cruiser visits to New Zealand, 

Australia and Singapore, he commented i "From a military standpoint I think 

a division of heavy cruisers in such an area on the outbreak of war would 

be unfortunate." And finally, the taking of positive action against Japan 

if she moved south from Hanoi, Stark interpreted as meaning war with Japan. 

Memos Admiral Yamell to See. Navy, 35 January l?Ul} Ibid. 

. tStmtit add 

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"X do not recommend war against Japan if she seizes all of Indo-Cliina." 

The Philippines were strengthened, cruisers were sent on visits to New 
Zealand and Australia and "positive action" was taken by freezing assets 
and invoking a complete oil enbargo after the Japanese moved south in Indo- 
china. > Xarnellts suggestions were tried with Stark fluting then every 
step of the way* 

The final phase of the deterrent concept took on new meaning with the 
fast moving events in the Fall of 19ijl« The previous attitude that it was 
impossible to defend the Philippines gave way to optimism over General 
MacArthur's new Army command and the arrival of B-17 bombers* submarines 
and additional troops* In November Marshall and Stark in an "Estimate 
concerning Far pastern Situation" for the "resident were able to report? 

The present combined naval* air and ground forces will 
make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking* Qy 
about the middle of December. 191*1, United States air 
and submarine strength in the Philippines will have 
become a positive threat to any Japanese operations 
south of Formosa* The **S* Army air forces in the 
Philippines will have reached its projected strength by 
February or March, 19U2. The potency of this threat 
will have then increased to a point where it might well 
be a deciding factor In deterring Japan in operations 
in the areas south and west of the Philippines* By 
this time, additional British naval and air reinforce- 
ments to Singapore will have arrived* The general 
defensive strength of the entire southern area against 
possible Japanese operations will then have reached 
impressive proportions* 20 

The last attempt to deter Japan failed by months* In an intriguing game of 

historical supposition* it is most interesting to speculate whether Japan 

would have been deterred if the final ?hilipr>ine buildup had been attained* 

19 Lettert OW) to Sec* Navy, Serial 09012, 1? January 19U| Ibid * 


earl Harbor Attack, fart 16, p. 2222. 


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The United states fleet at Hawaii as a deterrent * 

As the war broke in Europe, Admiml tart, Commander in Chief Asiatic 

Fleet, asked for a division of four heavy cruisers to rsenforce his fleet* 

The Chief of Ifeval Operations, Admiral Stark wanted to do what he could for 

Hart, to strengthen the State Department* s hand and at the sane ti»e not 

weaken the Navy's position. On review of the Orange War rlan, and after 

having talked it over with the resident who "okayed it one hundred percent; 

as did the State Department" rtark sent a detachment to Hawaii rather than 

to the Asiatic Fleet* The Asiatic Fleet received one tender, a squadron of 

patrol planes and six new subnarines instead of the cruisers, which remained 

under the control of the Commander in Chief* In correspondence with Admiral 

Richardson over the Hawaiian Detactsient, Admiral Stark said a 

I still think the decision to send the Detachment 
to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound* No 
one can measure how Much effect its presence there may 
have on the Orange foreign policy* The State Depart- 
ment is strong for the present setup and considers it 
beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press 
releases, etc." 

At the end of the annual naval maneuvers the United States Fleet was 

in Hawaiian waters* On May 7 Stark wrote to Richardson in Hawaii* "Just 

hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this 

reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a 

couple of weeks*" On May 22 Richardson, still in Hawaii uninformed about 

the plans for his fleet and facing problems of scheduling and training, 

wrote rtark again to find "why we are here and how long we will probably 

stay?" Stark »s answer wast "You are there because of the deterrent effect 


'earl Harbor Attack , rart 12*, p. ?32. 

22~ 23 

Ibid* , p. 933. JWLd.* P« S»iiO. 


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whlch it Is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East 
Indies* M Later he added: 

• ••you would naturally ask— suppose the Jape do go 
into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? 
Hy answer is that is, (sic) I don»t know and I think 
there is nobody in Ood*s green earth who can tell you. 
I do know my own argument with regard to this, both in 
the White House and in the State Department, are in line 
with the thought contained in your recent letter* 

I would point out one tiling and that is that even 
if the decision here were for the tf*S* to take no 
decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the 
Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as 
by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for 
your presence in the Hawaiian area* Just remember that 
the Japs don*t know what we are going to do and so 
Icing (sic) as they don*t know they may hesitate, or be 
deterred *<2* 

It would appear that a cycle had been completed* Roosevelt had inherited a 

fleet at earl Harbor being used as a deterrent against the Japanese when 

he took office in 1933* 

Admiral Richardson did not accept the validity of the concept that the 

fleet at Pearl Harbor was a deterrent to the Japanese* He visited Washington 

to persuade the President to return the fleet to the west coast where it 

could be better supported and trained* In a memorandum covering his talks 

with the President, Richardson recorded that the President could be convinced 

"of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if /he 

couldJ7 be given a good statement which will convince the American people, 

and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West 

Coast we are not stepping backward. " Roosevelt is also reported to have 

told Stark relative to moving the fleets *Vhen I don't know how to move I 


Ibid., p. 9l;3. 

Ibid*, p* 962. 

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stay put." Stark in November 19u0, reiterated the problem to Richardson: 

n Aa you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, 

and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in 

Washington* It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some 

good pretext*" It would appear that the Fleet was imprisoned at I earl 

Harbor by the deterrent idea which first put it there* Its withdrawal might 

be considered by the Japanese as the withdrawal of a deterrent, thereby 

giving encouragement to any moves which were held in abeyance because of the 


In a letter to Stark on October 22, Hiehardson stated that his feelings 

the previous July were "that the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area 

solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese 

aggressive action and ... that there was no intention of embarking on actual 

hostilities against Japan*" After Ills October visit he felt that the United 

States planned more active steps against Japan which would lead to war* 

He then outlined the serious deficiencies in the Fleet *s readiness for war* 

On February 1, l?Ul, Admiral Richardson was relieved by Admiral Ximmel 

because he insisted upon the fleet returning to the west coast, according to 

one revisionist* ^IClmnel and the deterring fleet remained in place until 

the deterrent was removed not to the West Coast by the Jaited States but to 

the bottom of Paarl Barber by the Japanese* 

William T^ Langer and S* Hverett Gloason, The Challenge to Isolation ^ 
1937-19UO (RSw Yorki Harper ft Brothers, 1S52), P.1W. 

' earl iiarbor Attack, I art lb, p. 971. 

Charles A* Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 19U0 
(New Haven t Yale university Press, 19iiU), p* it!5ff. 

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The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines narked the end of a 
nost significant >hase in Japanese- American foreign relations. The years 
of planning for war with Japan were at &n end. In the preceding five years 
the old unrealistic Orange War Ian reached its last stage of development. 
Fortunately for the United States it was not given the ultimate test, for 
although the objectives and estimated requirements were pared down from the 
original ,^ihe last )range Plan was still overly ambitious. The chronic 
shortage of troops, the lack of a train to sup; -art a fleet movement, the 
weakness of the ; hilippine defenses and the unknown oar abilities of the 
Japanese in the Jiandated Islands were factors which couM not be ignored. 
Attempts to visit the strategically located islands, so inconveniently 
located across American lines of communications to the Orient, failed, 
lending more weight to suspicions of illegal fortifications. To have allowed 
the islands to pass from Spanish possession through German hands to the 
Japanese was a strategic mistake due to lack of foresightedness. Hot to 
ensure that the islands were kept in accordance with the mandate was an 
accepted strategic risk, since Ouam and the Philippines were undefended by 
the Washington Treaty of 1922. 

As German successes continued in 19k0 American naval leaders appreciated 
more the necessity of cooperation with allies in the Atlantic and Pacific. 
The strategic thinking found expression in Admiral Stark* s Ian Dog. 
Subsequently conferences with the British in early 19iil produced an agree- 
ment on strategy in the Atlantic, but meetings with the British and Dutch 
in Singapore and Batavia were less fruitful* In the pacific the strategic 
questions such as the defense of Singapore continued to generate disagree- 
ments, so much so that war started without a workable operations plan. The 
weak Asiatic Fleet and its British and Dutch counterparts paid the price 

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before a superior Japanese force* In fairness to the Tar East allies an 
operations agreement would not have solved all their problem. Too little 
attention was paid to a major strength factor of the Japanese which effectively 
took its toll of ships — air superiority. The subsequent loss of ths PRXKOS 
OP WAI.ES and the I are oases in point. 

The question of the oil export restrictions was a thorny one. Japan 
received the bulk of her oil frora the 'nited States. As the possibility of 
war with Japan increased, the export of oil was tantamount to furnishing a 
probable enemy with important logistic support. )n the surface such actions 
would appear strategically unsound, but several considerations colored the 
whole picture. Qy 1939 Japan had accumulated her huge oil reserves 9 and 
in the period of accumulation the American people were little concerned over 
future national security. There was no attempt to curtail the profitable 
oil trade while the reserves were being built, When operations in China 
out into the reserves and huge orders were placed to compensate for the 
increased use. the international situation had changed. Oil in 19u0 had 
become a strategic commodity due to the war in ®xro\m 9 and Japan was tied 
to the Axis I overs fighting in that area. 

Secretaries Morgenthau, Stimson. Knox and Ickes and many naval officers 
thought that curtailing shipments of oil to Japan would deter that nati 
from further aggression, reasoning that for want of oil she could not fight 
elsewhere. It would appear that this faction had a low estimate of the 
accumulated reserve, or else chose to ignore the fact that a total embargo 
did not run the tap) dry immediately. Conservative estimates gave Japan 
nine to twelve months reserve at "normal" war usage. The group lead by 
Stark and Welles, who wanted limited shipments continued (which amounted 
to near total orders through circumvention) reasoned that though the price 

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of peace in the Pacific were high, it was worth it until the defeat of 
Germany- were assured* Again it is interesting to speculate whether 
continuing the oil shipments would have kept Japan out of the war long 
enough for the deterrents in the Pl&lippines and in the British Far eastern 
Fleet to become completely effective, or whether J a an would have reacted 
to the deterrents regardless of the oil policy. Fears of Japanese seizure 
of the oil in Dutch Bt*t Indies started even before the War in Europe and 
certainly contributed to the ultimate decision to build up the British and 
American forces in the Far East in late lylil. Those deterrents in the 
Philippines and the augmented British Fleet and the 'Jnited States Fleet "on 
her eastern flank" were effective against Japan until the decision to strike 
I earl Harbor was made. That which Stark feared happened. With prospects of 
diminishing oil reserve and ever growing deterrents encircling her. Japan 
decided she had to strike while she could. Those forces which posed the 
greatest threat to her were the first to be attacked and quickly eliminated. 

The first target was the fleet at .earl Harbor. That force represented 
the only military force available to the Administration until mobilization 
and training created a new Army. Though its presence at Hawaii served as a 
deterrent force, units were constantly being siphoned off for duty in the 
Atlantic against the German threat. Until the build up of the "two-ocean 
navy" voted in July 191*0, there were not enough ships to fight a war in both 
oceans. Genuine fear that Germany might gain control of the French and 
British Fleets in the summer of 1?U()* dictated avoidance of war with Japan. 
Histo ry will probably uphold Stark's Plan Dog as good strategic thinking 
under the circumstances. 

The influence of the naval leaders and the use of the Mavy figured 
heavily in determining American positions in relations with Japan in this 

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period. Stark 1 e support of Welles on the oil matter and his fighting the 
State Department on the use of ships to vieit the Far Bast or to be used to 
reenforce the Asiatic Fleet or Singapore night appear inconsistentX ctually 
there was continuity to Stark's thoughts and that was to keep Japan out of 
war until Germany were defeated. To this end also Stark, according to his 
correspondence, repeatedly and successfully pressed his points en the 

■resident. He was in an ideal position with a personal relationship with 
a naval-oriented r resident. Yet despite his favored position, his near 
opposite in strategic thinking, Admiral Yarnell, also influenced the 

resident and had most of his ideas tried. The Hoosevelt technique of 
orchestrating the divergent views of his subordinates applied to naval 
strategy at well as in the political fields. 

The Tnited States Navy in the period discussed was certainly the 
dominant American force in the acific and naval strategy and naval 
influence were deeply involved in almost all relations with Japan. Though 
the naval influence was pronounced and the ?Javy must take its share of the 
mistakes made, the final decisions were made by the .resident. 


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Op-12-CTB November 12 , 19UQ 


Referring to my very brief touch in a recent conference as to the 
desirability of obtaining at once some Hpjht upon the major decisions which 
the Fresident nay make for guiding our future naval effort in the event of 
war, and in further immediate preparation for war, you my recall my remarks 
the evening we discueeed War ^larai for the Navy* I stated then that if 
Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere? but that if 
she loses the problem confronting us would be very great j and, while we 
ml?>ht not lose everywhere , we might possibly, not win anywhere . 

As I stated last winter on the Hill, in these circumstances we would be 
set back upon our haunches* Our war effort, instead of bein : : widespread, 
would then have to be confined to the "'©stern Hemisphere* 

I now wish to expand my remarks, and to present to you ay views con- 
cerning steps we might take to meet the situation that will exist should the 
United States enter war either alone or with allies* In this presentation, I 
have endeavored to keep in view the political realities in our own country* 

The first thing to consider is how and where we might become involved* 

(a) War with Japan in which we have no allies* This mi^t be 
precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we strongly reinforce our 
Asiatic Fleet or the Philippines Garrison, should we start fortifying Guam, 
or should we impose additional important economic sanctions; or it might be 
precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against us, or by 
further attention of Japanese hegemony* 

(b) War with Japan in which we have the British Empire, or the British 
Empire and Netherlands East Indies, as allies* This might be precipitated 
by one of the causes mentioned in (a) , by our movement of a naval reinforce- 
ment to Singapore, or by Japanese attack on British or Netherlands territory* 

(c) War with Japan in which she is aided by Germany and Italy, and in 
which we are or are not aided by allies* To the causes of such a war, 
previously listed, might be added augmented American material assistance to 
Great Britain, our active military intervention in Britain's favor, or our 
active resistance to German extention of military activities to the -Western 

(d) ,T ar with Germany and Italy in which Japan would not be initially 
Involved and in which we would be allied with the British* Such a was- would 
be initiated by American decision to intervene for the purpose of preventing 
the disruption of the British Empire, or German capture of the British Isles, 

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(e) We should also consider the alternative of now remaining out of 
war, and devoting ourselves exclusively to building up our defense of the 
Western Hemisphere, >lus the preservation by peaceful means of our Far 
Eastern interests, and plus also continued material assistance to Great 

As I see it, our major national objectives in the immediate future 
"tif-ftt be stated as preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological 
integrity of the ifcited States, plus that of the remainder of the Western 
Hemisphere} the prevention of the disruption of the British itoipire, with all 
that such a consummation implies; and the diminution of the offensive 
military power of Japan, with a view to the retention of our economic and 
political interests in the Far East* It is doubtful, however, that it would 
be in our interest to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and 
economic power* A balance of power in the Ear East is .to our interest as 
much as is a balance of power in Europe* 

The questions that confront us are concerned with the preparation and 
distribution of the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with 
its military forces, for use in war in the accomplishment of all or part of 
these national objectives* 

I can only surmise as to the military, political, and economic situation 
that would exist in the Atlantic should the British Empire collapse* Since 
Latin-America has rich natural resources, and is the only important area of 
the world not now under the practical control of strong military powers, we 
can not dismiss the possibility that, sooner or later, victorious Axis nations 
ni^ht move firmly in that direction* For some years they might remain too 
weak to attack directly across the seaj their effort more likely would first 
be devoted to developing Latin American economic dependence, combined with 
strongly reinforced internal political upheavals for the purpose of 
establishing friendly regimes in effective military control* The immediacy 
of danger to us may depend upon the security of the Axis military position 
in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the degree of our own military 
preoccupation in the Pacific, and the disturbing influence of unsatisfied 
economic .eeds of Latin-America* 

The present situation of the British Empire is not encouraging* I believe 
it easily possible, lacking active American military assistance, for that 
empire to lose this war and eventually be disrupted* 

It is my opinion that the British are over-optimistic as to their chances 
for ultimate success* It is not at all sure that the British Isles can hold 
out, and it may be that they do not realise the danger that will exist should 
they lose in other regions* 

Should Britain lose the war, the military consequences to the United 
States would be serious* 

If we are to prevent the disruption of the 3ritish Empire, we must support 
its vital needs* 

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Obviously, the British Isles, the "Heart of the Empire", mist remain 

But even if the British Isles are held* this does not mean that Britain 
can win the war* To win* she must finally be able to effect the complete* or* 
at least* the partial collapse of the Gorman Reich* 

This result might* conceivably* be accomplished by bombing and by 
economic starvation through the agency of the blockade* It surely can be 
accomplished only by military successes on shore* facilitated possibly by 
over-extension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests* 

Alone* the British Empire lacks the man power and the material means to 
master Germany* Assistance by powerful allies Is necessary both with respect 
to men and with respect to munitions and supplies* If such assistance is to 
function effectively* Britain must not only continue to maintain the blockade* 
but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful 
land action can later be launched* 

rovided England continues to sustain its present successful resistance 
at home* the area of next concern to the British Empire ought to be the 
Egyptian Theater* 

Should Kgypt be lost, the Eastern Mediterranean would be opened to 
Germany, and Italy, the effectiveness of the sea blockade would be largely 
nullified | Turkey's military position would be fully compromised! and all 
hope of favorable Bussian action would vanish* 

Any anti-German offensive in the Near East would then become impossible* 

The spot next in importance to Egypt, in my opinion, is Gibraltar, 
combined with /est and northwest Africa* From this area an ultimate 
offensive through Portugal, Spain and Prance, with the help of populations 
inimical to Germany, might give results equal to those which many years ago 
were produced by Wellington* The western gate to the Mediterranean would 
still be .cent closed, provided Britain holds this region* 

This brief discussion naturally brings into question the value to Britain 
of the Mediterranean relative to that of Hon?: Kong, Singapore and India* 
Were the Mediterranean lost, Britain's strength in the Far East could be 
augmented without weakening home territory* 

Japan probably wants the British out of Hong Kong and Singapore; and 
wants economic control, and ultimately military control, of Malaysia. 

It is v&ry questionable if Japan has territorial ambitions in Australia 
and New Zealand* 

But does she now wish the British out of India, thus exposing that region 
and Western China to early Russian penetration or islifluence? I doubt it* 

It would seem more probable that Japan, devoted to the Axis alliance only 
so far as her own Immediate interests are involved, would prefer not to move 

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military forces against Britain, and pr*sib3y not against the Netherlands 
East Indies , because , if she can obtain a high decree of economic control 
over Malaysia* she will then be in a position to Improve her financial 
structure by increased trade with Britain and America. Her economic offensive 
power will be increased. Her military dominance will follow rapidly or 
slowly, as seems best at the time. 

The Netherlands East Indies has 60,000,000 people, under the rule of 
80,000 Dutchmen, including women and children. This political situation can 
not be viewed as in permanent equilibrium. The rulers are unsupported by a 
home country or by an alliance. Native rebellions have occurred in the past, 
and may recur in the future. These Dutchmen will act in what they believe 
is their own selfish best interests. 

Will they alone resist aggression, or will they accept an accommodation 
with the Japanese? 

Will they resist, if supported only by the British Krapire? 

Will they firmly resist, if supported by the British Empire and the U. 

Will the British resist Japanese aggression directed only against the 

Netherlands 3ast Indies? 

Should both firmly resist, what local military assistance will they 
sBquire from the 'tatted States to ensure success? 

No light on these questions has been thrown by the report of the 
proceedings of the recent Singapore Conference. 

The basic character of a war against Japan by the British and Dutch would 
be the fixed defense of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and Java* The allied 
army, naval, and air forces now in position are considerable, and some 
future reenforcement may be expected from Australia and Hew Zealand. Borneo 
and the inlands to the Bast are vulnerable. There is little chance for an 
allied offensive. Without Dutch assistance, the external effectiveness of the 
British bases at Hong Kong and Singapore would soon disappear. 

The Japanese deployment in 'lanohukuo and China requires much of their 
Army, large supplies and merchant tonnage, and some naval force* It is 
doubtful if Japan will feel secure in withdrawing much strength 1'rom in front 
of Russia, regardless of non-aggression agreements. The winter lull in China 
will probably permit the withdrawal of the forces they need for a campaign 
against Malaysia. The availability of ample supplies for such a campaign is 

Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and efficient 
defense of Malaysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with all 
categories of military force to capture the entire . rea* The campaign mijht 
even last several months. Whether Japan would concurrently be able 
successfully to attack Kong Kong and the Philippines, and also strongly to 
support the fixed positions in the Mid-Pacific, seems doubtful. 

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Daring such a campaign, due to her wide dispersion of effort, Japan 
would, unquestionably be more vulnerable to attack by the United States (or 
by Russia) than she would be onoe Malaysia is in her possession. 

This brings us to a consideration of the strategy of an American war 
against Japan, that is, either the so-called "Orange Plan", or a modification. 
It must be understood that the orange Flan was drawn up to govern our opera- 
tions when the United States and Japan are at war, and no other nations are 

You have heard enough fc£ the Orange Plan to know that, in a nutshell, 
it envisages our Fleet 1 s proceeding westward throu# the Marshalls and the 
Carolines, consolidating as it goes, and then on to the recapture of the 
Philippines. Once there, the Orange Plan contemplates the eventual economic 
starvation of Japan, and, finally, the complete destruction of her external 
military power. Its accomplishment would require several years, and the 
absorption of the full military, naval, and economic energy of the American 

In proceedine through these Xle> Pacific islands, we have several sub- 
sidiary objectives in mind. First, we hope that our attack will induce the 
Japanese to expose their fleet in action against our fleet, and lead to their 
naval defeat. Second, we wish to destroy the ability of the Japanese to use 
these positions as air and submarine bases from which to project attacks on 
our lines of communication to the mainland and Hawaii. Third, we would use 
the captured positions for supporting our further advance westward. 

Most of the island positions are atolls* These atolls, devoid of natural 
sources of water other than rainfall, and devoid of all supplies, are merely 
narrow coral and sand fringes around large shallow areas where vessels may 
anchor. Alone, they are undefendable against serious attack, either by one 
side or the other. They do, however, afford weak positions for basins 
submarines and seaplanes. Our Fleet should have no difficulty in capturing 
atolls, provided we have enough troops, but we could not hold them 
indefinitely unless the Jleet were nearh • 

We know little about the Japanese defenses in the Mid- Pacific. We 
believe the real islands of Truk and Ponape in the Carolines are defended with 
guns and troops, and we believe that some of the atolls of the Marshalls may 
be equipped as submarine and air bases, and be garrisoned with relatively 
small detachments of troops. 

The Marshalls contain no sites suitable for bases in the absence of the 
Fleet, though there are numerous good anchorages. With the Fleet at hand, 
they can be developed for use as seaplane and submarine bases for the support 
of an attack on real islands such as onape and Truk. ■ ith the Fleet 
permanently absent, they will succumb to any serious thrust. 

Our first real Marshall-Caroline objective is Truk, a magnificant 
harbor, relatively easily defended against raids, &ai capable of conversion 
into an admirable advanced base. When we get this far in the accompl*ahment 
of the "Orange Plan", we have the site for a base where we can begin to 

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assemble our ships , stores, and troops, for farther advance toward the 

illppines* It would also become the center of the defense system for the 
lines of communications against flank attack from Japan. 

Getting to Truk involves a strong effort* We would incur losses from 
aircraft, mines and submarines, particularly as the latter could be spared 
the operations in Malaysia, ^ie would lose many troops in assaulting the 

doing beyond Truk initiates the most difficult part of the Orange Flan, 
would take a Ion? time, and would require the maximum effort which the United 
States could sustain* 

Truk is not looked upon as a satisfactory final geographical objective* 
It is too far away to support useful operations in the China Sea* It can not 
be held in the absence of fairly continuous Fleet support* >o matter what 
rains are made in the Old- 'acifle, they would undoubtedly be lost were the 
Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic* We would have then to choose between 
a lengthy evacuation process, and a major loss of men, material and prestige* 

In advancing to the capture of Ponape and Truk, the Orange flan con- 
templates proceeding promptly, delaying in the Marshalls only lonj enou^i to 
destroy Japanese shore bases, to capture the atolls necessary to support the 
advance and to deny future bases to Japan* 

We have little knowledge as to the present defensive strength of the 
Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a whole* If they are well 
defended, to capture them we estimate initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly 
trained troops, with another $0,000 in immediate reserve* If they are not 
well defended, an early advance with fewer troops might be YQry profitable* 
Several months must elapse from the present date before 75#0O0 troops could 
be made ready, considering the defense requirements of Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Samoa, and our commitments with respect to the internal political stability 
of the Latln-Amerioan countries* 

We should consider carefully the chances of failure as well as of success* 
An immediate success would be most important morally, while a failure would be 
oostly from the moral viewpoint* Before invading Uorway, Germany trained for 
three months the veterans of the Polish campaign, Itemerabering Norway, we have 
the example of two methods of overseas adventure* One is the British method; 
the other is the German method* 

The question of jumping directly from Hawaii to the iMU|)plnes hao often 
been debated, but, so far as I know, this plan has always been ruled out by 
responsible authorities as unsound from a military viewpoint* Truk is 1900 
miles from Yokohama, 5300 miles from San Francisco, 3200 from Honolulu, and 
2000 miles from %nila* I mention this to compare the logistic problem with 
that of the Norway incident* An enormous amount of shipping would be required. 
Its availability under present world conditions would be doubtful. 

Of course the foregoing, (the Orange Plan) , is a major commitment in the 
aeific, and does not envisage the cooperation of allies* Once started the 

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abandonment of the offensive required by the plan, to meet a threat in the 
Atlantic, would involve abandoning the objectives of the war, and also great 
loss of prestige* 

A totally different situation would exist were the Philippines and Guam 
rendered secure against attack by adequate troops, aircraft, and fortifica- 
tions* The movement of the fleet across the Pacific for the purpose ot 
applying direct pressure upon Japan, and its support when in position, would 
be less difficult than in the existing situation* 

Should we adopt the present Orange Plan today, or any modification of 
that plan which involves the movement of very strong naval and army 
contingents to the Far East, we would have to accept considerable danger in 
the Atlantic, and would probably be unable to augment our material assistance 
to Great Britain* 

We should, therefore, examine other plans which involve a war having a 
more limited objective than the complete defeat of Japan, and in which we 
would undertake hostilities only in cooperation with the British and Dutch, 
and in which these undertake to provide an effective and continued resistance 
in Malaysia* 

Our involvement in war in the Pacific might well make us also an ally of 
Britain in the Atlantic. The naval forces remaining in the Atlantic, for 
help ng our ally and for defending ourselves, would, by just so much, reduce 
the power which the United States Fleet could put forth in the Pacific* 

The objective in a limited war against Japan would be the reduction of 
Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade* Under one 
concept, allied strategy would comprise holding the ^alay Barrier, denying 
access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of 
communication with the Astern Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the 
'*id- Pacific, the hilippin%, China, and Indo-China* United States defensive 
strategy would also require army reenforcement of Alaska and the Hawaiian 
Islands, the establishment of naval bases in the Fiji, Samoan and Gilbert 
Islands areas, and denial to Japan of the use of the Marshalls as liiht 
force bases* V'e might be able to re-enforce the 'hiliapine garrison, 
particularly with aircraft* I do not believe that the British and IXitch 
alone could hold ?folay 3arrier without direct military assistance by the 
United States* In addition to help from our Asiatic Fleet, X am convinced 
that they would need further reenforcement by ships and aircraft drawn fro» 
our KLeet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops* 

Besides military aid for the allied defense forces, our intervention 
would brin,* them a tremendous moral stimulus* 

An alternative concept of the suggested limited war would provide 
additional support from the main body of the Fleet either by capturing the 
Harebells, or by capturing both the Marshall* and Carolines* This, or a 
similar fleet activity, would be for the purpose of diverting away from 
Malaysia important Japanese forces to oppose it, and thus reducing the 
strength of their assault against the Dutch and British* 

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But we should consider the prospect that the losses which we would incur 
in such operations wight not be fruitful of compensating results. Furthermore, 
withdrawal of the Fleet from captured positions for transfer to the Atlantic 
would be more difficult* 

It is out of the question to consider sending our entire Jleet at 
to Singapore. Base facilities are far too limited, the supply problem would 
be v9ry great, and Hawaii, Alaska, and our coasts would be greatly exposed to 

One point to remember, in connection with a decision to adept a limited 
offensive role, as in both of the alternative plans just mentioned, is that, 
in case of reverses, public opinion may require a stronger effort. For 
example, should Japanese success in the Far "ast seem Imminent, there would 
be great pressure brought to bear to support our force there, instead of 
leaving it hanging in the air* Thus, what we might originally plan as a 
limited war with Japan might well become an unlimited war; our entire 
strength would then be required in the Far East, and little force would remain 
for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support of the British Isles* 

Let us now look eastward, and examine our possible action in the Atlantic. 

In the first place, if we avoid serious eomitment in the Pacific, the 
purely American Atlantic problem, envisaging defense of our coasts, the 
Caribbean, Canada, and South America, plus giving strong naval assistance to 
Britain, is not difficult so long as the British are able to maintain their 
present naval activity. Should the British Isles then fall we would find 
ourselves acting alone, and at war with the world. To repeat, we would be 
thrown back on our haunches* 

Should we enter the war as an ally of Great Britain, and not then be at 
war with Japan, we envisage the British asking us for widespread naval 
assistance* Roughly, they would want us, in the Western Atlantic Ocean from 
Cape Sable to Cape Horn, to protect shipping against raiders and submarine 
activities* They would also need strong reenforcements for their escort and 
mlneaweeping forces in their home waters; and strong flying boat reconnaissance 
from Scotland, the Atlantic Islands, and Capetown* l y w might ask us to 
capture the Asores and the Cape Verde Islands* 

To their home waters they would have us send submarines and small craft, 
and to the Mediterranean assistance of any character which we may be able to 
provide* They would expect us to take charge of allied interests in the 
acifio, and to send a naval detachment to Singapore* 

This purely naval assistance, would not, in my opinion, assure final 
victory for Oreat Britain* Victory would probably depend upon her ability 
ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers* For making a 
successful land offensive, British man power is insufficient. Offensive 
troops from other nations will be required* I believe that the United States, 
in addition to sending naval assistance, would also m&d to send large air 
and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to artieipate strongly in 
this land offensive* The naval task of transporting an army abroad would be 

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To carry out such tasks we would have to exert a major naval and 
railitary effort in the Atlantic. Wo would than be able to do little more in 
the Pacific than remain on a strict defensive. 

Were we to enter the war against Germany and Italy as an ally of Great 
Britain, I do not necessarily anticipate imsedi&te hostile action by Japan* 
whatever may be her Axis obligation* She may fear eventual consequences and 
do nothing* we might be faced with demands for concessions as the price of 
her neutrality* She might agree to defer her aggressions in the Netherlands 
East Indies for the time being by a guarantee of ample economic access to the 
Western Hemisphere and to British and Dutch possessions* But she mi^ht even 
demand complete cessation of British and American assistance to China* 

The strong wish of the American government and people at present seems 
to be to remain at peace* In spite of this, we must face the possibility 
that we may at any moment become involved in war* With war in prospect, I 
believe our every effort should be directed toward the prosecution of a 
national policy with mutually supporting diplomatic and' military aspects * 
and having as its guiding feature a determination that any intervention we 
may undertake shall be such as will ultimately best promote our own national 
interests* We should see the best answer to the question? wwhere should we 
fight the' war, and for what objective?* With the answer to this question to 
guide me, I can make a more logical plan, can more appropriately distribute 
the naval forces, can ':. itter coordinate the future material preparation of 
the Navy, and can more usefully advise as to whether or not proposed 
diplomatic measures can adequately be supported by available naval strength* 

That is to say, until the question concerning our final railitary 
objective is authoritatively answered, I can not determine the scale and the 
nature of the effort which the Havy may be called upon to exert in the Far 
?ast, the Pacific, and the Atlantic* 

It is a fundamental requirement of our military position that our home- 
land remain secure against successful a&taek. Directly concerned in this 
security is the safety of other parts of the Western Hemisphere* A very 
strong pillar of the defense structure of the Americas has, for many years, 
been the balance of power existing in Europe* The ccl lapse of Great Britain 
or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy this 
balance and will free Kuropean military power for possible encroachment in 
this hemisphere* 

I believe that we should recognise as the foundation of adequate armed 
strength the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw materials 
and in finished goods* without such a trade, our economy can scarcely 
support heavy armaments* The restoration of foreign trade, particularly with 
Europe, may depend upon the oontinued integrity of the British ^Smpire* 

It may be possible for us te prevent a British collapse by military 

Our interests in the Far FAst are very important* The economic effect 
of a complete Japanese hegemony in that region is conjectural* But regardless 
of economic considerations, we have heretofore strongly opposed the further 

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expannion of Japan* 

We might temporarily check Japanese expansion by defeating her In a war 
In the Far Seat, but to check her permanently would require that ve retain 
possession of, and militarily develop* an extensive and strategically 
located Asiatic base area having reasonably secure lines of communication 
with the United States. Retaining, and adequately developing, an Asiatic base 
area would mean the reversal of longstanding American policy* 

Whether we could ensure the continued existence of a strong British 
Empire by soundly defeating Japan in the Jar Sast is questionable, though 
continuing to hold on there for the present is a definite contribution to 
3ritish strenjjth* 

Lacking possession of an Asiatic base area of our ,, own, continued British 
strength in the Far East would doubtless prove advantageous to us in checking 
Japan permanently* 

The military matters diseased in tills memorandum nay property receive 
consideration In arriving at a decision on the course that we should adopt 
in the diplomatic field* An early decision in this field will facilitate 
a naval preparation which will best promote the adopted course* As I see 
affairs today } answers to the following broad questions will be most useful 
to the Navy* 

(A) Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere 
defense, and include chiefly those activities within the Western hemisphere 
which contribute directly to security against attack In either or both oceans? 
An affirmative answer would indicate that the United States, as seems now 
to be the hope of this country, would remain out of war unless pushed into 
it» If and when forced into war, the greater psrtion of our Fleet could 
remain for the time being in its threatening position in the Pacific, but 
no major effort would be exerted overseas either to the east or the west) the 
most that would be done for allies, besides providing material help, would 
be to send detachments to assist in their defense* It should be noted here 
that, were minor help to be given in one direction, public opinion might 
soon push us into giving it major support, as was the* *?ass in the World War* 

Under this plan, our influence upon the outcome of the European War would 
be small* 

J Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on 
assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far Sast, and remaf i on 
the strict defensive In the Atlantic? If this course is selected, we would 
be placing full trust in the British to hold their own indefinitely in the 
Atlantic, or, at least, until after we should have defeated Japan decisively, 
and thus had fully curbed her offensive power Tor the time being* Plans for 
augmenting the scale of our present material assistance to Oreat Britain would 
be adversely affected until Japan had b&en decisively defeated. The length 
of time required to defeat Japan would be very considerable* 

If we enter the war against Japan and then if Great Britain loses, we 

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probably would in any case havo to reorient towards the Atlantic* ihere is 
no dissenting view on this point* 

(C) Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance 
both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch and Chinese in the 
Far East? The naval and air detachments we would send to the British isles 
would possibly ensure their continued resistance, but would not increase 
British power to conduct a land offenslYe* The strength we could send to the 
Far ";act might be enough to check the southward spread of Japanese rule for 
the duration of the war* The strength of naval forces remaining in Hawaii 
for the defense of the Eastern Pacific, and the strength of the forces in 
the Western Atlantic for the defense of that area, would be reduced to that 
barely sufficient for executing their tasks. Should Great Britain finally 
lose, or should Malaysia fall to Japan, our naval strength might thev be 
found to have h&«n seriously reduced, relative to that of the Axis powers* 
It should be understood that, under this plan, we would be operating under 
the handicap of fighting major wars on two fronts* 

Should we adopt Plan (C), we must face the consequences that would 
ensue were we to start a war with one plan, and then, after becoming heavily 
enganod, be forced greatly to modify it or discard it altogether, as, for 
example, in case of a British fold up* On neither of these distant fronts 
would it be possible to execute a really major offensive* Strategically, the 
situation might become disastrous should our effort on either front fail* 

(0) Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual stroa* offensive in 
the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific? Any 
strength that we might send to the Far East would, by just so much, reduce 
the force of our blows against Germany and Italy. About the least that we 
would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light forces and aircraft 
to Qreat Britain and the Mediterranean* Probably we could not stop with a 
purely naval effort* The plan might ultimately require capture of the 
Portuguese and Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and 
possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full scale land 
offensive* In consideration of a course that would require landing larga 
numbers of troops abroad, account must be taken of the possible unwillingness 
of the people of the United States to support land operations of this 
character, and to incur the risk of heavy loss should Great Britain collapse* 
Under Plan (D) we would be unable to exert strong pressure against Japan, and 
would necessarily gradually reorient our policy in the Far Bast* The full 
national offensive strength would be exerted in a single direction, rather 
than be extended in areas far distant from each other* At the conclusion 
of the war, even if Britain should finally collapse, we might still find 
ourselves possessed of bases in Africa suitable for assisting in the defense 
of South America* 

Under any of these plans, we must recognize the possibility of the 
involvement of France as an ally of Germany* 

I believe that the continued existence of the British Itapire, combined 
with building up a strong protection in our home areas, will do most to ensure 

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the status quo in the Western Hemisphere, and to promote our principal 
national interests* As X have previously stated* I also believe that Great 
Britain requires from us very great help in the Atlantic* and possibly even 
on the continents of surope or Africa* if she is to be enabled to survive* 
In my opinion Alternatives (A) * (3) • and (C) will most probably not provide 
the necessary degree of assistance* and* therefore* if we undertake war* 
that Alternative (D) is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States* 
particularly if we enter the war at an early date* Initially* the offensive 
measures adopted would* necessarily* be purely naval* Even should we 
intervene* final victory in Europe is not certain. I believe that the 
chances for success are in our favor* particularly if we insist upon full 
equality in the political and military direction of the war* 

The odds seem against our being able under Plan (D) to check Japanese 
expansion unless we win the war in Europe* we might not long retain 
possession of the hilippines* Our political and military influence in the 
Far East minht largely disappear* so Ions as we were fully engaged in the 
Atlantic* A preliminary to a war in this category would be a positive effort 
to avoid war with Japan* and to endeavor to prevent war between Japan and the 
British Stop ire and the Netherlands East Indies* The possible cost of 
avoiding a war with Japan has been referred to previously* 

I would add that Plan (D) does not mean the immediate movement of the 
Fleet into the Atlantic* I would make no further moves until war should 
become imminent* and then I would recommend redistribution of our naval forces 
as the situation then demanded* I fully recognize the value of retaining 
strong forces in the Pacific as long as they can profitably be kept there* 

Until such time as the United States should decide to engage its full 
forces in war* I recommend that we pursue a course that will most rapidly 
increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy, that is to say, 
adopt alternative (A) without hostilities* 

Under any decision that the President may tentatively make* we should at 
once prepare a complete Joint Plan for guiding Army and Navy activities* r *to 
should also prepare at least the skeletons of alternative plans %$ fit 
possible alternative situations which may eventuate* Z aake the specific 
recommendation that* should we be forced into a war with Japan* we should, 
because of the prospect of war in the Atlantic also* definitely plan to avoid 
operations in the iter East or the Mid-Pacific that will prevent the Navy from 
promptly moving to .he Atlantic forces fully adequate to safeguard our 
interests and policies in the event of a British collapse* We ou^ht not now 
willingly engage in any war against Japan unless vq are certain of aid from 
Oreat Britain and the Jethsrlands Sast Indies* 

So important allied military deeision should be reached without clear 
understanding between the nations involved as to the strength and extent of 
the participation which may be expected in any particular theater* and as to 
a proposed skeleton ->lan of operations* 


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Aco rdingly, I <»ke the recommendation that, as a preliminary to 
possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States 
Army and Mavy at once undertake secret staff talks on technical matters with 
the British military and naval authorities in London, with Canadian military 
authorities in Washington, and with British and Dutoh authorities in 
Singapore and Batavia* The purpose would be to reach agreements and lay down 
plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it 
necessary to enter the war under any of the alternative eventualities 
considered in this memorandum. 

H*R* Stark 

oJuCfa** *u* otfiti mitrt ***** «w ^« 



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American- rltish- Conversations 
Amer xc an- Uitch-bri tish 

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet 
Commander in Chief, United states Fleet 
Chief of Maval Operations 
Commander iangtze River 'atrol 
Chief of Staff 
Joint doard 

Joint Planning Committee 
National Archives 
Naval History Division 
Rear Admiral 
Secretary of the Navy- 
Senior "aval officer 
Special ttaval Ooserver 
War ?lans Division 


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Primary Sources of Original Material 

Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Depart- 
ment; Washington, D.C.. 

Naval Records Branch, National Archives; Washington, D.G.. 

State Department Records, National Archives; Washington, D.C.. 

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President Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorial Library; Hyde Park, New Tork. 
Naval War College Library, Newport, Rhode Island. 

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D.C., 19U3. 2 vols. 

Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack , Seventy-ninth Congress, United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., 19U6. 39 vols. 

Navy Regulations 1920 , Navy Department, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1920. 

Oil in Japan's War , Report of the Oil and Chemical Division, United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey, Washington, D.C., 19U6V 

United States Navy . Senate Document 3$, Seventy-fifth Congress, first session. 
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%water, lector C. Sea-'ower in the acific . Boston: Houston Mifflin Co., 

Churchill, Winatea B«» Their Finest I our . Boston: Houghton Hifilin Co., 

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Feia, Herbert. The Hpad to Pearl ..arbor , rineeton: Princeton University 
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Furer, Rear Admiral Julius Augustus* AdaJUala^ratlga g£ B&J8fiBLiS fi££ 

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York: Karper and brothers, 19: . 

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Little, .irown and Company, ll:??. 

, The Proolem of Asia. Boston: Little, irown and Corcpany, 1900. 

, From Sail to Steamt Recollections of IJaval ..ife . tfav iork and 
London: harper and Brothers, 1^07. 

■ The interest of America In International Conditions * Boston: 
Little, Brown and Corapany, 19i0. 

t#o0 -friT bW ,XJiitotiaO 

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•JR^I «\pnA «tt lo 4n*tt*uq«C % x»att2H x^*tiIiH 1© leirfO 

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— SS .gggl ,x^H «k * *flt**iaq<iG tflo^nlUMK .IIj 

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Katloff , Maurice and Sdwin M* Snell* trategic Planning for ition War- 
f are, 19UJ-19U2 . In the series S'nitS cT St ates A rssy in wiaK E jsKFTn 
..ashir; ;ton: Qifice of the Chief ox Military History, Jepartmant of the 
Army, 1953* 

May, Srnest IV* The World War and A merican Isol ati on, 19 l U-193,7 » Cambridge. 
Harvard University Prase, I9b>9* 

Mitchell, Donald d*. history of the Modern American Kavy * Uw Xorks Alfred 
A* Knopf , 19i*6* 

Morieon, KLti , .. Admiral si ?,; xi. tr.:: Modern .*aeriean Mnvy. Sastons 
IJoughton Mifflin Company, 191*2 # 

?ison, Samuel Mliot. The dattie of the A tlantac, -September 1939-Mlay 19U3 * 
os ton t Little, arown and Cqiipar^, 191*7* (Volume I of History of Inited 
States Naval derations in »*orld War II*) 

* The Kiaing Sun in the Pacific, 1931-Aprii 191*2 * Sostont Little, 
3rown and Company, 191*d* (Volume III of History of -JnTted Mtafres ?iaval 
Operations in World War II ,) 

:orton, ijouis* The frail of the -Mlippines . In the series United States 

Army in "orld War 11 * Washington t Office of the °hief of Military -istory, 
- apartment of the Army, 19S3* 

Sprout, Harold and Margaret, The liiae of American Kaval ower, 177fr-191d * 
rincetom Princeton Mniversity toss, 191*6* 

* Toward a New Order ox sea Powers American Naval Policy and the 
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